

Legacies of the Past and Democratic Transition: Formation and Programmatic  
Crystallization of Political Parties in Poland, Russia, and Spain

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### Transition to democracy and programmatic crystallization of political parties

Studying the change from an authoritarian or totalitarian regime to a democracy most of the scholars make a distinction between the processes of transition to and consolidation of the new regime<sup>1</sup>. In the process of transition, the basic rules of the game are established, both within the political class and society at large. These rules concern among others the limits of state power, the means of access of both politicians and society to that power, and the modalities for the exercise of such power.

There are different ways how to measure the end of the transition period – for instance, it is possible to say that the period of democratic transition in a given country is concluded by one of such events as the sanctioning of the new constitution; the first free elections or the first successfully complete term of the work of new parliament, elected on the base of the democratic competition among political parties.

Nevertheless, the process of transition should be distinguished from that of consolidation of the new regime, at the end of which there is a widespread expectation that the regime is going to stay, and its basic rules will be respected, since there is no credible threat to its existence.

There is a discussion among scholars about the role of political parties in the democratic transition; however, establishing a competitive multi-party system seems to be the

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<sup>1</sup> See O'Donnell, Guillermo; Schmitter, Philippe C., *Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Tentative Conclusions about Uncertain Democracies*. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986; Huntington, Samuel P., *The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century*. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991; Linz, Juan J.; Stepan, Alfred, *Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern Europe, South America, and Post-Communist Europe*. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996.

inevitable part of that process<sup>2</sup>. Following this, the consolidation of the new regime is also reflected by the structuring and stabilization of the party system.

In this paper I am going to concentrate on the influence of the legacies of the past on the process of formation and programmatic crystallization of individual parties under the democratic transition. I am going to use the Herbert Kitschelt's definition of "programmatic crystallization"<sup>3</sup>, based on the distinction between three main types of party-voter linkages, which are most likely to emerge in the new democracies.

According to him, it is possible to distinguish three main key-considerations underlying the voters' choice of a new party:

1. Sympathy with the personality of a party's candidates;
2. Expected personal and selective advantages derived from the victory of a party;
3. The production of indirect advantages in the form of collective goods if the party of choice wins the election.

These types of party-voter linkages correspond with three types of party organizations: charismatic, clientelistic and the programmatic ones.

Charismatic parties avoid high costs of organization and political consensus building because they involve not much more than an unstructured mass of people rallying around a leader. Clientelistic parties make high investments in organizational structure and have to provide a constant flow of resources to their following. Both types are prevailing in the new democracies – mostly because they are dealing with uneducated and unsophisticated voters, who lack an active civic orientation.

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<sup>2</sup> See Bermeo, Nancy, Rethinking Regime Change. In: *Comparative Politics*, Vol. 22, No. 3, 1990; Lipset, Seymour Martin, "The Social Requisites of Democracy Revisited." In: *American Sociological Review*, Vol. 59, No. 1, 1994.

<sup>3</sup> Kitschelt, Herbert, "The Formation of Party Cleavages in Post-Communist Democracies." In: *Party Politics*, Vol. 1, No. 4, 1995. See also Kitschelt, Herbert; Mansfeldova, Zdenka; Markowski, Radoslaw; Toka, Gabor, *Post-Communist Party Systems; Competition, Representation and Inter-Party Cooperation*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999.

Such situation could be explained by the concept of a “civilizational incompetence”, presented by Piotr Sztompka as a part of “tabula rasa” hypothesis<sup>4</sup>. The “tabula rasa” theorists deal with post-communist transitions and claim that communist societies have left behind relatively homogeneous, “atomized”, egalitarian social structures that prevent social actors from formulating individual and collective economic and political interests.

However, the formulation and articulation of such interests is necessary for the program-based parties, which attempt to build an organizational structure basing on the advertisement of their ideas about a desirable society as the collective good they promise to produce and on the attraction of the activists and leaders ready to propagate and to implement these ideas. On the party level programmatic structuring occurs when the party takes programmatic appeal as the basis of political competition, concentrating its message to the voters on a certain policy issues that serve voters as signals conveying the party’s broader programmatic principles.

Although programmatic parties are harder to build than charismatic or clientelistic parties, they are more likely to reinforce the consolidation and stability of democratic regimes – and we can also assume that the development of programmatic parties is one of the symptoms that reflect the successful character of democratic consolidation.

#### Party cleavages and legacies of the past

Most of the scholars of West European party systems have assumed that different political programs, articulated by political parties in the process of electoral competition, are typically organized around societal cleavages, anchored in the social-structural group differences. Seymour Martin Lipset and Stein Rokkan in their fundamental study on cleavage structures, party systems and voter alignments, claimed that the pathways of modern state and industrial development created four cleavages – center/periphery, religious/secular, urban/rural, and capital/labour – which have crystallized among

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<sup>4</sup> Sztompka, Piotr, Dilemmas of the Great Transition. In: Sisyphus, Social Studies, Vol. 2, 1992.

Western European parties<sup>5</sup>. The processes of crystallization of party cleavages presented by programmatic alternatives in West European party systems was gradual and took place over extended periods of time<sup>6</sup>.

As it was claimed above, in new democracies, parties seem to lack the societal and political anchors that would permit programmatic structuring. Parties are the newcomers on the political stage; they have no appreciable reputation that gives voters the possibility of choice among programmatic alternatives in an intelligent fashion. It is possible to assume, therefore, that in new democracies that emerged after the long period of the non-democratic rule, divisions between parties rather will not repeat the configuration of cleavages, presented in West European party systems. The question is what determines the divisions between political parties at the beginning of the democratic transition process?

My hypothesis is that the division line goes along the paths of political conflict that are rooted in the immediate past of the country. In other words, competitive divides between parties at the initial phase of democratic transition are influenced by the extent and nature of the legacies of the power relations emerged under the pre-democratic rule. To avoid misunderstanding, starting from now, I am going to use the term “regime legacies” instead of the “legacies of the past” – since the latter includes also historical antecedents

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<sup>5</sup> Lipset, Seymour Martin; Rokkan, Stein, *Cleavage Structures, Party Systems, and Voter Alignments. An Introduction*. In: Lipset, Seymour Martin; Rokkan, Stein (eds.), *Party Systems and Voter Alignments; Cross-National Perspectives*. New York: Free Press, 1967.

<sup>6</sup> See Daalder, Hans, *Parties, Elites and Political Development in Western Europe*. In: LaPalombara, Joseph; Weiner, Myron (eds.) *Political Parties and Political Development*, Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1966; Beyme, Klaus Von, *Political Parties in Western Democracies*, New York: St. Martin Press, 1985; Budge, Ian; Robertson, David; Hearl, Derek, *Ideology, Strategy, and Party Change: Spatial Analysis of Post-War Elections: Programs in 19 Democracies*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987; Panebianco, Angelo, *Political Parties: Organization and Power*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988; Daalder, Hans, *Parties, Elites and Political Development in Western Europe*. In: LaPalombara, Joseph; Weiner, Myron (eds.) *Political Parties and Political Development*. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1966;

of the non-democratic regime, and could be characterized by such indicators as: the nature and lasting of the previous democratic experiences of the country; the nature and extent of the economic development of the country (including the nature of industrialization and urbanization processes); the nature and timing of the formation of modern political parties in the late nineteenth – early twentieth centuries, etc.

Although these “historical legacies” inevitably affect the nature of the non-democratic regime in the given country and also leave their mark on the conditions that shape newly emerged democracy, I am going to concentrate on the legacies of the recent past – paying special attention to the character of the power relations between the regime and its opponents. It is my hypothesis that in new democracies the legacy of these relations is reflected by the division between parties – successors of regime ruling elite<sup>7</sup>, and parties – inheritors of the anti-regime opposition.

To explain the mechanism of the influence of regime legacies on the configuration of divides between new political parties, I would like to use the scheme taken from the theory of mass communication, more specifically – from the theory of the formation of public opinion. It has to be mentioned that the democratic system itself defines a number of issues on which citizens are under pressure to form opinions – for instance, they are called upon to decide among various candidates on parliamentary elections.

Using traditional scheme of mass communication process (sender-message-receiver) it is possible to find that in the formation of voters’ preferences, voters play the role of the “receiver” of necessary information about parties’ positions on current issues and events, and the party elites play the role of “sender” of such information. Parties construct certain “signaling system”, providing voters by the opportunity to learn about particular party's

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<sup>7</sup> It is necessary to point out that talking about “parties – successors of regime ruling elite” I mean broader range of organizations, than merely “successors of ruling monopolistic parties” (for analysis of post-communist parties see Ishiyama, John T., *Communist Parties in Transition. Structures, Leaders, and Processes of Democratization in Eastern Europe*. In: *Comparative Politics*, Vol. 27, No. 2, 1995): in cases of Poland and Russia, for instance, this category includes agrarian parties.

orientation through various verbal and non-verbal signals (public speeches, programmatic documents, declarations, visual symbols, party candidates' biographies, models and types of electoral campaign, etc.).

However, people do not produce opinions spontaneously: this is result of the complicated multistage process. Most of the scholars, in order to define some fundamental underlying generalization, provide the term «attitude» – individual's orientation towards particular object that is manifested by expressing the opinion. Scholars often distinguish two main sets of factors affecting individual's attitude to each particular issue – John Zaller defines them as «predisposition», which motivates some conclusion about a given issue, and «information», which helps to form a mental picture of it<sup>8</sup>.

As a rule, there is a strong dependence between these two influences. First is perceived as a complex of cultural, social and psychological factors, such as interests, orientations, beliefs, moral principles, convictions, sentiments, cultural codes and archetypes, myths, stereotypes, prejudices, superstitions, fads and fashions, etc. Although such a “predisposition” seems to be highly vague and complicated phenomena, Zaller claims that it could be indicated by personal system of values and ideological orientation (which is quite close to the notion of “political culture”).

Some scholars characterize the “predisposition” as mainly emotional and non-rational tendencies which only being confronted to current information about an event or an issue of a special interest converts into opinions followed by conscious and rational activities<sup>9</sup>. According to this concept, attitude to each particular issue or event is somehow latent and

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<sup>8</sup> Zaller, John R., The Nature and Origins of Mass Opinion. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992. See also Griffin, Robert; Glaser, James, M.; Sniderman, Paul M., Information and Electoral Choice. In: Ferejohn, John A.; Kuklinski, James H. (eds.) Information and Democratic Processes. Urbana and Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1990.

<sup>9</sup> See Zaller, John R., Op. Cit.; Hyman, Herbert, Political Socialization. A Study in the Psychology of Political Behavior. New York: Free Press, 1959; Krassa, Michael, The Structure of Interaction and the Transmission of Political Influence and Information. In:

could be activated, modified and strengthened when the public discussion on it starts – that is to say, when an event occurs or an issue arises and information about it comes to individual.

It is very important to take into account that “predisposition” is partly determined by the personal situations of an individual, but mostly – by preexisting knowledge or experience that individual has learned in the past. And in the situation of democratic transition, the people’s “predisposition” to create the opinion about current issues, is formed in the immediate past of the country – that is, under the circumstances of non-democratic regime.

Zaller’s concept of the “information” and “predisposition” goes very close to the theoretical perspective of “symbolic interaction”, that provides a sociological-psychological perspective of the entire spectrum of human communication. One of the key concepts of “symbolic interaction” is the notion of “shared meaning” – that is of a situation when two sides of communication process perceive a symbol (a unit of information) in the same way and attach a similar meaning to that symbol<sup>10</sup>. It is quite clear that “shared meaning” of the particular informational signals is crucial for the successful political communication.

As it was mentioned before, in the first phase of democratic transition political parties found themselves in the situation of the absence of the strong party-voters linkages. The logic of electoral competition forces parties to establish these linkages defining their specific positions regarding to other political actors, in order to make the voters’ to turn their vote. The necessity of successful communication with voters needs party elite to use clear signals, easily understandable by the average voter (in the situation when the population is characterized by rather low level of political socialization and

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Ferejohn, John A.; Kuklinski, James H. (eds.) *Information and Democratic Processes*. Urbana and Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1990.

<sup>10</sup> Faules, Don. F.; Alexander, Dennis C., *Communication and Social Behavior: A Symbolic Interaction Perspective*. Reading, Massachusetts: Addison-Wesley Publishing Company, 1978.

mobilization). As far as voter's "predisposition" to receive the signal and react on it properly is formed mostly under the pre-democratic regime past, parties are forced to use signaling system built on the cleavages and divisions, rooted in the regime past as well.

Summing up, it is possible to claim that on the initial phase of the formation of political parties under the conditions of the democratic transition, the main linkage between parties and their supporters is built on the memory of tensions and cleavages rooted in the immediate past of the country, and goes along the main division line between regime successors and anti-regime opponents. Looking at the each case of main types of party organization, it is possible to assume that regime legacies would influence each of them:

- In the case of charismatic parties crucial role plays "pre-transitional" biography of the party leader/candidate (was he member of regime elite, or did he represent anti-regime dissent);

- In the case of clientelistic parties, party-voter linkage is based on the ties between party elite and party supporters/militants, established under pre-democratic regime;

- In the case of emerging programmatic parties, programmatic appeal presents prospects for the future, regarding to the regime past – it is either "return to" or "escape from" the past regime policies on particular issues.

#### Regime legacies and the formation of political parties in Poland, Russia and Spain

The problem of the past legacy of the non-democratic regime was studied mostly by the scholars specialized in post-communist transitions<sup>11</sup>. Although there are different

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<sup>11</sup> See Barany, Zoltan; Volgyes, Ivan (eds.) *The Legacies of Communism in Eastern Europe*. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1995; Welsh, Helga, *Dealing With the Communist Past: Central and Eastern European Experiences after 1990*. In: *Europe-Asia Studies*, Vol. 48, No. 3, 1996; Rose, Richard; Mishler, William; Haerpfer, Christian, *Democracy and Its Alternatives: Understanding Post-Communist Societies*. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1998; Korbonski Andrzej, *The New Democracies in East Central Europe and the Legacies of Communism*. In: Jasinska-Kania, Aleksandra; Kohn, Melvin L.; Slomczynski Kazimierz M. (eds.) *Power and Social*

approaches to the nature of the regime legacies, very clear-cut scheme is presented by Claus Offe, Jon Elster and Ulrich Preuss<sup>12</sup> – according to them, there are three types of inherited constraints for a new democratic regime:

- (1) The state of material resources and their organization;
- (2) The „inner environment” of mental residues, including the cognitive and normative culture, human capital, work; habits, and social and political aspirations, collective identities and their potential for social conflict;
- (3) The established elite and their informal power resources.

Applying this approach to the problem of party formation, it seems possible to assume that generally we could use two dimensions of regime legacies:

1. Structural legacies – material, organizational, and human resources of various kinds;
2. Cultural legacies – in terms of inherited patterns of political culture and shared political “predisposition” between party elite and its supporters.

Providing the line between “regime successors/supporters” and “regime opponents”, it is possible to deal with four sets of indicators, in order to illustrate the extent and nature of the influence of regime legacies on the configuration of new parties. The following table provides a general sense of the variance between political parties, which is possible to find in these three cases of new democracies. Because particular sets of indicators are difficult to score, I tend to use dual system of “strong/weak” nature of each set of indicators, which takes into account both quantitative and qualitative nature of every particular indicator, measured somehow in comparative way. Each of the sets of indicators draws overall picture of existing situation and may be disputable. After the table there are explanations of the each set of indicators in cases of each particular country.

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Structure. Essays in honor of Włodzimierz Wesolowski. Warszawa: Wydawnictwa Uniwersytetu Warszawskiego, 1999.

<sup>12</sup> Offe Claus; Elster Jon; Preuss Ulrich K. Institutional Design in Post-Communist Societies. Rebuilding the Ship at Sea. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998.

Countries	Political parties	Structural regime legacies	Cultural regime legacies
Poland	Successors	<b>strong</b>	<b>weak</b>
	Opponents	<b>weak</b>	<b>strong</b>
Russia	Successors	<b>strong</b>	<b>strong</b>
	Opponents	<b>weak</b>	<b>weak</b>
Spain	Successors	<b>weak</b>	<b>weak</b>
	Opponents	<b>strong</b>	<b>strong</b>

Poland:

1. Structural legacies among regime successors: **strong**

SdRP (Social Democracy of Poland) experienced gradual evolution from PZPR (Polish Workers' Party): it took place within the existing mechanisms of party self-rule. Evolution was led with some splits, but new party elites presented the second-rank leaders of previous party apparatus: mostly younger ones, and from the local party cells. Party preserved its system of local committees and the control over the communication network, based on the major national newspaper, "Trybuna" (formerly – "Trybuna Ludu").

2. Cultural legacies among regime successors: **weak**

Any references to the communist ideals were highly unpopular, because of the existing in Poland large scale of anti-regime resentments based on the idea of "communism as a soviet domination". This was possibly the one of the main reasons why SdRP leaders have chosen the strategy to label their organization on the "western" ideological pattern of "social-democracy". It is also significant that along with Polish Workers' Party existed two minor satellite political organizations: Democratic Union and Polish Peasants' Union: both of them preserved their structures, elites and militants since the pre-transitional period – being de-facto ruling elite successors, their positioned themselves as somehow independent from the regime, splitting the unity of regime supporters.

3. Structural legacies among regime opponents: **weak**

The main organization represented the anti-regime dissent, "Solidarity", was not a party. Its nature is very vague and hard to define – was it labor union, dissent movement, or an alliance of different interest groups? Principle aim and unifying goal for "Solidarity" was to struggle against regime (more specifically – to struggle for the improvement and reforming of the regime). There was no any political or ideological common ground, within "Solidarity" it was possible to find liberals, nationalists, Christian-democrats, etc. During the transition period a lot of political parties appeared, which proclaimed themselves as "inheritors" of the "Solidarity", or tried to refer to the traditions of this organization. At the same time, "Solidarity" continued to exist as an

independent labor union, which officially supported some (but not all) of anti-regime parties and candidates.

#### 4. Cultural legacies among regime opponents: **strong**

However, "Solidarity" was the unique phenomenon within the "socialist camp" – first of all, because of its mass character. This resulted also in the strong tradition of anti-regime dissent in forms of strikes and demonstrations (much stronger than in Russia – as strong as in Spain). Cultural legacy of collective dissent actions was supported by the mass memory of the regime repression (the most common feature of which was the martial law of 1981). Poland was the most "open" to the West communist country, where it was comparatively easy to obtain the possibility for traveling abroad. That was partly a result of the existence of the large Polish Diaspora around the world, mostly in such Western Democracies as USA, Canada, Great Britain and France. Poland also had the largest scale of informal communication network (with thousands of underground newspapers and magazines). High anti-regime resentments were also based on the common perceiving of the regime as the result of foreign domination. Very significant role played anti-communist orientation of the Catholic Church.

#### Russia:

##### 1. Structural legacies among regime successors: **strong**

The Communist Party of Russian Federation emerged from its soviet predecessor, leaving the same organizational structure. Party elite consisted of the members of the previous Communist Party of Soviet Union. The linkage between party elite and their supporters was tightened by the strong communicational network, based mainly on the daily press – such newspapers as "Pravda" and "Sovietskaia Rossija", with millions of issues. Although the CPRF was the main regime successor organization, there were dozen of other smaller parties of the same origin – from various agrarian parties to the ultra-leftist, "Stalinist" parties.

##### 2. Cultural legacies among regime successors: **strong**

CPRF party doctrine was oriented to the past from the very beginning of the party activity: stable points of party program claim the "restoration" of the communist regime and the Soviet Union as a state. Party elite uses the same symbolic and rhetoric, shared by

its supporters. Unlike in Poland, successors of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union organize mass demonstrations on the dates of old soviet holidays, with thousands of participants and such symbols of previous regime as red flags and portraits of Lenin and Stalin. At the same time, unlike in Poland, soviet ruling elite in the post-war period actively started to use symbols of Russian nationalism (first of all – related to the military history of Russian Empire), successfully overtaking one of the most influential ideological resources of possible anti-communist dissent.

### 3. Structural legacies among regime opponents: **weak**

Newly emerged parties proclaiming their opposition to the soviet regime and soviet legacy had almost no organizational or personal ties with any kind of political dissent from the pre-transitional period. They were very loosely linked to the weak organizations of democratic civil society that emerged during the last years of regime existence (these organizations had no political character – they were various “discussion clubs” and “historical societies”). The most active members of the anti-regime opposition (although using of the word “opposition” for the Soviet Union is highly problematic) stayed away from the new parties, presenting themselves as moral rather than political authorities.

### 4. Cultural legacies among regime opponents: **weak**

As it was said before, weak dissent for the regime did not have political or even economical character – its common ground was the problem of the “human right advocacy”. Regime opponents were not united in a single organization, they were not numerous, they did not have strong communication network – “samizdat” in Soviet Union had rather cultural than political character. The most organized political forces of anti-regime character appeared at the end of 1980s and took form of various “national fronts” mostly in national republics within the Soviet Union (especially in the Baltic republics), but not within the Russian Federation itself. Although during post-war soviet history there were examples of spontaneous mass protest (the most famous is the case of the city of Novocherkassk), they were separated in time and space and state apparatus of propaganda and repression successfully hid any information about them.

Spain:

1. Structural legacies among regime successors: **weak**

In Francoist Spain there was no monopolistic state-party, comparable to the cases of Soviet Union or Nazi Germany. Existing organization run by state, “Movimiento Nacional” was not a mass-party in a proper sense of the word, it was created by state authorities, but it had very loose ties with state structures. Ruling elite were not homogeneous – except of the leadership of the “Movimiento”, there were other independent political and interest groups with their representation in government, such as monarchists, or high military officers.

2. Cultural legacies among regime successors: **weak**

Stability of the regime depended mostly on the personal power of the dictator, who based his political influence mostly not on the hierarchically organized party structure, but on the personal relationship with different ideological groups within the ruling elite – nationalists, high military officers, monarchists, technocrats from Catholic organization “Opus Dei” etc. As a result, ruling elite was not unified, “limited pluralism” between their members led even to the appearance of the various groups of “inner opposition”.

3. Structural legacies among regime opponents: **strong**

Two main parties of anti-regime character, PSOE (Socialist Labor Party) and PCE (Communist Party) were not created in the process of transition, but legalized: they existed since the previous democratic (republican) regime of 1930s. These organizations preserved their structures, their elites, significant number of militants/supporters and extended communication network (newspapers and magazines).

4. Cultural legacies among regime opponents: **strong**

As a result of long and cruel civil war, Spanish society had strong memory of political repression against the regime opponents, especially because of the fact, that arrests of the members of communist and socialist parties were often even in the beginning of 1970s. At the same time, there were the stable traditions of mass contest – strikes and protests at factories and universities. Economic reforms of 1960s provided by regime were connected with the mass labor migration of Spaniards to the Western European countries, which resulted also in certain “political democratic education” of

immigrants. Catholic Church, which was among the supporters of the Francoist regime since its foundation, to the 1970s became the center of intellectual dissent, spread by some of Catholic magazines.

### Final considerations

The micro-logic of political cleavage formation in new democracies cannot be reduced to a single rule. There are a lot of factors, that influence particular party system configurations, such as: chosen path of democratic transition; level of bureaucratic competence of the regime elite; influence of external actors on the transitional processes; role of interest groups and institutes of civil society; specific patterns of institutional design of the new regime (main division here goes between parliamentary and presidential systems); existing religious and ethnic cleavages, etc.

Regime legacies are not solely responsible for the formation of political divisions that are articulated on the field of party competition, although, in my assumption, in the initial phase of transition, they serve as an axis, around which the other cleavage dimensions concentrate. Existing divide patterns, such as sociological (by age or social group); distributive-economical (pro or against market economy); ethnic (titular nation and minorities); religious-cultural (libertarian and secular vs. traditional and religious); national-cosmopolitan, and others, appear at that initial period of democratic transition in the rhetoric of political leaders and in party programs mostly in the context of their previous existence within the frameworks of the regime-society conflict. When these divide patterns start to appear separately, providing the basis for the new cleavages, independent from the past legacies, it is possible to say about programmatic crystallization of the new parties.

Concluding hypothesis sounds as follows: the potential for the successful programmatic crystallization of the individual political parties – and as a result, of the party system as a whole, is proportionally higher when in the parties' electoral appeal decreases the presence of the signals based on past legacies. This could happen in the situation when

regime opponents have both strong structural and cultural legacies of the opposition to the regime – that gives them possibility to produce a credible democratic alternative to the regime successors. On the reverse, programmatic political structuring does not proceed very far in the situation, when anti-regime oriented parties have roots too shallow, and when regime successors revolve around symbolical meaning of the immediate past of the country, highlighting such values, characteristic for the non-democratic regime, as authoritative order, national autonomy and hostility to political liberalization.