

TRANSREGIONAL CENTER FOR DEMOCRATIC STUDIES

CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE • SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA • LATIN AMERICA



Photo by Elmaze Gashi, Prishtina, Spring 2008

2008 has already been a year of upheaval and change as well as a time for reflection as we remember the protests and revolts of 1968 and approach the 20th anniversary of 1989. Already this year, we have seen bold moves toward independence and statehood, as in the case of Kosovo, as well as brutal crackdowns on freedom that threaten democracy, as followed the recent elections in Kenya. In this country also we are

witnessing a historic primary election, and for the first time can actually imagine a woman or an African American in the White House, testament to how far we have come since 1968.

In this issue of the *Bulletin*, we invite you to reflect with us on some of the momentous developments and anniversaries of 2008. TCDS alumnus Godfrey Chesang discusses the unhappy events in Kenya, while Anna Di Lellio, a friend and colleague of TCDS, and three Kosovar TCDS alumni and NSSR students, Elmaze Gashi, Elife Krasniqi and Artan Muhaxhiri, share their thoughts on the international implications and the newness of an independent Kosovo.

As we prepare for this year's *Democracy & Diversity Institute* in Krakow in July, and announce our January 2009 Cape Town Institute (see page 7), we wish all of our friends and colleagues around the world a peaceful and productive summer.

Amy Sodaro

Serbia's Choice

ANNA DI LELLIO

On April 29, the Serbian ministers from the Democratic Party (DS), along with party leader and Serbian President Boris Tadic, signed the Stabilization and Association Agreement (SAA, the first step towards eventual admission) with the European Union. The moment is critical for all parties involved.

The upcoming Serbian Parliamentary elections on May 11, 2008 have been fashioned as a plebiscite on European accession. A large political and intellectual bloc headed by Prime Minister Vojislav Kostunica considers the pro-European stance of President Tadic a Judas-like attitude that subordinates the national interest to the opportunistic, material gains provided by potential European funding. Even the minimal condition posed by the EU for the full implementation of the SAA, that is, compliance with the International Criminal Tribunal of The Hague, is seen as foreign interference. Furthermore, Kostunica believes that signing

the agreement weakens Serbia's stubborn defense of its sovereignty over Kosovo, the former Yugoslav province that on February 17 declared independence. Hoping to win the election, he has vowed to annul the deal signed with the EU as the leader of the new cabinet.

The problem with this approach, and the potential risk that Kostunica poses for the democratic future of Serbia, are clear: whether the national interests he purports to defend translate into the refusal to bring indicted war criminals General Ratko Mladic and former Bosnia leader Radovan Karadzic to justice, or they are expressed

through a revanchist stance on Kosovo, they remain squarely within the framework of the ethno-nationalist myth that led the country to war.

When in 1989 the communist regimes of the Soviet bloc fell, and a tide of democratic mobilization was the main engine of this change, Serbia too experienced enthusiastic manifestations of "people power." In Serbia, however, thousands of protesters clamored to defend their rights from the enemy within – whether bureaucrats or Albanian counter-revolutionaries; not to "return to Europe" was a popular slogan. The consequences are known. After the fall of com

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Kenya: An Inelegant Coup?

GODFREY CHESANG

Judgment Day: An Inelegant Coup, the Devil Unmasked and Hell and Heaven Postponed

Voter turnout during Kenya's Election Day (27th December, 2007) was dramatic, both in numbers and form. Voters started queuing at polling stations as early as four o'clock in the morning. National and international media reported that the polling was going smoothly. Apart from a hitch in the morning, where the name of the opposition presidential candidate was missing on the voters register, there were no major disruptions or violence, as had been the case in previous elections. Even so, the country was quietly tense.

Tensions began to ease when the day ended without other incidents. In many polling stations in opposition strongholds, voters remained after voting to guard the ballots; the police were not to be trusted. Fears were further calmed when the initial set of results started trickling in. By the second day of tallying, incumbent president Mwai Kibaki had lost 22 ministers, including his vice president and some of his most ardent supporters in his home province. More importantly Raila Odinga, the opposition candidate, was leading with a clear margin which, by the end of the second day, was a million votes. The ODM party was winning by a landslide. Opposition strongholds were about to burst into celebration as it became increasingly certain that their candidate was winning. A series of spectacular events then followed.

The vote tallying process at the national centre came to a sudden halt. The chairman of the electoral commission announced that he could not get in touch with a number of election officers, who had apparently switched off their cell phones. The electoral results from their areas had not reached the commission headquarters, and could not be tallied. The chairman went on to suggest that the election results were being 'cooked.' He seemed genuinely bewildered – the face of an impartial arbiter. Tension began to mount again. The prophecy that the government had intentions to rig the election was

beginning to unfold.

When the delayed results came through finally, electoral agents of the opposition immediately began to point to irregularities. They complained that the results had been manipulated, with Kibaki's votes being massively inflated and Raila Odinga's deflated. Despite these complaints, the electoral commission, which was dominated by Kibaki's appointees -- 19 of whom were incidentally appointed only a month before the election -- decided to go ahead and tally the results overnight. When the updated tally of results was finally announced the next day, Raila Odinga's lead had evaporated. A few constituencies remained, almost entirely in Kibaki's strongholds, and when these were finally tallied, Kibaki had overtaken Odinga and now had a lead of over 100,000 votes. National tension peaked at this point.

This was December 31st, four days after Election Day. Constitutionally, the presidency would become vacant at the end of the day. Government supporters had begun celebrating, and the mood in opposition strongholds was grim. If he was to remain president, Kibaki had to be sworn in by the end of the day. In the meantime, the opposition was disputing the elections and demanding a recount. For most of the morning, the electoral commission was holed up in a meeting, deliberating over what to do. Reportedly, the commission was split between doing a recount and declaring the results. Media attention was piqued, and every event was being recorded. The meeting of the commissioners ended with a resolution to announce the results, but there was no authoritative information.

At 4:00 pm that day, the electoral commission convened a press conference to announce the results as they stood, in effect declaring Kibaki the victor. The opposition was fully represented at the press conference, as was the government, by key ministers, members of the public and the international and local media who were covering the event. As the chairman began announcing the results, a number of opposition leaders protested, interrupting the chairman with

'evidence' of tampering. At one point an elections officer confessed that Kibaki's vote from his polling station had been inflated. The intended announcement degenerated into chaos, as a shouting match between the opposition and the chairman of the electoral commission ensued in full view of the national and international media. One can assume that the whole nation was watching the events.

As the exchange escalated, the police, who had since cordoned off the building, whisked away the chairman of the electoral commission. The opposition leaders were forced out, and power went off in the whole building, disrupting the live transmission of the events. The nation had been blacked out. In less than half an hour, the chairman of the electoral commission was on the state controlled television, Kenya Broadcasting Corporation, announcing that Kibaki was the victor. Almost immediately afterwards, the whole country erupted: Kibaki's strongholds in celebration, and opposition strongholds in violence. Kibaki was hurriedly sworn in at dusk, and the ceremony beamed on KBC, even as the nation was consumed in an orgy of violence, burning and gunfire.

As a newly sworn in president, Kibaki used his powers to implement martial law. A curfew on movement, a ban on the media, deployment of security forces all over the country, and systematic jamming of mobile telephones followed, as the country slid into what veritably looked like the beginning of a civil war.

At some point in January, it even seemed that genocide could not be ruled out after thirty people were burned to death in a church. Other images were as punitively ugly as they were damning and depressing; a child crying next to the body of her freshly bludgeoned mother, a man crying motionless on the ground because his limbs had all been broken, the bodies of a family of 19 that had been burnt beyond recognition in their own house, a young man shot in cold blood for making fun of the police and another being chopped up with machetes.

There were also pictures of homes burning, stories of women and children raped, and of men and women forcefully circumcised by marauding gangs.

For a nation whose consciousness had wilfully internalised an externally constructed notion that it was an island of peace in a turbulent region, post election violence disrupted an erstwhile confident self-construction within the national intellectual collective and forced it into a state of self-shame.

Grand Coalition Government: Heaven and Hell Deferred

What was immediately obvious after the botched election was that there was a massive legitimacy crisis within the government, which triggered the violence. The crisis has been partly blunted by the formation of a Grand Coalition government in which President Kibaki's party, the Party of National Unity, and the opposition Orange Democratic Party share power in the government. But the problem certainly remains. For example, Odinga, who almost certainly won the presidential election, occupies the newly created and less prestigious position of Prime Minister. The PNU, which won less than 25% of parliamentary seats, remains in charge of key ministries while the ODM, which won roughly 50%, has been given less prestigious government docket. Kibaki's allies continue to enjoy a stranglehold over key sectors of the economy and the security apparatus, and remain unrepentant about a crisis they certainly contributed to precipitating.

What is certain, however, is that for both pre-elections camps, neither heaven nor hell has been realized, and one can expect that the hope and fears of such futures will remain alive. It would appear then that many who are unhappy have been forced to defer the unrelenting search for a democratic arrangement for the solace of an uncertain if immediately tangible peace under an uncomfortable political arrangement. Recent opinion polls tellingly find that most Kenyans do not expect the government to last for the next five years. In the meantime, erstwhile simmering anti-Kikuyu sentiment has now solidified into a quiet conviction.

Perhaps the most important outcome of the election, and the post-election violence, was the displacement of 600,000 people,

mostly from Kibaki's ethnic group, and mostly in opposition strongholds. Unlike the 1500 killed during the post-election violence, these 600,000 are of more material significance in the country's politics. Presently, they are the momentous political problem. Most continue to live in makeshift camps, and are treated as Internally Displaced People.

These displaced people raise key issues at the heart of the national question in Kenya. The eruption of violence may have initially been triggered by frustrated popular expectations. However, these expectations are yet to be interrogated. What is also unclear is the progression of popular protest into ugly violence: why did these 600,000 people become the target of popular anger? Did they, at least in the popular imagination of their assailants personify the anti-Christ? Was their displacement an exercise in exorcising an undesirable impurity? If so, what made them impure? If this thesis holds water, what ritual will purify them and make them acceptable once more?

Godfrey Chesang (Cape Town 2002; NSST Fellow 2002), holds a PhD in Politics from the University of Witwatersrand.

iNdependence 1.0

ARTAN MUHAXHIRI

1. A Multiple Single

"Where are you from?" I was asked by an officer with a confused expression on his face at JFK airport in late August 2007, after I handed my documents to him at the airport check-in. Then, probably for the hundredth time in my life, I repeated the story: "*I am from Kosovo, which is currently a United Nations protectorate...it was part of ex-Yugoslavia...the war in 1999...international negotiations for the final status...*"

This situation was almost inevitable. I didn't have a regular passport, but a "Travel Document" that read "UNMIK" (United Nations Mission in Kosovo) on its cover, accompanied by a big UN emblem. Additionally, my US visa was not attached to a page on my travel document, as is common practice, but was on a separate piece of paper with a supplementary note: "Unrecognized passport." Finally, on my US visa, under the column "Nationality," it read

"SRM," which is truly bizarre, because that was the abbreviation for "Serbia and Montenegro" – a short-lived federation that ceased to exist in the beginning of June 2006, after Montenegro declared independence.

So, there I was – entering the United States with an unusual travel document with a strange abbreviation and a UN emblem, a valid US visa on a sheet of paper, and a non-existent nationality.

The officer took a good look at my visa, and after making sure that it was an original, put a seal on it and said, "Welcome to the United States!"

"Thank you very much," I replied.

After 1999, my international postal correspondences were sent to me in Kosovo under three different state names: "Kosovo – UNMIK"; "Serbia and Montenegro"; and "Yugoslavia." Yet, I had a strange feeling when I once received three international packages in three days – each sent to a different "state."

It was a Borgesian situation, I must admit.

I thought about these two scenes while sitting in my room in New York City watching the live broadcast of the Kosovar Parliament declaring independence and the subsequent celebrations in the streets of the capital Prishtina on February 17.

The first thing that came to my mind was that, from now on, my international identity would be unique and confusion-free. Finally.

2. Identity Matters

The topic of the "State of Kosovo" has been a crucial part of my life, as it has been in the lives of Kosovar Albanians in general. It was not a matter of choice, because there was no alternative. Indifference is not a rational option once you are confronted with a totalitarian regime, like the decade-long ruthless one of Slobodan Milosevic.

The core identity of the "Independent State of Kosovo" was formed and cultivated during the "Kosovar Parallel System" in the '90s, when Kosovar Albanians decided to define their situation as if they were living in an independent state, albeit under a brutal dictatorship. They created an independent network, which provided an institutional framework in the everyday lives of Kosovar Albanians. The public sphere was also sub-

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Serbia's Choice

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munism, most of the former Soviet bloc was able to reframe itself as European, both ideally and institutionally. Serbia's mobilization began a different dynamic that was incompatible with democratization. Yugoslav socialism morphed into a nationalist and populist authoritarianism and in a few years the country collapsed, but not before plunging into bloody ethnic conflicts that revived notions of the Balkan otherness to a continent where internal wars are (and must be) a thing of the past.

The Yugoslav wars of the 1990s culminated with the NATO intervention against Serbia, followed by an uneasy peace. Bosnia is now a EU ward, and Kosovo, newly independent from Serbia, is slated to become one. Among all successor states of former Yugoslavia, Serbia alone seems to resist European integration.

History never repeats itself in the same manner, but the similarities with the prewar period are suggestive. It could not be otherwise. On February 21, Kostunica and Tomislav Nikolic, the leader of the Radical Party, staged a huge mass rally in Belgrade to protest Kosovo's independence. These two nationalist politicians planned to concentrate power and marginalize even the lukewarm opposition of President Boris Tadic, by claiming to have the full support of the "people's parliament." It is a known pattern, reminiscent of the "happenings" of Milosevic's time.

The protagonists are often known too. Nikolic was once Milosevic's deputy. Standing at the helm of the Radical Party on behalf of indicted war criminal Vojislav Seselj, he has been suspected by the Humanitarian Law Center of having participated in criminal actions during the war in Croatia. The acting Orthodox Patriarch who officiated the religious service on February 21 is Bishop Amfilohije, an outspoken supporter of Milosevic who once praised Karadzic for his defiance of the Dayton Accord. A rumor in Belgrade attributed the fiery but lyrical speech delivered by Kostunica to the poet Matija Beckovic. It could easily be true. Another enthusiastic supporter of Milosevic, Beckovic wrote in a 1987 poem, "where to walk away with the Visoki Decani? Where to Shift the Pec Monastery?" In his speech

Kostunica cried out, "Never will anyone hear from us that the Patriarchate of Pec does not belong to us, that Visoki Decani and Gracanica are not ours!" Even the nameless crowd of "hooligans" who later attacked several Western Embassies is unfortunately known. These are not just juvenile delinquents. Ivan Colovic (2002) noticed years ago how seamlessly violence moved from the stadium to the battlefield at the start of the Yugoslav wars, when the themes of ethnic identity and greater Serbia came to dominate the football fans' folklore.

The crucial issue is also the same. Today, like twenty years ago, the struggle over Kosovo is a morality play on Serbia's European and democratic identity. Letting go of Kosovo would mean much more than giving up part of Serbia. It would mean abandoning Serbia's exclusionary self-image as a territory inhabited by an ethno-nation founded on Kosovo. It would also mean coming to terms with the role that this particular nationalism played in the massive physical and human destruction of the recent Yugoslav wars. Politically and psychologically free of Kosovo, Serbia will have the chance of moving toward civic citizenship and becoming a factor of regional stability within the EU. The alternative promises to be the further consolidation of a homogenizing ethnic nationalism that is potentially threatening to Kosovo, the Republika Srpska, and Serbia itself.

Why is Kosovo so important? In 1389 a local coalition of forces led by the Serb Prince Lazar Hrebeljanovic fought against the Ottoman army on the field of Kosovo. There was no clear victory, but Lazar and the Sultan were killed and, within less than a century, what remained of the Serbian medieval kingdom was completely subjected to Ottoman rule. The story of the battle, developed as a myth through Orthodox liturgy and regional folklore, was elaborated in the 19th century as the main subplot for Serbia's national narrative. By opting for a Heavenly Kingdom rather than submitting to the Sultan, the figure of Prince Lazar came to crystallize the character and the history of the nation. His "Kosovo option" is both a spiritual and a political choice: it reflects the unchanging loyalty to the spirituality of Orthodox Christianity, but also includes a belligerent pledge to never be

defeated again. The story of Kosovo identifies Serbia as an old and embattled Christian nation with a unique identity, in which blood, language, religion, folk tradition, culture and politics are integral parts of the whole. Uniquely valiant and defiant, Serbs go through times of intense suffering and oppression, but never lose their spiritual strength and their love for freedom. To fulfill their mission, they must unite in defense of their national identity at all cost.

By elevating Kosovo to a myth, and turning history into a story, Serb nationalism obscures a few facts on the ground. When Serbs took Kosovo back from the Ottomans in 1912 they did not notice that "there were hardly any Serbs left in 'Old Serbia,'" as historian Ivo Banac reminds us in his excellent study of the national question in Yugoslavia. Belgrade went on to constitute the Albanian majority as a group to be controlled and suppressed. Serbs never doubted that the failure to assimilate Albanians over almost a century of "government as occupation" was a justification for more suppression or elimination if necessary. The primacy given to the organic vision of the ethno-nation sketched above obviously collided, and continues to collide, with liberal and cosmopolitan values. But with a twist. Kosovo not only territorializes the Serbian ethnos; it also territorializes the opposition between the cross and the crescent, in which the Serb nation stands against the Islamic Orient and its Albanian-Turk version, on the side of Christianity in its purest form. Kosovo is thus constructed as a Serb and European battlefield, where Serbia can either win or lose her sacred ground, but cannot lose her soul, which is the same as the soul of Europe.

No party – whether Kostunica's DSS or Tadic's DS – has made any concession on the recognition of Kosovo independence and the acceptance of the newly deployed EU mission in Kosovo. No signal is coming from Belgrade on delivering to The Hague the war criminals that still count on large popular and political support as national heroes. Yet, nobody seems to find any contradiction between this intransigent stance and being part of Europe. Kostunica thinks of a spiritual notion of Europe that cannot possibly be embodied by the bureaucracy in Brussels and is instead better represented by

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17th February 2008 -- Kosovo's Independence Day

Elife Krasniqi



I was looking at a photo from my high school days, one of the few that I took with me when I came to New York. It shows my two best friends and me sitting on the floor of a room which, for four years, served as our classroom. It had a sofa, coffee table, TV and video recorder and an aquarium with goldfish. On the back of the photo is written "1996, Prishtina." This was during the so-called "parallel system" that functioned in opposition to the official Serbian regime in Kosovo. In 1989 when Serbia revoked Kosovo's autonomy, Albanians were expelled from public institutions and most Albanian language schools and universities closed down. The only alternative was turning houses or basements into schools and offices of the Republic of Kosovo, which was declared in 1990, though no one recognized it.

October 1st, 1997 for my generation was the first day of university as well as the first day of student protests: the beginning of an end, as we used to say. The streets of Prishtina became noisy after the long-endured silence. We shouted for our rights for education and held onions in our pockets just in case tear gas exploded somewhere nearby.

The war started in 1998. My friend who is in the photo stopped coming to the lectures. She lived 30km from Prishtina, where the war started. The international news agencies reported killings, massacres and humanitarian catastrophe in Kosovo, as well as the Clinton and Lewinsky scandal.

Finally, in March 1999 NATO began air strikes in Serbia; in response, Serbia killed 10,000 Albanians and deported almost a million. Those of us who managed to cross the border were sent immediately to a refugee camp. As soon as we left the camp, we were given green cards with our name,

sex, place of birth and photo, and which were marked "Begalac" (Refugee). This was our identity. It was valid until June 1999, when NATO entered Kosovo and we returned. The streets of Prishtina were noisy again. This time we celebrated freedom; holding flags and balloons we sang and danced all night in the streets. Only then was I able to enter some buildings that I had never been in before, and walk some streets that had been dangerous to pass by. I was discovering the city in which I was born and raised.

I stopped this chain of memories and went to visit my superintendent, who happened to be an Albanian from Prishtina, and we watched the news and the entire festive program honoring the independence. People celebrated in the streets. Kosovo declared its independence. Will this mean finally an opportunity for self governance, an opportunity to decide for ourselves? I went back to my flat, opened my laptop hoping to talk to someone from Prishtina. I tried all possible ways to reach my friends, through Skype, MSN, G Talk, Facebook...no one was in the virtual spaces. Everyone was in real spaces celebrating the independence, while I was left with my questions and with my fingers crossed that other countries will recognize the independent Kosovo.

Elife Krasniqi (Krakow 2005) is an MA student in Sociology at The New School for Social Research.

Independence

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stituted with an underground alternative, which in Kosovo's context became more real than the real one. The *politics of small things* and *performative politics* began to have more social impact than the numerous military and police forces of the Serbian regime. Power was in the hands of the Powerless. Again.

The biggest symbolic outcome of the declaration of the independence of Kosovo is going to be international institutions' recognition of Kosovo's state identity, which will bring with it a sense of *international subjectivity* for its citizens. The State of Kosovo

will become an integral part of the international community and this will, without question, result in the transformation of the (self)perceptions of Kosovars. The international presence of Kosovo, embodied in embassies and other important representational institutions, but also participation in international cultural and sporting events, will create a conscience of international equality within Kosovar citizens.

3. Is There a (Good) Life after Independence?

This is version 1.0 of Kosovo's independence. Its subsequent upgrading will come when it's accepted into organizations such as the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, the World Trade Organization, and eventually, the UN and the EU. The time-frame of Kosovo's integration into these institutions is much dependent on Kosovars' ability to demonstrate a commitment and responsibility to building a democratic state, in which equal rights and opportunities for all citizens are sacrosanct. The first steps are promising: the constitution of Kosovo ("The Republic of Kosovo is a state of its citizens"), and the state flag (six white stars in an arc above a golden map of Kosovo on a blue field) strongly support civic identity and multiethnic representation.

Building stable state institutions has always been a longterm and complex process, especially in economically ruined places. Myriad social and economic problems in Kosovo, which accumulated during the last decades, will be around for many years to come. Therefore, it is extremely encouraging that the independence of Kosovo was immediately recognized by the "G7," the group of the seven major industrialized nations (US, Japan, Germany, UK, France, Italy, and Canada).

According to a Confucian proverb, a journey of a thousand miles begins with a single step. For the international journey of the State of Kosovo, that step was made on February 17, 2008.

The other thousand miles will have to be traveled in the years to come.

E pur si muove!

Artan Muhaxhiri (Krakow 2006) is an MA student in Sociology at The New School for Social Research.

Returning to a “Newborn” State

Elmaze Gashi

In August 2006, I left Kosovo in a stateless state. In March 2008 I returned to an independent Kosovo, sort of. On February 17, 2008 Kosovo declared its independence from Serbia.

Vienna to the “newborn” state

On March 17, I found myself sitting at the Vienna airport Franz Johann Strauss Café. After an exhausting nine hour flight from New York’s JFK, I faced a five hour wait for my connecting flight to Prishtina. All flights to the major Balkan cities depart from the same terminal – and too often from the same gate only a few hours apart – and the smoking section at the café is a common haunt for Albanians, Serbs, Montenegrins, Macedonians, and Bosnians. The departing gates for Croatia and Slovenia are, ironically enough, located in another terminal.

The lead story in the print and electronic media, as well as among the Balkan patrons at the Strauss Café was Kosovo’s independence. The Albanian patrons used the occasion to congratulate each other and sigh in relief that the day has finally come.

Just like my fellow countrymen, I was also eager to get to Prishtina to what I imagined would be a different Kosovo. After all, I was raised on the belief that independence is a magic wand that can solve all our regional problems. Meanwhile, the headlines on the German and English newspapers scattered around the café pointed to rising tensions between the Serbs and Albanians in the divided city of Mitrovica and the split between European Union member states on the recognition of Kosovo’s independence. Spain and Romania, with their own ethnic problems, clearly led the campaign against Kosovo’s independence. For a land-locked country of 2 million, Kosovo sure got more than its share of the world’s attention.

“Welcome to the Republic of Kosovo”

After a two hour flight from Vienna, I landed at the Prishtina airport where I was greeted with a large blue sign “Welcome to the Republic of Kosovo.”

My sister and my youngest brother were waiting for me at the airport. And, as though I would immediately notice a change, they began to question me: “So



Photo by Elmaze Gashi

what do you think? Has anything changed?” I had just arrived and, with the exception of the big blue welcome sign, everything else seemed the same. Trying to raise my spirit I added, “Maybe when we are in downtown Prishtina the change will be more obvious.” In downtown Prishtina a local artist had built a twenty foot yellow sign in the center of the city that spelled out NEWBORN, which would become the subtitle to independence. Each letter of “NEWBORN” was signed by passersby. By the time I got there, an iron rail with guards kept people at bay as if to say sorry but the letters were full with signatures and well wishes.

Recalling the cheerful mood in Prishtina when independence was declared I was quite disappointed with the energy one felt after just one month. Once the cheers died down, many were quick to discuss the hard economic realities: 45% unemployment, fatigued youth and civic engagement, the new government’s position of opportunity rather than responsibility. I spent just a week in Prishtina, and as I left the newborn, supervised state, I did so with mixed feelings. On one hand, after all these years we have become masters of our own future; but on the other, I remain a bit skeptical and wonder whether we will be able to avoid the pitfalls of our neighbors.

Kosovars are learning that the process leading up to statehood is much easier than its implementation. As to the latter, Kosovo’s leadership is learning quickly that there is little room for error. If Kosovo is to avoid

the pitfalls of a “failed state,” its leaders must have a long term plan and must be able to coordinate the development and implementation of policies at the local, regional and international levels. No matter what path we choose, one thing is certain from now on, we Kosovars do not have any more excuses.

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Serbia’s Choice

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possibly be embodied by the bureaucracy in Brussels and is instead better represented by Serbia’s Christian ethno-nationalism. Tadic counts on the lack of assertiveness of the EU in the field of foreign policy to gain access, while never accepting the very decision made by the large majority of European countries to recognize Kosovo independence and Brussels’ plan to make Kosovo its own ward. What’s worse, renouncing the legacy of the war is on nobody’s agenda in Serbia, and Brussels is going along with this potential new European member’s dangerous self-denial.

Anna Di Lellio is the editor of The Case for Kosovo: A Passage to Independence and is visiting professor at the Kosovo Institute of Journalism and Communication in Pristina and at the Graduate Program in International Affairs at The New School.

TCDS SPRING 2008 EVENTS

Moments of Madness? A Conversation on the 1968 Revolts in Europe, the United States and Mexico

In March 2008, to celebrate and reflect upon the movements and revolts of 1968, TCDS and the Department of History at NSSR and Eugene Lang College, hosted a panel discussion, *Moments of Madness? A Conversation on the 1968 Revolts in Europe, the United States, and Mexico*. Drawing from their own personal experiences in 1968 and considering some of the wider implications and relevance of 1968 was an impressive group, including Martin Palous, Irena Grudzinska-Gross, Aristide and Vera Zolberg, James Miller, Claudio Lomnitz, and Ann Snitow; the discussion was moderated by Elzbieta Matynia.

1989 and Beyond: The Future of Democracy

The fall of the Berlin Wall and the conflict in Tiananmen Square – the most telegenic events of the year 1989 – stimulated developments well beyond Central Europe, and unleashed the imagination that brought about the end of apartheid and the flowering of pro-democracy movements in Europe, Asia, Africa and the Americas. As we approach the 20th anniversary of 1989's non-violent transformations, we believe it is important not only to celebrate the collapse of communism and the achievements of other negotiated transitions, but also to draw from them lessons for future democratic politics.

In April 2008, TCDS, together with Research Network 1989, hosted a conference at The New School for Social Research to reflect on and to reassess 1989 now, almost twenty years later. This two-day gathering of senior and junior scholars from around the world addressed the questions of what we have and have not learned from the revolutions of 1989, as well as the broader, worldwide implications of 1989. Panelists included: Andrew Arato, Chris Armbruster, Thomas Bierschenk, Paul Blokker, Martin Butora, Monica Ciobanu, Anna Di Lellio, Barbara Falk, Nancy Fraser, Jeffrey Goldfarb, Mateusz Halawa, Florentina Harbo, Mara Lazda, Radim Marada, Elzbieta Matynia, Elidor Mehilli, Alexander Mirescu, Peter Molnar, David Ost, Martin Palous, Lauren Paremoer, Karolina Pietras, Monroe Price, Joanna Regulaska, Jonathan Schell, Amy Sodaro, Xiaoyang Tang, Sarah Taylor, and Jennifer Yvette Terrell.



Photo by Pavlina Majorsova

TCDS ALUMNI NEWS

SHAHLA ALIGULIYEVA (Krakow 2004) won an Erasmus Mundus Scholarship to study at University College London in 2008-2009.

LAURA BALBUENA (Krakow 2004) recently published a chapter, "Violence and Female Agency: Can Terror Empower Women?" in a book from the Institute for Peruvian Studies.

ELMAZE GASHI (Krakow 2004), an MA student in sociology at NSSR, has just taken an internship with the Press Office of the Attorney General of New York State.

PIKI ISH-SHALOM (TCDS Visiting Scholar 2000-2001), currently Lecturer at Hebrew University of Jerusalem's Department of International Affairs, has recently published "Let Caesar have what belongs to him: On the Joint Pursuit of Morality and Security," in *American Behavioral Scientist*.

OSTAP ODUSHKIN (Krakow 2001, NSST 2003) recently published "Ukraine is not Poland" in the prominent internet newspaper *Ukrjinska Pravda*.

DEMOCRACY & DIVERSITY INSTITUTE CAPE TOWN, SOUTH AFRICA JANUARY 2009

TCDS is pleased to announce the 9th annual *Democracy & Diversity* Institute in Cape Town, South Africa. Courses at the 2009 institute include:

- *Democracies & Boundaries – Conflicts about Membership, Borders, and Diversity*
Prof. David Plotke, Political Science, NSSR

- *Gender and Democracy*
Profs. Elzbieta Matynia, Sociology & Liberal Studies, NSSR, and Shireen Hassim, Political Studies, University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg

- *Democracy and Africanism*
Prof. Hylton White, Anthropology, NSSR and Eugene Lang College, and guest speakers

- *Shifting Power in the Global Economy: Rethinking Development Strategies*
Profs. William Milberg, Economics, NSSR, and Stephen Gelb, Executive Director, The EDGE Institute, Johannesburg; and Development Studies, University of the Witwatersrand

THE NEW SCHOOL FOR SOCIAL RESEARCH

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Events/Announcements

APRIL 16

Krzysztof Czyzewski (Director, Borderland Centre of Arts, Culture, Nations) in conversation with Elzbieta Matynia (NSSR; TCDS) and Jeffrey Goldfarb (NSSR) on "Between the Past and the Future: Memory Work in the Borderlands."

MAY 5

Adam Michnik (Editor-in-Chief, *Gazeta Wyborcza*) gave a talk on "Politics in White and Red" at the Gagosian Gallery in New York. The presentation took place in the setting of the exhibition by Piotr Uklanski, entitled Bialo-Czerwona (white-red), which refers to Poland's national colors and its bi-colored flag.

17th Annual Democracy & Diversity Summer Institute **KRAKOW, POLAND, JULY 8-25, 2008**

TCDS is pleased to announce the 17th annual *Democracy & Diversity* Summer Institute in Krakow, Poland, to be held in collaboration with the International Cultural Center in Krakow (MCK). During this highly intensive program, approximately 35 civic-minded junior scholars, graduate students, and advanced undergraduates from Central & Eastern Europe, the Caucasus, Central Asia, Africa, the US, Latin America, and Western Europe will gather together to examine current challenges to democracy in the host region and beyond.

The program includes four seminars led by NSSR faculty. The curriculum is complemented by evening discussions with public intellectuals, policy makers, civic leaders, and scholars from the region, as well as study tours to Auschwitz-Birkenau and architectural and historical landmarks, including Krakow's formerly Jewish Quarter, Kazimierz.

The Institute will offer the following classes: **Cosmopolitanism and its Discontents** (Elzbieta Matynia, NSSR & Andreas Kalyvas, NSSR); **Gender Stable and Unstable** (Ann Snitow, Eugene Lang College and NSSR); **Political Culture: Then and Now** (Jeffrey Goldfarb, NSSR); **Memory, Trauma, Genocide, Evil** (Carol Bernstein, Bryn Mawr College & Richard J. Bernstein, NSSR).