Table of Contents
February 1994 - Vol. 4/No.3
Issue Number 14
Elzbieta Matynia: Director and Editor
Sharon Cooley: Program Associate
Philip Pezeshki: Executive Editor
Justyna Duriasz: Staff Associate
Published quarterly by the East and Central Europe Program.
Funded by the Andrew W. Mellon Foundation & the Ford
Foundation.
Table of ContentsRevolution and Academia: A Few
Remarks on Some Post-Revolutionary ParadoxesIt was this community that launched flying universities, private seminars, and underground presses and publishing houses. The academic milieu in its broadest Eastern European sense--which includes scholars and intellectuals, students and artists--was crucial in generating ideas for changing the system. Academic institutions were frequently seen as a safe playgrounds for those who were mildly unorthodox politically, for those who wanted to flirt with opposition and revolution--within safe limits, that is. Often it functioned as a refuge for those who were not able to fit in anywhere else because of their moral and political commitments. And sometimes it served as a place of exile for those who, while occupying leading positions, had committed political misdemeanors or had caused some problems for their regime.
In societies in which the pursuit of careers in public life was reserved for those who were in or very close to the nomenklatura, academic careers began to function for many as a substitute for other careers. The very decision to enter academia often indicated a conscious refusal to take part in official political life; it was just as often a desire for precisely the kind of protective umbrella that academia provided.
When the regime, with its whole system of restrictions and rewards, ceased to exist, academia lost not only its excitement and prestige, but also its main provider of resources to support teaching and research. Now that new opportunities for careers in public life have opened up, the "refugees" to academia are returning home: to parliament, government, the media, business, and above-ground publishing. Adding to this internal brain drain are the talented and energetic young people who were already teaching at the universities but who are now taking their chances in the market economy. And many promising graduates are not choosing academic careers in the first place. It looks as though this revolution, too, may be "devouring its own children".
In such a state of affairs, what can be done? The Bulletin describes what the New School is trying to do within the region's social science community. Beyond that, we can only urge others to join in the effort, and hope that decision-makers in the West realize that the transition in East and Central Europe can not be successfully addressed by economic measures alone. The Academia which played such an important role in promoting revolution should beconsidered equally important in the current transition as a beacon of democratic ideas and habits.-- Elzbieta Matynia
A Resurgent Left in East and
Central Europe? The national elections in Poland in 1993 are a dramatic, but by no means the only, sign of a renewal of political forces whose prospects have seemed either dim or nonexistent. In several countries in East and Central Europe, political parties identifying themselves as on the left have done well electorally or seem headed toward success in the near future. These are not unreconstructed Communist groups of the sort that provide an important part of the opposition to Yeltsin in Russia. They mainly term themselves social democratic and claim not to be restorationist. Their links to the previous Communist parties are significant, however; whether or not they derive from a formal act of reconstitution, there are continuities of personnel, organization, and sometimes property.
Such parties have had surprising electoral successes in several countries where their predecessors were thrown out of power over the last decade (where no abrupt shift occurred and a more-or-less reformed old regime remains in power, a different dynamic is at work). Why have such forces gained ground?
1. No Soviet Threat
One factor that allows left parties and currents to gain strength is, ironically, the demise of the Soviet Union. Put simply, that historic event makes a vote for left parties less dangerous - there is no plausible scenario through which such a vote will lead to the return of the Red Army. Thus even parties that seem uncomfortably close to the old regime cannot be credibly charged with ties to the old regime's patron.
This deep change in the regional political terrain guarantees nothing for parties of the left. But it does remove, or at least limit to a domestic issue, any threat that a vote for a left party will be the last vote.
2. Democracy is Forgetful
Even if a Soviet threat makes voting for the left less costly, aren't their ties to the Communist past ties of parts of the renewed leftan unbearable electoral and political burden? Since the answer is apparently no, one must consider a deeper question lying behind the first, namely, isn't it shameful that such a resurgence is feasible?
Left parties are subject to special scrutiny regarding their commitment to democratic processes. Hesitation and ambiguous action will hurt them very badly. Yet democratic practices are forgetful in the sense that the fierce pressure of ongoing political competition can wipe away prior malfeasance. Memories can be shortened by the need to address urgent immediate problems.
Thus, to the extent that these parties behave according to the new democratic rules, their links to oppressive regimes will be of diminishing importance. Democratic political competition is present-minded and often disrespectful of even recently formed understandings of political history. It is surprising, and in a sense even scandalous, that ex-Communists can approach or even regain power so soon as social democrats. Amidst regular electoral procedures, however, if ex-Communists don't act like social democrats, they will rapidly become marginal.
3. Poland is not (West) Germany
What politics should we expect after Communism? By and large, opposition currents under the Communist regimes were most closely in contact with intellectuals and political forces in Western Europe and North America. Many of the latter saw in the anti-Communist movements and currents of opinion a confirmation of their view that contemporary politics has moved beyond left and right.
If there are strong tendencies to blur conventional left-right dichotomies in the most economically prosperous OECD countries, the ex-Communist states are not bound to duplicate that experience, at least not yet. There are other possibilities, and to imagine them it may not be most useful to think in terms of West Germany, Sweden, or France. I would suggest another analogy, one not intended to generate precise predictions so much as to direct attention toward the types of political forces that we might expect to develop in Poland or the Czech Republic or Hungary.
4. Eastern and Southern Europe
In the 1970s and 1980s dictatorships were toppled and replaced with apparently durable democratic orders in Southern Europe - Portugal, Greece, and Spain. Nearby, a longstanding Christian Democratic regime in Italy gradually decayed and may finally be finished. If one recalls these countries in the 1970s there are a number of political and social parallels with the contemporary situation of the more prosperous countries of East and Central Europe. In all the countries of Southern Europe, democratic left parties (Socialist or Euro-Communist) have been able to gain a substantial vote through several elections, ranging from 25-40%. The party configuration has differed among these countries, but in each of them a major left party or coalition of parties has been a serious contender for national political power.
This seriousness was initially conditional on such parties affirming three points: 1) they are liberal parties in that they avow respect for political rights and for constitutional procedures regarding property relations; 2) they affirm a welfare state rather than a full governmental determination of resource shares; and 3) they are secular but not anticlerical. It might be objected that some of these features are now taken for granted, and others are shared by all parties. To the extent that either point holds it signifies the strength of a broad political framework within which these left parties can present programs.
It may be that the recent and prospective upsurge of a left in East and Central Europe should be read in the light of the experience of Southern Europe, where democratic left parties became major political actors during or soon after the fall of the dictatorships. This analogy would suggest that a renewed left is a likely feature of a "normal" postauthoritarian politics. If this analogy has merit, it would imply that subject to strict scrutiny in terms of democratic norms, such parties should be welcomed into politics. The alternative, given actual conditions in countries like Poland, is more likely to be a distortion of political dialogue and a reduction of modes of legitimate protest than a smooth transition to a new and more open politics beyond left and right.
One might object to my argument by analogy that I have paid insufficient attention to the historic identification of the left with the Communist regimes--therefore I overstate the routine character of the renewal of left parties. Possibly so. But I have my doubts as to whether such an identification will prove sufficient to determine the forms of political life in the ex-communist countries very far into the future. First, some of the left parties in Southern Europe had to reject substantial authoritarian legacies of their own in order to gain electoral significance. Second, in Southern Europe conservative parties with many links to the old regimes have managed to gain national office or at least respectable levels of electoral support--they have not been permanently disqualified. Third, the reformed (or quasi-reformed) parties of the left in East and Central Europe are typically not competing with organized parties that can claim primary credit for demolishing the Communist regimes.
Given these factors, the way is open for democratic politics to be mainly about sharp competition among rival conceptions of how to manage daunting problems. In countries like Poland and Hungary, there is much to disagree on within fairly conventional left-right terms: the extent of social welfare provision; the distributive effects of taxes; the relative weight of concerns about inflation and unemployment in macroeconomic policy; and the role of religious institutions in national politics and education. As so many analysts have noted, we can expect such issues to be intertwined with national and ethnic conflicts. And the postconventional issues of Western European politics will also take hold in East and Central Europe. These conditions may limit the size and prospects of left parties in the ex-Communist states, and encourage the growth of as yet unfamiliar coalitions and political perspectives. In the meantime, a renewal of left parties may be neither surprising nor very ominous if we think about the recent experience of other countries that have sought to build democratic forms after the end of an authoritarian regime.
David Plotke is Associate Professor in the GF Political Science Department.
I Want to be Your Partner The initiative defines our government's position vis-a-vis the demise of Communism, arguably this century's most sweeping political revolution. What will the "transition to democracy" of post-Communist societies look like? How, when, where, and over how long a period will it take place? Answers to such questions are an essential part of our destiny. Whether we even have a destiny at all may depend on these answers.
The former "people's democracies"--the Soviet-bloc countries situated in East Central Europe--are well on their way to becoming "regular democracies" following the 1989 annus mirabilis. On the whole their citizens have a genuine sense of belonging to the West. They have multiple and intimate ties with western societies due to centuries of westward migration from the region. They have a long-standing, deep admiration for the United States, a country where their once poor relatives have "made it", and which is distant enough to shine in the collective imagination of successive generations as a promised land.
East Europeans' sentimental attachment has withstood shameful deals that the West has already concluded twice this century at their expense and, as it belatedly discovered, not even to its own benefit. Their commitment and deeply felt need to be integrated into the Western political, economic, and military institutions is about to be frustrated once again, even though their participation would enhance the strength of these institutions (i.e. "our" own security and welfare) in no small degree. We are about to decline a plea for inclusion into NATO from about one hundred million residents of Europe, who are genuinely fearful about their future. There had better be good reasons why we are doing this.
As best we can tell, our State Department is responding to President Yeltsin's worries about the growth of nationalist sentiments in Russia. It is argued (both by Yeltsin in Moscow and, apparently, by Strobe Talbott in Washington) that the sense of "encirclement" that East Europeans' inclusion into NATO might generate in Russia could feed ugly nationalist sentiments over there. Mr. Zhirinovsky's recent electoral success is apparently a case in point.
But in effect, Zhirinovsky's success was primarily a proof of the power of television. He turned out to have the most telegenic personality among all the candidates; from single digit support he moved in four weeks to garner a plurality of the votes cast. He got the most television exposure under the equal time access provisions of electoral law, because he was the only individual whom his Liberal Democratic Party put before the cameras. He could say anything he wanted, because he didn't have a record to run against. He has an easy talent for one-liners and addressed an exhausted and dispirited electorate. About one eighth of eligible voters supported him. If this sounds familiar, then we'll also appreciate that the content of his message mattered less to his supporters than the messenger, and the good feeling he projected that he can quickly set things right. As to whether NATO's intent is to encircle Russia, our State Department, if in doubt, should consult Manfred Worner. I bet it is not. For rabid nationalists in Russia, they chiefly feed off events in Moldova, Crimea, Abchazia, and the rest of the "near abroad", and will have enough to feed their frenzy in the foreseeable future with or without the Partnership for Peace.
Mr. Yeltsin's desire to play a "good cop's" role to Zhirinovsky's "bad cop" is transparent enough, and justified. It is his responsibility, maybe even his instinct, not to foreclose Russia's imperial option for the future. Are we willing to accommodate him--should he have such a temptation? Or is the U.S. administration seriously proposing to conceptualize our foreign policy according to the moods and perceptions of those Russian voters who supported an authoritarian nationalist who calls himself a liberal
democrat? Do we have that much confidence in their collective judgment? Isn't there enough confusion in the State Department already?
We have to tell Yeltsin, it seems to me, that he need not worry, that NATO does not have aggressive intentions vis-a-vis Russia, and that neither does the United States. On the other hand, the East Europeans have powerful reasons to be concerned about Russia's intentions, since they have been repeatedly subjugated or dominated by a Communist as well as a non-Communist Russia over the span of several centuries. And if Yeltsin worries all the same, well, that's just too bad. We can do no better than assume he is a reasonable man with a lot of real problems to face up to. We should just go about our business--which happens to be his business as well.
We should continue helping Russia on its way to democracy, while building a solid framework for an all-around peace and security. At the present moment this may call for bringing into the fold of NATO, if such is their sovereign wish, those 100 million citizens of Europe. One can conceive a number of intriguing and original scenarios for the evolution of international relations. But grounding the logic of American foreign policy in the anticipated judgments and perceptions of Zhirinovsky's Russian sympathizers ought not be one of them.
In short, there are better things than the Partnership for Peace that we can do, indeed that we should do, to stave off the rise of aggressive Russian nationalism. Firstly, we ought to implement a massive, imaginative, and substantial program of material and technical assistance to help the citizens of Russia (and other successor states of the Soviet Union) in their difficult transition from state-run to market-driven economies. The Under Secretary of State designate, Mr. Talbott, was in charge of doing precisely this till he was recently elevated to his new office. Whatever the reasons for his promotion, the American public has not yet been informed as to what he had accomplished in his previous capacity. (Naturally, this matter should be satisfactorily reviewed during his confirmation hearings in the Senate.)
The other necessary foreign policy initiative to stunt the growth of nationalism in Russia must be played out in former Yugoslavia. We must deny success to aggressive nationalists over there. The Serbian war of aggression on its neighbors must be stopped, and the Serbo-Croat collusion in the dismemberment of Bosnia-Herzegovina must be turned around. The State Department has yet to earn its keep by developing effective strategies to serve our national interest there.
Partnership for Peace in the former Yugoslavia may be elusive, but we can certainly limit the scope of hostilities over there. And if we can then we must, or else we become directly responsible for this war's horrors and bloodbath. The West has already imposed an arms embargo on the region, but it can be effectively implemented only against the Bosnians. (Since no other warring party is encircled by enemy territory, the Serbs' and the Croats' arsenals are overflowing.) We should, therefore, at least deny the use of heavy weapons to the combatants; given the current pattern of hostilities this means, in effect, denying it to the Serbs and the Serb-sponsored militias.
Let the United States join in the deployment of some 250,000 United Nations peace-keeping troops on the ground, so that the U.N. contingent no longer remains hostage to local uniformed thugs. Then every heavy gun fired in violation of the U.N. resolution banning them, every helicopter or aircraft that flies an unauthorized sortie, should be taken out. If our military is not capable of effectively carry ing out such a mission against the assorted butchers of civilians in this blood-drenched corner of Europe, then heads should roll--in the Pentagon. For if it can not deliver on this one, it will be a sure sign that we, the taxpayers, have been cheated, and that we are far from getting even a decent "bang" for some pretty steep "bucks" that we have paid out over the years.
Let us also not forget about the war crimes tribunal. An international warrant should be issued for the arrest of Seselji, Milosevic, Karadic, Mladic, and everyone else responsible for the atrocities perpetrated during this brutal conflict. Until they are apprehended, let them remain confined to their own countries, which they have already run down by their hubris. (Perhaps there they will finally be brought to justice by their exhausted Fellow citizens.) Surely, the taming and the house arrest imposed on hurrah nationalists from the former Yugoslavia would give Zhirinovsky food for different thoughts than those of our leaving East Central Europe hanging out to dry, under the guise of a partnership for peace. What better way is there to stave off his ugly rhetoric, and cool the enthusiasm of his admirers, than by showing ruthlessness, ethnic hatred, and imperial ambition policed and punished by the international community?
Jan T. Gross is Professor of Politics at New York University.
Transforming East Germany's
Universities The legal basis for the unification of the two German post-war states is to be found in the Unification Act of October 3, 1990. In particular, this act contains general guidelines for the incorporation of the East German education system into the West German one, with special attention given to universities. Because the unification was performed according to Article 23 of the West German "Grundgesetz", the provisional constitution effectively entailed the submission of the former German Democratic Republic to West German law. That is, the whole political, economic and administrative system of East Germany was legally subsumed.
Since Germany is constituted as a federal republic, the states act independently in educational and cultural matters. However, the unification act prescribed a two-step procedure for the transition and adaptation process. First, the various states' parliaments had to pass temporary laws--the so-called "university renewal acts"--which regulated the transition process for universities. This stage had to be completed by October 3, 1993, when final legislation regarding universities in the five new federal states was mandated to be in place.
For those institutes or departments no longer needed in the now-unified Germany, and for those which were so ideologically anachronistic that fundamental reform was in order, the unification act prescribed a procedure call "Abwicklung", or "overhaul". All philosophy departments--which were, of course, ideologically biased--were most affected by this procedure. The institutes of Marxism-Leninism and special academies attached to the Central Committee of the Communist party were closed down altogether. There is only one institute in West Germany that I know of which was also overhauled, an institute which conducted research on the GDR, a plainly unnecessary project now, although one which I think will eventually reappear, if only in departments of history.
Since the procedures at the various universities were different, I can only speak in detail about my experience at the TU-Dresden. In general, there were two stages: first, the evaluation of existing departments, and second, the creation of departments which had been absent in the former GDR, such as departments of political science. To oversee the overhaul, the new State Minister for Education and Universities appointed so-called "Gründungsdekane", or "founding deans", all of whom, so far as I know, came from West Germany. Aided by similarly-appointed "founding committees", the deans were responsible for all reforms and restructuring up to the point at which the various departments could carry out a democratic election of the university governance system.
During this transition period, the founding deans obviously occupied positions of great power. It was a more or less authoritarian way to set up democracy. Direct democracy could have been another way to direct the transformation process, but I personally do not believe this would have worked very well under these special circumstances. Whether or not a university's reform was carried out fairly was highly dependent upon the sensitivity and open-mindedness of a given dean, because East Germany was (and is) in a situation comparable to a colonized country.
One of the more reasonable aspects of this process were the staffing decisions, for which the deans were also responsible. There was a 50% reduction of positions during the transition period. Of the positions to be retained, from lab assistant up to the highest rank of professor, all were filled on a competitive basis. For administrative staffs at the university level, as well as for the scientific staff, this competition was nation-wide. However, if they had the requisite qualifications, former staff members received bonuses in addition to their retention. A political assessment of all East German applicants was made by elected "personnel committees"; staff members in high-ranking positions in the former Communist Party, or who had collaborated with the Secret Service, were scrutinized first.
In some ways the overhaul of the department of philosophy at the TU-Dresden is exceptional in comparison to that at other universities. On the one hand, the founding dean had many of the above-mentioned, desirable personal qualities, but on the other, because the former Institute of Philosophy was very small, a completely new department had to be developed" ; it was more a process of creation than destruction. The result was that a greater number of East Germany scholars than elsewhere had the opportunity to continue their scientific work or to receive one of the many new appointments available.
At the end of this three-year period, the Technische Universität at Dresden became a full-fledged university offering a complete spectrum of sciences, engineering, arts, and humanities. Presently there are more than 20,000 students studying there.
I have tried to report this series of events as objectively as possible; however, I must add that, despite the ultimately positive outcome, the last three years have been a truly difficult time for me and for everyone involved.
Doz. Dr. Hans-Peter Böhm, of the Faculty of Philosophy, Technische Universität, Dresden, was a Visiting Scholar at the GF in Fall 1993.
COLLABORATIVE COURSESCourses in 1994
The 1994 Collaborative Courses will take place in four universities this spring: New Bulgarian University and Sofia University in Sofia, Bulgaria; Comenius University in Bratislava, Slovakia; and Eotvos Lorand University in Budapest, Hungary. The courses are arranged by ECEP in coordination with local professors and involve the planning of the syllabus, the shipment of books and materials, and the coordination of visits by four New School professors. The course, Introduction to Political Sociology, has been introduced into the curriculum in two Bulgarian sites, in Sofia at the New Bulgarian University it will be organized and taught by Professor Dobrin Kanev of the Political Science Department, while at Sofia University, it will be presented by Professors Rumyana Kolarova, Georgy Karasimeonov, and Dmiter Dimitrov of the Political Science Department. Professors Jeffrey Goldfarb,David Plotke, and Aristide Zolberg from the New School will travel to Sofia to give lectures on specific topics.
At Comenius University in Bratislava, Slovakia, the course is being organized and taught by Miroslav Kusy and Sylvia Mihalikova, both of the Political Science Department; Andrew Arato, Jeffrey Goldfarb, David Plotke, and Aristide Zolberg of the New School will co-teach. Books are deposited in the universities' faculty libraries.
In Budapest, Professor Antal Orkeny is coordinating a new course, Political Theory of Ethnicity and Minorities. This course will focus on the main political, legal, and social aspects of the ethnic and minority issues in East and Central Europe as they relate to the current transition from state socialism. Among theœteachers of the course will be three New School professors, Andrew Arato, Jeffrey Goldfarb, and David Plotke, as well as ECEP Associate Andras Kovacs, and Gabor Fodor, and Miklos Tamas Gaspar. The course is part of the master's degree program of Ethnic and Minority Studies, organized by the Institute of Sociology, Eotvos Lorand University.
Report from the Budapest Course 1993
Issues in the Sociology of Democracy was a course jointly organized by the New School for Social Research and the Institute of Sociology, ELTE-Budapest, in Spring 1993. It focused on various models of democracy and explored the relationship of sociological concepts and approaches to the problems of democratic politics. The ten one-hour lectures were followed by a discussion in each case.
The visiting professors were: Ferenc Fehér (majoritarian and consensus models), Agnes Heller (modernity and democracy), Andrew Arató (civil society) and Ann Snitow ("Gender, Family Socialization and Democracy") of the New School; and Ulrich Preuss ("Democracy and Constitutionalism") of Bremen University.
A full report on the course is available from the ECEP office.
Democracy & Diversity,
Cracow Summer Institute, July 20-Aug.10, 1994The following are the titles and instructors of courses to be offered in this year's session; all professors, except where indicated, are from the Graduate Faculty of the New School:
× Constituting Democracy: The Political Theory of Hannah Arendt, with Jeffrey C. Goldfarb, Dept. of Sociology;
× Ethnos and Demos: The Dynamics of 19th-20th Century Nationalism, with Elzbieta Matynia, Comm. on Liberal Studies, and Jerzy Szacki, GSSR, Warsaw;
Theories of Gender in Culture, with Ann Snitow, Comm. on Liberal Studies;
× Democracy after Communism, with David Plotke, Dept. of Political Science; and
× Families, Women, and Public Policy, a special workshop on policy design and analysis with Elaine Zimmerman, Executive Director of the Commission on Children, The State of Connecticut General Assembly.
For more information, contact Sharon Cooley, East & Central Europe Program, 229-5580, or Cynthia Mueller, GF Admissions Office, 229-5710.q
Regional Collaborators Among the programs of ICC are: the Center for the Promotion of Arts and Sciences; the Institute for Urban, Architectural, and Monument Preservation Studies; the Institute of European Cultures; and the College for The New Europe.
The ECEP has worked closely for three years already with the ICC's College for the New Europe in organizing our Summer Graduate Institute, Democracy and Diversity. The regular program of the College for The New Europe also includes four courses, open to the international community of scholars and students, on the politics and culture of the region.
A full description of the ICC and its programs can be obtained from the ECEP office, or from Dr. Jacek Purchla, Director, ICC, College for The New Europe, Rynek Gl. 25, 31-008 Krakow, Poland; or Fax: (48) 12 218-571.q
Annual Democracy Seminar MeetingFor the first time, incorporated into the annual meetings of the Democracy Seminars will be the concerns of our International Working Groups, which have been studying the problems of political parties, ethnicity, and gender. Each Working Group will prepare a "position paper" dealing with their central issue with the expectation that interested members of Democracy Seminar chapters will respond to them in writing; these responses should reflect members' own national experiences of the various issues. The position papers, along with the responses, will be presented during each session of the conference in May. The ECEP plans to send the "position papers" to each branch of the Democracy Seminar by the end of March.
THE NEW DEMOCRACIES:
DIVERGENT PATHS
(program outline)
May 28
Morning session: Nationality and Diversity: Challenges to Liberalism
and Democracy
Afternoon session: Political Parties and Party Systems in East and
Central Europe
May 29
Morning session: Religion and the Public Sphere
Afternoon session: Smaller discussions of the various international
Working Groups for further project planning.
The co-organizers of this annual meeting are Iveta Radicova and Martin Bútora of the Bratislava Chapter of the Democracy Seminar, Hviezdoslavovo námesti. 17, 81102 Bratislava, Slovakia (Milan Simecka Foundation), FAX: (427) 333-552.
NOTESMonday, February 7
l Robert L. Hutchings, Fellow at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, Washington, D.C., spoke on U.S. Interests in Eastern Europe Beyond the Cold War.
IN MARCH:
Monday, March 7
l Prof. Jacek Kurczewski, Professor at the Institute of Applied Social Sciences University of Warsaw, former Speaker of the Polish Parliament will speak on The Experience of Parliamentarianism In Emerging Democracies at 6:00pm in NYU's Main Bldg., Washington Square East, Rm. 703.
Tuesday, March 15
l Prof. Ulrich Preuss, Professor of the Faculty of Public Law, University of Bremen, and Fellow of the East and Central Europe Program, will speak for the New York chapter of the Democracy Seminar on Observations on the Concept of Citizenship in the Constitutional Evolution in East and Central Europe, at 12:00 p.m. in Room 217.
Thursday, March 17
l Prof. Reka Ivekovic, a long-time faculty member of the University of Zagreb, Croatia, will speak on the philosophical aspects of nationalism at 8:00p.m. in Room 217. This lecture is sponsored by the GF Department of Philosophy.
Wednesday, March 30
l Prof. Andrei Marga, Rector of the "Babes-Bolyai" University in Cluj-Napoca, Romania, will speak on Democratic Politics and the Dangers of Restoration: the Case of Romania, at 6:00 p.m. in Room 242.
IN APRIL:
Monday, April 4
l Prof. Marcin Krol, Institute of Applied Social Sciences, Warsaw University, and Editor-in-Chief of Res Publica, will speak on The Realm of the Political in the New Democracies, at 5:30 p.m. in Room 242.
IN MAY:
Monday, May 2
l AICA (International Association of Art Critics)-USA Section (their annual meeting, open to the public), Rising From the Rubble: Getting a Critical Foothold on the New Artworld in the U.S., Eastern Europe and Western Europe, in Swayduck Auditorium from 7:00-9:00 p.m. The program will feature critics, curators, and speakers from the respective regions.
TBA
l Prof. Elena Michailovska, head of the Department of Sociology, Sofia University, will speak on Biographical Challenges and Collective Memory in Post-Communist Bulgarian Society (1989-1993), Date and Room TBA.
All events take place at the New School for Social Research, 65 Fifth Avenue. For more information, please call Sharon Cooley at (212) 229-5580.q
Meetings
Meetings in Winter 1993/94 were held with:
Social ResearchThe following authors and co-authors are included in the volume: Martin Bútora and Zora Bútorová; Gábor Gyáni; Pavel Campeanu and Stefana Steriade; Jiri Kabele; Mira Marody; Arista Maria Cirtautas and Edmund Mokrzycki; Jirina äiklová; Jan Kulig and Adam Lipowski; Jacek Kochanowicz; Gale Stokes; Claus Offe; Petr Pithart; and György Csepeli, Tamás Kolosi, Mária Neményi, and Antal Örkény.
The East Faces West; The West Faces East issue of SOCIAL RESEARCH
(Volume 60, Issue 4) is available at a special rate of $5.00/copy (supplies
limited). To order, please write to the journal c/o Tracey McPeake, 65
Fifth Avenue, Room 354, NY, NY 10003.
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