

José Alejandro Coronado Arciniegas

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Education

- Spring 2019 **PhD Candidate, Economics**, *New School for Social Research*, New York, NY
(Expected) Dissertation Title: Essays on Information Theory and its Applications to Economic Analysis
Comprehensive Exams: Microeconomics, Political Economy
Committee members: Duncan Foley, Mark Setterfield, Paulo dos Santos, Venkat Venkatasubramanian
- 2016 **MA, Economics**, *New School for Social Research*, New York, NY
- 2014 **BA, Economics**, *Universidad de los Andes*, Bogotá, Colombia

Dissertation Abstract

My dissertation consists of three essays that examine the implications of introducing the principle of maximum entropy to analyze particular problems in economics. The first essay introduces the principle of maximum entropy to derive a model of bounded rationality to characterize the empirical distributions obtained from ultimatum bargaining game experiments. The essay advances the claim that the informative constraints can be used to test behavioral hypothesis underlying agent decision making. I show that empirical evidence suggests that subjects playing the ultimatum game are motivated by fairness. The second essay develops a game theoretic model of Adam Smith's "early and rude state" of specialized producers. I conclude that in the absence of information constraints the economy arrives at full employment. However, introducing informational constraints leads to a statistical equilibrium in which agents produce below full employment. The final essay explores the problem of aggregation and welfare in a partial equilibrium setting with information constraints. We are able to conclude that the statistical equilibrium implies non-pareto optimal allocations are observed with some probability, and that the resulting distribution of total quantities demanded can not come from a representative agent even when wealth effects are negligible.

Research Interests

- Complex Systems
- Political Economy
- Game Theory
- History of Economic Thought

Teaching Competencies

- Microeconomics
- Econometrics
- History of Economic Thought
- Advanced Math Methods
- Political Economy

Scholarships, Awards and Grants

2018-2019	Dissertation Fellowship	<i>The New School</i>
2015-2019	Provost's Scholarship	<i>The New School</i>
2014-2015	Dean's Scholarship	<i>The New School</i>

Works in progress

Working Papers

- 2018 Coronado, José Alejandro (2018), 'An Information-Constrained Model for Ultimatum Bargaining', *New School for Social Research, Department of Economics*, WP 1815.

Papers in Progress and Potential Publication Outlets

Coronado, José Alejandro and Foley, Duncan, 'Aggregate demand in a classical hub-and-spoke production model', Potential publication outlets: *Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization*, *Entropy*, *Cambridge Journal of Economics*.

Shaikh, Anwar and Coronado, José Alejandro, 'On the statistical regularities of prices of production', Potential publication outlets: *Cambridge Journal of Economics*, *Metroeconomica*.

Teaching Experience

- 2018 **Adjunct Professor**, *John Jay College for Criminal Justice*, New York, NY
- Introduction to Economics and Global Capitalism (Fall 2018)
 - Understanding U.S. Economy Data (Spring 2018)
- 2015, 2017, 2018 **Teaching Assistant**, *The New School for Social Research*, New York, NY
- Historical Foundations of Political Economy (Professor: Paulo dos Santos)
- Fall 2017 **Teaching Assistant**, *Barnard College, Columbia University*, New York, NY
- Theoretical Foundations of Political Economy (Professor: Belinda Archibong)
- Spring 2016 **Teaching Assistant**, *Eugene Lang College The New School for Liberal Arts*, New York, NY
- Introduction to Political Economy (Professor: Clara Mattei)
- Fall 2016 **Teaching Assistant**, *Milano School for International Affairs*, New York, NY
- Economics for International Affairs (Professor: Sheba Tejani)

Research and Professional Experience

- 2015-2017 **Research Assistant**, *New School for Social Research*, Economics Department, New York, NY
- Researched focused on characterizing the empirical distribution of eigenvalue modulus for the U.S. Input-Output data base using Bayesian methods. Principal Investigator: Professor Anwar Shaikh

Selected Presentations

Conference Presentations

- 2018 **NSSR-UMASS Graduate Student Workshop**, November, New York, NY
"A Maximum Entropy Model of Ultimatum Bargaining", Income Distribution Panel
- 2017 **Festival for New Economic Thinking**, Edinburgh, Scotland
"Maxwellian Demons and the Competitive Process: a HMM Approach to Changes in Information in the Competitive Economy", Complexity Economics Panel

Additional Training

Summer Schools & Workshops

- 2018 **CORE USA Workshop, Barnard College**, New York, New York
- 2017 **Complex Systems Summer School, Santa Fe Institute**, Santa Fe, New Mexico

Committee, Service, and Community Experience

- 2016-2017 **Executive Editor**, *The New School Economic Review*, The New School
- 2015-2016 **Associate Editor**, *The New School Economic Review*, The New School
- 2016 **Elected Representative**, *Economics Student Union*, The New School

Computer Skills

- Advanced R, Mathematica, \LaTeX
- Intermediate STATA, MATLAB, Excel

Languages

- Spanish Native
- English Bilingual

Professional References

Duncan K. Foley

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Paulo dos Santos

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