VOL. 7/2 (ISSUE 25) February 1997
The Graduate Faculty - New School for Social Research
65 Fifth Avenue, Room 404 & 423 - New York, NY 10003
Tel: (212) 229-5580 - Fax: (212) 229-5894 - E-mail: BreuerI@newschool.edu
Director: Elzbieta Matynia; Program Coordinator: Ina Breuer; Assistant
and Bulletin Editor: Heshan de Silva-Weeramuni;
Associate: Magdalena Iwanska
The ECEP is made possible through the generous support of The Eurasia Foundation, The Ford Foundation, The Pew Charitable Trusts, The Andrew W. Mellon Foundation, the USIA, Mr. Aso Tavidian and the G-Tech Corporation.
Table of Contents
Democracy, Diversity
and DramaOur E-mail, fax, and answering machine have been flooded with messages about this winter's many dramas in Belgrade, Sofia, Tirana, and Lima. In this issue of the Bulletin you will find assorted reflections and eyewitness reports by Ivan Vejvoda, Kathy Imholz, Rumyana Kolarova, and Eduardo Gonzalez-Cueva. We are pleased to announce that the latter piece, on the crisis in Lima, launches a new, and we hope regular, column entitled: Latin American Connection.
I am happy to let you know that our summer "campus" in Cracow will be serving again this year as the site of the three-week Democracy & Diversity Institute. As you may know, the Institute, designed for junior scholars from the US, Eastern Europe, and other parts of the world, offers the equivalent of a full semester's study in society, politics and culture. The core faculty comes, as usual, from the New School for Social Research and will be joined by distinguished scholars and guest speakers from Israel, Poland, Russia, and South Africa.
This year's curriculum includes the following offerings:
Citizenship & Continuity in Democratic Politics - Prof. David
Plotke;
Nation, State, Identity - Prof. Shlomo Avineri and Prof. Elzbieta
Matynia;
Politics of Culture in Liberal and Repressive Regimes - Prof.
Jeffrey Goldfarb;
Theories of Gender in Culture - Prof. Ann Snitow;
Public Policy, Citizen Involvement & Communications - Workshop
by Elaine Zimmerman.
Upon completion of the Institute's requirements the US graduate students will be granted credits, and the foreign participants receive certificates. The Institute runs from July 13 through August 2. Anyone interested in joining us should contact ECEP at (212) 229-5580, Fax: (212) 229-5894, or e-mail: BreuerI@newschool.edu. -- E.M.
COGITO ERGO AMBULO
Being a democrat means, primarily, not to be afraid (Istvan Bibo)
Since the first free elections in 1990, only individuals, small opposition groups, and a few political parties supported by a minority of voters had challenged the disastrous policies of the Milosevic regime in Serbia. Then the two-round federal and municipal elections of 1996, on November 3rd and 17th respectively, raised hopes for a possible turn-around.
But the returns on November 3rd dismayed even the most prudent forecasters. The ruling Socialist Party of Serbia along with the Montenegrin Democratic Party of Socialists won a majority; the opposition, which had only managed to form a coalition at the last possible moment in late October, fared badly. There were signs, however, that the coalition, called Zajedno ("Together"), was very well positioned for the municipal elections on November 17th. The opposition leaders doubled their efforts and canvassed broadly to make sure that as many undecided voters as possible went to the polls.
The opposition won overwhelmingly in the capital, Belgrade, and in the other 13 largest cities and towns of Serbia, which, taken together, represent about 60% of the population. The ruling party conceded victory to the opposition on November 18th, but reneged two days later by calling upon the courts to annul the election results. This was the beginning of a state-legal imbroglio in which the regime tried to justify its theft of the opposition's victory. It lasted right up until the enactment of the lex specialist which Milosevic demanded from the parliament in order to reinstate the opposition's victory. Parliament voted for this reinstatement on February 12, 1997.
Those are the facts. What the annulment of the municipal election results sparked off has been called the beginning of Serbia's belated "1989": an outburst of civic energy surfacing after a prolonged state of lethargy. The demands put forward in the protests of Zajedno (which had originally started as victory celebrations) and in the "Student Protest 96/97" (which began on November 22) were simply for the reinstatement of the original election results and democratic process, and for an end to the catastrophic autocratic policies of the regime.
The distinguishing features of this sudden, widespread civic, social, and political movement are these: it encompasses not only Belgrade and Nis, the two largest cities, but all those other cities of inner Serbia where the opposition won, and even in some where it did not; it mobilized a great many of those who had previously remained "at home" waiting for somebody else to do their civic duty for them (38% of the voters "abstained" on November 3); it compelled the Montenegrin leadership to distance itself from Milosevic and to demand recognition of the election results.
The non-violent, civil character of the protests of both the opposition coalition and the students was strongly emphasized. The initial document of the Student Protest of November 27th was revealingly entitled Declaration of Decency, and the main emphasis in its demands was on the "basic principles of democracy, and...the rule of law". Both movements managed to steer through a series of police provocations, shows of force, and use of violence.
The use of imaginative, carnivalesque strategies characterized both movements from the outset. The regime was "fired" at with eggs, blown at with whistles, banged at with pots and pans, and ridiculed by clowns. The overcoming of fear was a defining moment, which reinforced the rock-hard determination of the demonstrators, young and old, to hold out as long as necessary for satisfaction on the main grievances, even if it meant "sticking it out one day longer than Milosevic." As Adam Michnik once wrote: "Our freedom begins with ourselves."
The peripatetic mode of the demonstrations became their trademark. Cogito ergo ambulo - I think therefore I walk. This itinerant taking over of public space, in a society in which the hundreds of thousands of people who were in the streets never for a moment appeared on any of the three state-run TV channels - a truly Orwellian nightmare at the end of the millennium in a European country - triggered in all those taking part an accelerated civil and social learning process.
Five members of the Supreme Court of Serbia spoke out strongly against the abuse of the Constitution and the legal system by the Milosevic regime. Professors, lawyers, artists, writers, officers, taxi drivers, - some as individuals and some in their professional capacity - started voicing their support for the movement and their disgust with the regime's attitude. The Army Chiefs of Staff, in an unprecedented move, received a delegation from the Student Protest and went on record as saying they would not intervene in the conflict in any way. The Orthodox Church came out with a strong statement against the annulment of the elections and against the use of police violence.
Most importantly, those who had followed the events but thought considered active opposition useless, dangerous, or even suicidal, those who had long since become apathetic, or were cynical about the possibility of changing anything, emerged from their seclusion. As a friend once active in the opposition told me: "I never knew I had half a million friends in Belgrade".
The scarce independent media played a gallant role in maintaining, while under duress, the highest standards of professional journalism: independent daily newspapers (Nasa Borba, Dnevni Telegraf, Blic), the independent weeklies (Vreme and NIN), and above all the radio stations B92 and Radio Index in Belgrade, and several in the smaller cities. And for the first time in the history of protest in Yugoslavia, Radio B92, as well as the Student Protest 96/97, took full advantage of the Internet as an alternative public sphere when all else was closed off.
These non-violent protest movements have won salutes from all over the world. Letters of support have come in from George Konrad and Vaclav Havel, from anonymous individuals, from university groups, and from organizations of all kinds (including a sheep farmers' radio station in New Zealand called Radio B92).
The authoritarian regime, once legitimized through previous elections, had to face the beginning of its delegitimization. Its total exclusion of the parliaments (federal and republic) from political decision-making, the monopolization of power in the hands of one person, the lies of the media, the sheer economic devastation and hopelessness, coupled with a creeping and not yet acknowledged sense of shame... all this needed nothing more than one provocation to trigger a public, civic reaction.
As citizens went out into the streets and recognized each other, there began a process of reconstruction of utterly destroyed social bonds. The possibility of visibly recapturing one's civic dignity in public space through public demonstrations of one's freedom of speech, action, and association led to a renewal of hope. This time it happened with the benefit of hindsight and without triumphalism; with prudence, vigilance ,and an awareness that this was an extremely important, but only the first, vulnerable step on the difficult path of inventing democracy.
There are no illusions. The overall situation is dire. Generalized impoverishment, with a politically criminalized, regime-driven remnant of an economy, may lead back into violence and survival tactics on the part of the still-ruling "ancien regime".
Neither the oppositional politicians nor their parties are cut from angelic cloth. Their imperfections and mistakes are known to all, but their deeds in these past 84 days have given them much better credentials than those of respectability and earnest intentions. They now must live up to them in the much more difficult "walk" toward consolidating their coalition, by putting forward a credible electoral platform in accord with all those civic and professional forces that took part in these events.
This time the acceleration of history has helped the hand of those who want to return to a state of normality and peace so that democracy can find its roots. That will be not only the guarantor of stability - and an exit from the darkness - in Serbia, but a voucher for long-term stability and peace in the region.
Ivan Vejvoda, a Social Historian from Belgrade, is currently Visiting Professor at Macalester College in Minnesota.
Bulgarian HopesHere, briefly, is what happened on February 4 in Sofia. On hearing the announcement that pre-term elections are going to be held within ten weeks, tens of thousands of Bulgarians flooded Sofia's streets, dancing, singing, and chanting. People had gathered around the Presidential offices to await the outcome of negotiations between the Prime Minister designee of the governing socialist majority and leaders of the consolidated opposition parties. The recently elected President, Peter Stoyanov, who brokered the end of a political crisis caused by the collapse of the national economy and 30 days of mass protests, was welcomed with cheers. Chanting his name, jubilant demonstrators carried him through the streets. Although proclaimed a hero, he did not incite the people further, but warned them of hard times ahead.
As I read the news on the Internet in my office at the New School, I reacted just like my family and friends in Sofia: smiling and almost dancing I went to the nearby offices of ECEP, ready to hug and kiss whomever I met. Later, when I spoke on the phone with my colleagues and friends in Bulgaria, the mood, though still optimistic, was already much more sober on both ends of the line.
What are the Bulgarians celebrating? Does the phrase, "luckily the democratic regime didn't break down" sound cheerful when compared with the disastrous results of the mismanagement of the country? A collapse seven years after the fall of communism...
There is a revealing detail which impartial scholars may overlook: most of the protests in Sofia had a festive character long before their "victorious" outcome. I was very worried when on the phone I asked why my mother (66) and my son (9) had gone to the rallies. The news agencies had described them as violent. It turned out that they were a lot of fun, especially on the weekends. Thousands of people sang or jumped to the chant, "those who do not jump are red." Surprisingly, seven painful post-communist years and the economic destruction seemed to have nourished a vital civil society.
Yet one must admit that within the framework of East European transitions Bulgaria is a laggard and has little chance of being touted as a success story, even among the so called "second tier" countries. It is a small nation with limited natural resources, has never been "in the center," and will remain on the periphery. The Bulgarian failure has a peculiarity that is also often overlooked both by social scholars and political analysts. After all, Bulgaria has been over-performing in building its new state institutions. This is why the current legitimacy crisis has not affected the democratic regime: protesters demanded pre-term elections, rather than seeking revenge. It was the lack of economic reforms, the blocked privatization, and the rampant criminalization of the economy that caused the government to collapse.
It is known that democratic institutions per se do not directly contribute to the economic welfare of the people; rather democracy is often claimed to be a luxury that poor nations cannot afford. In comparison with the other countries in the Soviet bloc in 1990, Bulgaria was by no means underdeveloped economically. Are Bulgarian politicians the most stupid, unskillful, and corrupt in the region? Have they wasted all the economic assets of the country? Will the new parliamentary majority get rid of the parasitic strategy of the ruling politicians? Where will the new Bulgarian government lead the country - to the West or to the South? These questions leave very little room for jubilation.
Bulgarian democracy has successfully passed a major test: it persisted. There was no revolution, no coup d'état, just a government crisis channeled through the proper institutions. Bulgarian society has managed to survive, despite the humiliating impoverishment of the entire population. Is there any hope that the Bulgarian economy will rebound from its current collapse?
Rumyana Kolarova, a Professor of Political Science, University of Sofia, is currently a Fulbright Fellow at the Graduate Faculty.
Albanian CrisisThe situation in Albania changes daily, so this is certainly out of date.
Albania had the most severe and isolationist Communist government in Eastern Europe, which held to Stalinist ideas long after they had been abandoned almost everywhere else. In early 1991, when the country finally opened up, many foreigners, including myself, became entranced with the people there, people who had been treated so badly by Hoxa's ruthless regime.
Now, unfortunately, Albanians are enduring new hardships, as an inter-related series of economic pyramidal schemes is in the process of collapsing. Although many countries of the region in their transition to a market economy have been vulnerable to "pyramid" schemes that also have a money laundering component, the problem became bigger in Albania, on a percentage basis, than anywhere else. The total amount of money involved is estimated to be $1.6 to $2.4 billion US dollars, a sum which exceeds the annual budget of the Albanian government.
As of mid-February, VEFA, the largest of the companies, has not fallen, but severe civil disturbances have been occurring all over the country. In particular, the southern city of Vlora, where the headquarters of one of the larger of the failed companies is located, has been the site of massive demonstrations for almost a week, demonstrations which have already led to some deaths.
The opposition and the demonstrators allege that the government was involved with some of these companies, and that it received from them substantial campaign contributions for the disputed parliamentary elections last May. Similar allegations have also been made against the government with reference to the quieter local elections held last October. This is one important reason why the failure of these companies is shaking the foundations of the Albanian state.
A Forum for Democracy was formed in early February, headed by Kurt Kola, Fatos Lubonja and Daut Gumeni, three people who were in prison under the Communist regime for a total of 50 years, and who are not affiliated with any political party. The Forum itself represents a broad spectrum of oppositional parties, from the left to the right, including the largest one, the Socialist Party.
The purpose of the Forum is to provide a united political platform, and to lead the country through these difficult days. In its recent Proclamation, which was signed by 18 leading independent intellectuals (among them most notably Fatos Lubonja), the Forum calls for the resignation of the government, for the election of a transitional government to begin dealing with the economic and political problems of the country, and for new parliamentary elections.
Excerpts from the Proclamation of the Forum for Democracy
Step by step, Berisha's regime:
Eliminated the Albanians' right to assemble;
Eliminated the Albanians' right to information;
Eliminated the Albanians' right to an independent judiciary;
Turned the television into a State instrument to attack and to
coerce;
Stole the most expensive structures constructed during the past
50 years;
Destroyed children's playgrounds;
Re-introduced the concept of "Your either with us or against
us";
Beat and imprisoned without reason;Destroyed the opposition;
Stole the only possibility for escaping this clique, the free
vote.
Katherine Imholz, a lawyer who practices in New York, is currently a Fulbright Fellow in Tirana.
Latin American Connection
Half the Peruvian State was taken hostage the night of December 17, 1996, when MRTA Marxist guerrillas assaulted the Residence of the Japanese Ambassador in Peru. Even though the guerrillas released most of the hostages within the first weeks, there remain in the compound about 70 high-ranking officials of the Peruvian government, including two Ministers and --irony of ironies-- the heads of the anti-terrorist police. In exchange for their release, the guerrillas demand the liberation of some 400 members of their organization who suffer draconian prison conditions.
For the Peruvian government this is an ordeal that shakes the relationship between the population and President Alberto Fujimori. In 1992, Fujimori dissolved the Parliament with the help of the Army and changed the Constitution to allow him to govern within severely limited judicial and parliamentary checks. In the following years, harsh economic measures reduced inflation, and a change in anti-terrorist legislation helped to reduce sharply the activities of the Shining Path Maoist guerrillas and the MRTA, putting thousands of its members in prison. The trade-offs of those achievements were a strong and sustained recession, the loss of all the state enterprises (privatized in favor of foreign capital), disappearances, the impunity of government paramilitary groups, and the imprisonment of hundreds of innocents, condemned without elementary rights of defense.
However, a sort of contract between the government and the population worked well enough to give Fujimori an overwhelming victory when he ran for re-election in 1995; but since then, the seriousness of the economic situation has changed the public's mood, as different public-opinion polls show. With his image as an economic wizard shaken, Fujimori still maintained his image as a victorious anti-terrorist leader. He knows that very well, and that is why he consciously stifled open discussions with the rebels for more than fifty days, until the Japanese government asked him to engage in regular negotiations. The Japanese leverage on Fujimori is essential in explaining why the crisis was not solved with military intervention: it is conventional knowledge in Lima that, were the hostages only Peruvians, the government would have attempted an armed takeover.
From the first moment, civil society organizations pressed for a negotiated solution to the crisis and the opening of comprehensive Peace Talks with the MRTA. Civil society, however, is extremely weak after seven years with a government that has destroyed political parties and unions and refused to enter into dialogue with any civic movement opposed to its policies. Thus the role of such movements in the current crisis is limited to reminding the government that the lives of the hostages are not expendable, and that the public would oppose any military intervention.
To confront that pressure, the government has given an answer: masses of municipal workers from city halls controlled by the government have marched in Lima in support of Fujimori and rejecting the MRTA. At the same time, the pro-government press condemns any "conciliation with the terrorists" and maintains that the opposition suffers a generalized "Stockholm syndrome," a psychological condition that links hostages emotionally with their captors. The pro-government press has also insinuated that the International Committee of the Red Cross --the only organization maintaining communication between the hostages and the external world-- is acting consciously as a human shield to protect the guerrillas. The independent press maintains a prudent stance: it is constantly threatened by fiscal debts to the government, and years of an anti-terrorist dirty war have made it prone to self-censorship.
In that scenario, the current negotiations between the government and the guerrillas seem to revolve around the immediate issue of the release of the hostages, thus ending hopes for comprehensive Peace Talks.
The biggest problem that confronts Peruvian civil society now is that its ongoing struggle to weaken the authoritarian rule of Fujimori has been stopped by the hostage crisis: everyone has postponed criticism of the government for the duration of the crisis. Fujimori has not shown any reciprocity and has continued to issue controversial measures without allowing any dialogue with the opposition, making it clear that he has intentions to run again for re-election in the year 2000, even though his own Constitution does not allow it.
Peru now resembles the assailed Residence of the Japanese Ambassador to Peru: democratic Peruvians are the silent hostages of a government that has all the freedom to act without the obligation to account for its actions. Only a sustained mobilization to re-inscribe the values of dialogue and economic solidarity, rather than more political imposition and economic self-interest, can help to solve at the same time the crises in the Residence of the Japanese Ambassador and in the larger residence of all Peruvians.
Eduardo Gonzalez-Cueva, a 1996 Democracy & Diversity alumnus, is a Peruvian Sociology Student at the Graduate Faculty.
Exploring Media and
DemocracyThis Fall marked an exciting period of development for our ongoing Policy Workshop initiative. The intensive program of seminars exploring various areas of policy concern, supported by The Pew Charitable Trusts, and the New School's University Technology Initiative, was launched last year under the title Democratic Policy & Politics. This year's workshop focuses on the media, and the role it plays in politics and policy formation in democratic societies.
As was the case last year, the Media, Politics & Policy workshop combines live seminar sessions in New York with an electronic component, in which transcripts of the sessions are e-mailed to regional study-groups. The list of institutions taking part in our electronic initiative has continued to grow, and currently about 100 faculty and students at 30 institutions in the region receive our materials through e-mail. Many participants meet in 'small study groups,' to discuss the transcriptions they receive, and prepare responses which are mailed back for distribution to all participants. In some cases, such as in Hungary and Romania, long-distance coordinators have put together ambitious for-credit courses which combine the electronic workshop materials with new contributions from their own participants.
We want to extend particular thanks to ECEP's longtime friends Jonathan Schell of the Freedom Forum Media Studies Center, and Professor Monroe Price of the Cardozo School of Law, for helping us to conceive and to facilitate this year's series of talks on media issues by leading scholars and practitioners in the field.
This Spring, ECEP was also pleased to expand the workshop, through a new collaboration with the Squadron Program in Law, Media & Society, at the Cardozo School of Law of Yeshiva University. This joint seminar initiative brings law students from Cardozo together with ECEP's Democracy Fellows at our weekly sessions, and will involve our own Fellows in the work of the Post-Soviet Media Law and Policy Newsletter, edited and published by Professor Monroe Price.
Our seminar sessions formally got under way in October with a presentation by writer and journalist Jonathan Schell, currently a Research Fellow with the Freedom Forum Media Studies Center in New York. His session, which took place just before the November 1996 U.S. Presidential elections, concerned the campaign ads for Bob Dole and Bill Clinton which were so ubiquitous on American television at the time. Jonathan Schell's vivid and humorous analyzes of the symbolism and propaganda in these ads led to a fascinating discussion of the sordid campaign industry in this country.
Elaine Zimmerman, the Executive Director of the Connecticut Commission on Children, provided our participants with an introduction to the concept, and the art, of public policy. She gave us a much-needed optimistic picture of the media as the primary venue through which individual citizens, non-profit organizations, and policy advocates can voice their concerns to other citizens and to political leaders.
Also addressing the important role of NGOs in developing democracies, Sam Husseini joined us as a research fellow and activist coordinator from the media watchdog organization Fairness and Accuracy and Reporting (F.A.I.R.). His talk on Corporate Influence in the Media and the Role of the Media Watchdog considered the role that 'watchdog' organizations play, or should play, in a democratic society. In his talk Husseini suggested that corporate ownership of the major media in this country, and increasingly worldwide, creates its own limitations on the range of expression and opinion possible in the majority of media news. In this context, we considered the importance of outside organizations whose role it is to point out these limitations, and to call for the widest possible range of opinion and representation within the media.
Victor Navasky, publisher and editorial director of the newsweekly The Nation, spoke to us about the changing role of the 'journal of opinion' -- the genre into which the 132-year-old Nation magazine falls. Navasky addressed the decreasing influence of print media in general, asking what role the limited-run, intellectually-oriented journal of opinion has to play in a media society increasingly dominated by television news and the 'Infobahn.' He concluded, recounting his own consultation with Jurgen Habermas on the subject, that indeed such journals set the standard for intellectual discussion in the country -- and must continue to do so.
Adam Michnik, the Fall 1996 G-Tech Professor in Democracy at the New School, similarly described his hopes that Gazeta Wyborcza, of which he is Editor-in-Chief, will not have to succumb to the levelling pressures of the market, which press public discussion toward the lowest common denominator. He hopes instead that the paper will find a balance between the ideals of public intellectuals and the demands of the market, still allowing room for intellectual and cultural debates. "It is difficult for a dissident, a man of the underground," Michnik told us, "to be transformed into the Editor-in-Chief of the biggest Polish newspaper in a democratic state. The reality of democracy is qualitatively different from the world of dictatorship."
Also worried about the decrease of significant public debate was Jay Rosen, Director of the Project on Public Life and the Press at New York University. In his talk with us on Improving Journalism by Building Democracy, he addressed the implications that increasing cynicism and disengagement of the public from politics have for the institution of journalism itself. The "Public Journalism" movement, which Rosen helped to develop and to define, suggests new models for journalistic practice which seek to engage the journalist as citizen in the active work of creating the public sphere. His talk raised interesting questions about the importance or even the possibility of 'objectivity' in U.S. journalism; and the possible dangers inherent in asking journalists to become active advocates for a better society.
We were also fortunate to host Lawrence Weschler, author and writer for the New Yorker magazine, shortly after his return from the former Yugoslavia. His talk addressed the deeply troubling and indispensable role played by the regional media in preparing the ground for war within the region. As he observed, the war was Serbian's "media by other means."
Toward the end of the Fall term, a new system of television ratings was announced in the U.S. As events unfolded, Media Studies Center Fellow Barry Sherman helped to illuminate the debate surrounding the "V-Chip" and TV ratings. At issue here more broadly is the increasing prevalence of violence, sex, and 'mature themes' on television and cable programming, and demands from parents and the public for a system which can help them to control its effects on children. Sherman is also the President of the Peabody Awards. These highly respected awards are given annually for the best television programs of the year covering a wide range of fields.
Two presentations of our country case studies, which will be emphasized during the second half of the workshop, were already conducted in the Fall. One joint session was led by Professor Martin Butora, President of the Slovak P.E.N., and Zora Butorova of the Bratislava public opinion research group FOCUS. They gave a presentation on the state of the media in Slovakia, analyzing its influence on the 1994 Slovakian elections. We also asked Professor Dmitry Strovsky of Ural State University, one of last Fall's visiting fellows, to share his insights on the state of the media in Russia.
We have begun to prepare a workbook based on the past two years of Policy Workshop presentations. The published volume will be available as a resource for faculty developing new curricula in public policy and media studies at universities throughout the region. It will combine substantial edited excerpts drawn from our live sessions with background reading material, and with responses which we receive from the region.
We invite new participants to join our long-distance mailing list at any time. Transcripts of the 1996-1997 seminar series and electronic discussion will continue to be sent through June 1997. For further information, please e-mail me at Underhik@ newschool.edu.
Karen Underhill, a 1996 Democracy & Diversity Institute alumna, now coordinates the Media, Politics and Policy Workshop.
Slovakia as a Work
in ProgressWhether you like it or not, home won't abandon you on the other side of the sea. On the day I arrived in New York, The New York Times published an editorial entitled "Nationalists in Europe." The article praised Hungary and Romania for signing a recent treaty aimed at overcoming old animosities. The Times reminds us that it was a desire to became a part of the EU and NATO which led both countries to negotiations, and the editorial went on to outline the contours of future cooperation. According to the piece, discrimination against Hungarians is moderate in Romania, Hungarians complain mainly about the verbal threats and attacks from Romanian nationalists made toward them. However, despite such ethnic tensions, relations between Hungary and Romania are good: their armies train together and the new treaty creates a framework for economic, environmental, and cultural cooperation. Romania pledges to respect the individual rights of two million ethnic Hungarians and Hungary cedes its territorial claims.
Such encouraging words warm not only Hungarian and Romanian hearts but delight democrats from other countries as well. To highlight the result, journalists all over the world like to compare this success to other failures. Later in the same newspaper, we read that the Hungarian prime-minister Gyula Horn signed a similar treaty with Slovakia - but it has some problems. The Times noted that, "Slovak nationalists passed laws threatening ethnic Hungarians. Hungarians reacted with rebellious claims about the necessity of local autonomy."
According to The Times, the treaty with Romania has better chances for success: it contains an article excluding the possibility of autonomy. Moreover, it notes that, "Romania - as opposed to Slovakia - seems to be really devoted to good relations. The treaty is supported by 3/4 of the people in both countries and during the past few years the nationalist parties are losing support."
Even in America, you can't escape your home. Whether we like it or not, during the last two years, from about the time of "the night of the long knives," Slovakia has become a cliché, a well-known example of backsliding.
"That is something to think about. Not only why it happened, how it happened, but most importantly, what can be done to change it?" asks Adam Michnik, Editor-in-Chief of the most influential Polish daily newspaper, Gazeta Wyborcza. "Such an article confirms the impression that Hungarians and, as we can see, Romanians as well, have their friends in the world. And now the question appears - where are the friends of Slovakia? But I am not sure if this is a good question. First of all, Slovakia should ask itself how one can gain those friends: by what traditions, personalities, creative works, actions from the past, by what kind of performance in the present?"
Michnik knew what he is talking about. He asked as a person very much involved - as a friend of Czechoslovak and Hungarian dissidents from the 1970s and 1980s, close to Vaclav Havel, Milan Simecka or Miroslav Kusy in his thinking, writing and public behavior. At that time, he was finishing an introduction to a book entitled The Slovak Question, an extensive anthology of Slovak political and social writings, to be published not only in Slovak, but also in Polish, Hungarian and Czech. "Perhaps I haven't said everything I could have in my essay. If it were, for example, Polish writings, I suppose I would have been more critical...," he commented.
Michnik is preoccupied in our current debates about World War II, the anti-fascist Slovak National Uprising of 1944, about the battles for new textbooks to teach modern Slovak history. He agrees that Slovakia has already undergone one civil war in 1944: the anti-fascist ethos of this uprising could be a legitimate source of pride. We continued to discuss democratic traditions, the political split between the urban and rural, the two faces of Slovakia - pro democratic and anti-democratic, and the role of critical intellectuals. He is even more intrigued in what is going on today at the grass roots, how civil society is being born, strengthened, and expanded. Michnik perceives Slovakia as Joyce's "work in progress." It is just being created, its final shape is still far from being decided.
This quintessentially Central European conversation, however, did not take place in Bratislava, Warsaw, or in Prague. We talked with Michnik in Manhattan's East Village, in an apartment which looked over the East River, where he was preparing his lectures for the students of the New School's Graduate Faculty.
(October, 1996)
(Translated by Michal Vasecka)
Martin Butora, a writer and President of Slovak P.E.N. is Professor of Sociology at Trnava University in Slovakia.
Michal Vasecka, a Junior Lecturer at Academia Istropolitana in Slovakia, is an ECEP 1996/97 Democracy II Fellow.
NOTESLECTURES
In February
Friday, February 21, 1997
Adam Michnik, Political Writer and Editor-In-Chief,
Gazeta Wyborcza, and Jay Rosen, Director of the
NYU Project on Public Life and the Press, will debate on Democracy,
Civil Society, and Journalism, 4 p.m., Room 217.
Thursday, February 27
Arlene Morgan, Fellow, Freedom Forum Media Studies
Center, will speak on Affirmative Action and the Media,"
12 p.m., Room 211.
In March
Thursday, March 6
Kenneth Best, Media specialist and Nigerian political
refugee, will speak on Media, democracy and Development in West
Africa, at 12 p.m., Room 211
Monday, March 10, 1997
Rumyana Kolarova, Professor of Political Science at
Sofia University, Dimitr Dimitrov, Member, Central Electoral
Committee and Professor of Political Science at Sofia University,
and Ivan Krastev, Director, Center for Liberal Strategies
and Professor of Political Science at New Bulgarian University,
will speak on Bulgaria: Collapse in a Time of Transition, 2 p.m.,
Machinist Room.
Thursday, March 27, 1997
Ivan Vejvoda, Social Historian and Visiting Professor,
Macalester College, will speak on The Politics of Post-Communism
in the Balkans, 6 p.m.,Wolff Conference Room (Room 242).
ANNOUNCEMENTS
MEETINGS