This article does not have an abstract.

This article does not have an abstract.

This article does not have an abstract.

The relation of Hannah Arendt's political theory to Martin Heidegger's philosophy is a fraught topic. This essay explores the basic structure of Arendt's appropriation of Heidegger, the better to defend her theory of political action against oft-repeated charges of elitism and exclusion. In my view, Arendt's critical reading of the canon (and the "traditional substitution of making for acting" that characterizes it) is deeply indebted to Heidegger, even though her ultimate goal--the recovery of human plurality as a basic and irreducible dimension of politics and the public world--is radically un-Heideggerian in nature.

The article deals with the question of how the breach in tradition (Traditionsbruch) became a topos of "Philosophy of Existence" after a particular set of historical experiences -- namely the genocide of the Jews in Europe and the collapse of European nation-states. More concretely, the article explores the ramifications of the biographical ruptures engendered by the years of National Socialism in the lives of several philosophers. Martin Heidegger had already worked with the metaphor of a "breach in tradition" in the 1920s, but this early conception of a "breach" referred to thinking's turn toward the reflecting subject and consciousness, and had its origins in early modernity. The profound historical dislocation, the most visible expression of which was the genocide of the European Jews, effected a certain realignment in the term's use. For Hannah Arendt, the beach appeared in the mid-20th century and had far-reaching ramifications for her thinking about the political. Karl Jaspers, too, began to reflect upon philosophical thinking after the catastrophe; he connected philosophy of existence and moral philosophy. What was at stake when Arendt, Heidegger, and Jaspers started reflecting upon the "breach in tradition"?

Politics seem most alien to the demand for truth, for they engage the future which is, on principle, undeterminable, whereas truth conversely requires that the object be determined according to strict rules. Yet, political philosophy has never renounced the quest for a true understanding of human living_together, an understanding that makes becoming predictable, thus denying its contingency. However lofty, the ambition nonetheless elicited the most devastating political experience in history: totalitarianism. Such a disaster would seem to call for cautious relativism, but letting oneself be ruled by the arbitrariness of opinions is just as irresponsible as obeying the necessity of a postulated "destiny."

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Although Arendt is usually read as a theorist of participatory democracy, her writings on judgment also offer a way of thinking about the role of citizens who do not actively participate, citizens who are more spectators than actors. The difficulties and ambiguities in her account of judgment especially, the elusiveness of standards of judgment arise from her effort to insure that individuals take full responsibility for their judgments.

This article does not have an abstract.

This article does not have an abstract.

This article does not have an abstract.

This paper offers a tentative analysis of some problematic "post-totalitarian" elements that can be found in the processes of establishment of the post-Yugoslav nation-states and have their origin in the time before, during, and after the period of wars and collective crimes. "With a little help" from Arendt, it asks questions about some features of the new post-war communities and their nation-states, such as the following: Why are they based on ideologies of non-responsibility for the past and on some very unpleasant features of the newly established "citizenship" and national identity - producing new exclusions and inventing new techniques of tribal nationalist and racist dehumanization within the framework of a new nation-state's "demographic policies? The analysis is paying special attention to the phenomenon described as an "organized innocence syndrome " - while alluding to Arendt's portrayal of German "organized guilt" under the Nazi-regime and elaborating on her notion of responsibility - a problematic "identity" basis for a nascent state, its citizenship and political institutions in general. To illustrate the phenomenon of organized innocence as a conditioning commonality of all the newly established states, special attention is paid to the post-war case of those called the "erased people" (inhabitants from the former Yugoslavia) in Slovenia."