In Susan Sontag’s essay, “The Imagination of Disaster,” she talks about fantasy, and particularly horror and fantasy movies, as able “to normalize what is psychologically unbearable, thereby inuring us to it.... neutraliz[ing] it.” These brief remarks ask whether that same cultural work—the cultural work of neutralization—might be performed by conferences like the one published in this volume. To borrow from Lee Clark, for example, how do we keep the genuine horror of possibility (his term) from being submerged/neutralized/assimilated into the quotidian roar of statistical probability and its accompanying protocols? One might also turn the question around and ask, How we can avoid the paralysis that comes with dwelling too much on the horror of disaster? This collection of papers is a good start.

Global warming provides a useful frame of reference for examining the problem of disasters. This papers uses this frame to address three questions: What is a disaster, why do disasters matter so much, and how can we improve our capacity to avoid and respond to disasters. The concept of vulnerability to disasters has biogeophysical as well aspolitical and socioeconomic aspects. The gap between adaptive capacity on the one hand, and actual responses to disaster and the risk of disaster on the other, was evident in the cases of Hurricane Katrina and the European heat wave of 2003. One feature of climate-related disasters (which resembles risks inherent in new technologies) is that past experience provides only limited guidance on the potential frequency and intensity of future disasters because the risks are changing as greenhouse gasses increase in the atmosphere. Accordingly, the ability to successfully apply lessons learned will be increasingly

A great deal of scholarship defines rational thought in terms of probability theory. An important problem with such an approach is that disasters, particularly large disasters, do not provide us with a meaningful distribution of events that would approximate a normal curve. Here, I propose that using possibilistic thinking can helpfully complement probabilistic thinking regarding risk and disaster. Possibilistic thinking highlights consequences of actions or events, while not ignoring their likelihood of occurrence. I point out the myriad ways that individuals and organizations use possibilistic thinking, even if they do not recognized it as such. I propose several conceptual tools to help discipline a possibilistic approach.

Disasters are not events; they are processes. True, news media inevitably focuses our attentions on the disaster singularity because it makes such compelling coverage. In the era of reality TV it’s about as good as it gets. Buildings are torn apart as we watch, people are seen in abject distress; there are miraculous escapes and heroic rescues and, as the cameras follow rescue workers into the rubble of buildings or search houses as flood waters recede, we might even see a real (live?) corpse. The only thing to compare is war reporting. Watching disaster coverage live on television is something akin to necro-voyeurism. But like wars and other forms of deadly conflict, disasters are anything but the singularities portrayed in news coverage. They have long portentous rehearsals and extended coda, little of which makes for entertainment like graphic scenes of destruction. The purpose of these remarks is to highlight the social conditions that lead to disaster, drawing on global and local lessons from natural disasters and deadly conflicts.

The contributions in this section make clear that while certain forces of nature have the potential to become catastrophic, a disaster can only be fully achieved through the playing out of human choices, political processes, and social structures. The pursuit of wealth and power, the setting of public priorities, the design of political institutions, and tolerance for inequality and discrimination, these authors argue, shape both the extent to which a potential disaster is realized and the highly uneven distribution of vulnerability to nature's destructive capacity. Yet, they also contend that, if human decisions and public policies greatly influence the extent and differential impact of disasters, some man-made elements can also be deployed to prevent disasters or mitigate their effects. The papers reflect on the current moment while taking a historical perspective on the politics of disasters and show how the choices, institutions, and policies that create and distribute vulnerability change over time. They all argue (some more explicitly than others) for changes in the way the US political system works and on whose behalf it works for. Major reforms are needed if we are to ever shake that déjà vu feeling when the forces of nature.

Natural and industrial disasters are increasing in the U.S., and the terrorist threat is still with us. Our response has been proximate remediation and protection—rather than basic—reducing our vulnerabilities. Reducing vulnerabilities will involve the deconcentration of hazardous materials, of population density in vulnerable areas, and of private centers of economic and political power. The objection that deconcentration will entail economic inefficiencies is addressed by examining four systems that are very large, highly efficient, robust, radically decentralized, and innovative: the Internet, the electric power grid, networks of small firms, and, alas, terrorist networks. All are threatened, but regulation by a strong state could preserve the efficiency of the first three, and muster the tools to thwart the fourth.

This paper uses an environmental justice framework to examine government response to weather-related disasters dating back some eight decades. It places the 2005 Hurricane Katrina disaster in socio-historical context of past emergencies with an emphasis on race and class dynamics and social vulnerability. Key questions explored include: What went wrong? Can it happen again? Is government equipped to plan for, mitigate against, respond to, and recover from natural and manmade disasters? Can the public trust government response to be fair? Why are so many African Americans “locked out” of New Orleans' post-Katrina rebuilding, reconstruction, and recovery?

In every corner of the globe, natural hazards are ubiquitous and varied from every perspective. Atmospheric and weather conditions, geological movements and other recurrent disturbances would occur with or without the existence of humans on the planet. It is when these natural events cause catastrophic consequences for human populations that they become what we call “disasters.” The extent to which people are at risk under disaster conditions, irrespective of etiology, is dependent upon many factors, not the least of which is “ill fortune”; simply being at the wrong place, at the wrong time. But sometimes people elect to live in communities where disaster risks are well known; and sometimes options are limited because of livelihood demands. But in almost all cases, biological and social factors can greatly increase vulnerability to the consequences of disaster. People with chronic illness or disability and people with limited economic or social resources are representative of populations who face exacerbated risk under a wide range of disaster scenarios.

No recent natural disaster since perhaps the great Mississippi floods of 1927 and 1993 has had such an immense impact on our national pride and confidence, as did Katrina. The reason was evident from the time the storm began to form in the Gulf of Mexico to once it hit land, our government at all levels was dazed and confused. The billions spent on infrastructure and the organizational structures operating for decades were overwhelmed. This was a disaster of great proportions taking place in one of the poorest communities in our country with some of the most important economic structures in the land. Our largest port, a huge network of oil and gas pipeline and production facilities, offshore drilling, ship building and some of our largest fisheries to just cite a few examples. Much has been written and debated about this event and its impacts on the local area and the nation and this paper does not intend to replicate that work. The focus here is on the process used to support and invest in the nations water resources infrastructure. It will describe changes that have come about in recent years and why this process may do more to put people and communities at risk.

After the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the worst disaster in the history of New York City, the Fire Department of New York (FDNY) faced a monumental challenge in rebuilding the Department, and in continuing to provide emergency services for New York City in a daunting new threat environment. Fire Commissioner Nicholas Scoppetta, who took over the agency in December 2001, describes how the FDNY has rebounded and what lessons were learned that terrible day.

The papers in this section explores how communities and individuals prepare for, and respond to, disasters and the extent to which they do that directly, indirectly or subconsciously. By asking, or perhaps stating “What ‘Really’ Happens When Disasters Happen,” Erwann Michel- Kerjan, Elliot Aronson, Enrico L. Quarantelli, and Howard Kunreuther unpack the personal and political calculus of disaster preparation and response. What is it about reality in the context of disasters that promises a socially constructed encounter? I would argue, and the essays that follow make clear, that the temporal and social geography of risk is shifting.

This paper examines the challenge of the calculus of risk while arguing for the necessity of new risk architecture. The field of catastrophe risk management today is faced with disasters of a totally new nature and scale as well recent important events that pose significant challenges to the established paradigm. This paper proposes a new risk architecture based around the following six central features: Growing interdependencies/globalization; change in scale from local to global risks; extreme costs, extreme benefits (a new loss dimension); confusing distribution of roles and responsibilities of preparedness; celerity (toward a just-in-time society); and uncertainty, if not ignorance. The paper then looks at large-scale natural disasters and terrorism threats as two illustrative cases for understanding this new threat architecture, arguing that uncertainty related to the estimate of future disaster is even more challenging because it is so dynamic. The paper argues that in this new era of global risks and interdependencies, how people make long-term decision under conditions of uncertainty will be an important element to consider in developing the new risk architecture.

How can we use our knowledge of how the mind works to help people act in ways that can prevent disaster, prepare for it, or at the very least, help them respond to a disaster in ways that will reduce its impact? This paper suggests that the most effective method for helping the public deal with disaster, and preventing denial, is to provide them with a concrete, doable, and effective strategy. A number of examples are discussed, including government warnings about increased threat levels, the handling of the 9/11 cleanup by the EPA, the disaster relief problems during Hurricane Katrina and several social psychology experiments which used a “hypocrisy paradigm” to address condom use and water conservation among college students. The paper suggests that the best policy approach for dealing with disaster is one which not only convinces people to prepare for disasters by changing their behaviors through puncturing their rationalizations but also one where communication which produces high fear can lead to sensible action.

In the early 1950s, the pioneer disaster researchers set forth what they called a series of “disaster myths.” They said there were six widely accepted major ideas about how human beings behaved in disaster situations, but for which they could find little or no support in their field studies. This paper describes these beliefs as that people in crises react in irrational panicky ways and behave in an antisocial manner by looting, that impacted populations are passive in the face of threats and manifest severe mental health consequences, as well as irresponsibly abandoning their role responsibilities because people can not rise to the challenges of a crisis. The paper then examines whether the very extensive research of the last 50 years raises questions about the validity of the idea of “disaster myths.” It reports there still is solid research based data for four of the myths; people do not panic, abandon important social roles, are passive, and are unable to rise to the challenges of the extremes stress of a disaster. Looting is still very rare in typical disasters in Western type societies but the picture is unclear for other kinds of social systems; mass looting can occur in catastrophes (being different from disasters) if some other facilitating social conditions are present. The question of severe mental health consequences in disasters is hotly disputed by two competing points of view that are not easily reconcilable.

This paper examines the role that insurance and mitigation can play in reducing losses from natural disasters using data collected as part of a large-scale study on catastrophic risk jointly undertaken by the Wharton Risk Management Center in conjunction with Georgia State University and the Insurance Information Institute. The paper graphically demonstrates why disaster losses have increased in the past twenty-five years and the magnitude of the problem today. It then shows how mitigation measures can reduce future losses using data on residential homes from four states facing severe risks from hurricanes. Insurance premiums can be used to incentivize homeowners to invest in protective measures if disaster coverage programs adhere to a set of guiding principles. The paper proposes long-term insurance as a way of reducing losses from future disasters and addressing concerns facing insurers and homeowners in hazard-prone areas.

The papers in this section demonstrate several interesting points about disasters, and about academic interest in them, including a remarkable convergence of perspective about what is important: the extent and dimensions of people's suffering as a result of disaster; the view that conventional approaches to thinking about disaster are insufficient; the realization that the idea of “natural” disaster misleadingly draws attention away from the pre-existing conditions that make people vulnerable to hazards in the first place. All agree, too, that at least two of the three of the big troika of inequality, race, class, and gender are crucial. Notably absent at the conference from which these papers came was any deep discussion of gender; indeed, notably absent from the program were women. Their absence was not because of lack of effort on the part of the conference organizers to invite female scholars. Female scholars were invited, but could not attend. Their absence is evidence of a paucity of female scholars in the field.

Disasters arising from natural hazards affect millions of people every year, killing tens of thousands and causing major economics losses. They disproportionately affect poor people and poor countries and are a threat to the achievement of the Millennium Development Goals. A root cause is the vulnerability of communities to natural hazards, often associated with poverty, social and economic disadvantage, environmental exploitation, and insufficient awareness, information, and political interest. Too often, disaster risk is not factored into planning and management, despite the ready availability of the necessary knowledge, tools and policy frameworks to reduce the risks. Moreover it is likely that global warning will increase the number and intensity of hazard events in future. Recognizing these issues, in 2005 Governments agreed on the landmark Hyogo Framework for Action, which seeks to achieve a substantial reduction in disaster losses by 2015. Progress is slow, however, and a greatly scaled-up effort will be needed to achieve this outcome and to avoid an unnecessarily risky and dangerous future for the countless communities worldwide.

This study examines the circumstances under which rural households can use outmigration to cope with negative shocks. In theory, when financial markets are imperfect and when migration involves a fixed cost, the impact of economic shocks on migration can depend on the extent to which shocks are common across households. When shocks are idiosyncratic, shocks are likely to raise migration. But aggregate shocks may make it more difficult to pay fixed migration costs, and so can actually lead to less migration. In a rural household panel from El Salvador, idiosyncratic and aggregate shocks do have opposite effects on migration. Households become differentially more likely to have a migrant relative in the year following an idiosyncratic shock (a death in the family). By contrast, aggregate shocks—proximity to the massive 2001 earthquakes—lead to large differential declines in migration. Increased difficulty in financing migration’s fixed cost is likely to help explain declines in migration in areas closest to the quakes: households in quake-affected areas also experience differential declines in granted credit. Empirical evidence does not support alternative explanations for the quake-induced migration decline, such as a desire for family unity, increases in outside aid, a need for family labor in reconstruction, or improved local income opportunities.

Catastrophic failures such as Hurricane Katrina and the levee collapse in New Orleans events serve as a potent symbol of the havoc caused by longstanding neglect of the public realm in our American cities. It vividly illustrates the risks and complexity we face to rebuild infrastructure systems in ways that will address past shortcomings but also meet new challenges posed by the disruptive shifts in economic, demographic, and environmental conditions underway across the nation. This paper argues that we must study the insights revealed by Katrina and fundamentally rethink the role of infrastructure as a cultural ecology where our private and collective lives add up to systems that supportequitable, robust, resilient and sustainable cities.

Disasters overwhelm resources and threaten the safety and functioning of communities. Mental health and community needs after catastrophic disasters can be substantial, however the effects of traumatic events are not exclusively bad with many people showing individual resilience and some reporting growth. Sustaining the social fabric of the community and facilitating recovery following disaster depends on leadership's knowledge of a community's resilience and vulnerabilities as well as an understanding of the distress, disorder, and health risk behavioral responses. A coordinated systems approach across medical care, public health, and emergency response system is necessary to meet the mental health care needs of a disaster region.