Adrienne Stafford September 2013

Three Dissertation Writing Samples

Writing Sample No. 1: Introduction, Section 2. Monistic Economic Representations in Critical Social Theory

Critical theory in general has survived at least three generations (Dahms 2011). As Max Horkheimer intended, critical theory is still, if ever more, an interdisciplinary field of research agendas now diffused across feminist and postmodern projects (Benhabib 1986; Calhoun 1995). The first generation spanning the 1930s to the late 1960s is commonly known as the Frankfurt School of Critical Theory from the Institute of Social Research. This generation culminated in Max Horkheimer and Theodor Adorno's critique of instrumental reason and can be seen today as "critical theory proper" (Benhabib 1986, 149-150).

This dissertation begins with Jürgen Habermas as the main representative of a second generation. Habermas's response to the critique of instrumental reason with his communicative action theory marks part of a 'linguistic turn' that conjoins critical theory proper with *social* theory. My analysis of Habermas's critical social theory also follows third generation critical social theorist Axel Honneth (Dahms 2011) and feminist critical social theorist Nancy Fraser. My interest, however, is less in critical theory as such than in how it portrays the economy, a portrayal that I think conflicts with the transgressive character of critical theory itself.

Harry Dahms asserts that one of the main strengths of critical social theory is it confronts and reflects on sociological assumptions even when doing so causes "major discomfort and cognitive dissonance among theorists, sociologists, and audiences alike" (2011, xii). Mindful of this point, one might well experience three areas of dissonance upon encountering critical social theory's representations of economy. The first dissonance I interpret as intellectual conflict between critical social theory's economic representations and ones from other disciplines. The second is discordance between critical theory's economic representations and our actual

everyday economic lives. The third dissonance pertains to incongruent beliefs in the "vitality of critical theory" (Dahms 2011) with beliefs about the economy that in my view weaken this vitality.

These areas of dissonance arise from the constraints of economic monism in critical theory. By *economic monism*, I first simply mean these economic representations lack an account of the diverse constitution of economy. Less simple are the varied ways and degrees social and political theorists portray *the* economy as monistic and its relationship with other areas of life. As I see it, there are two main profiles of economic monism across academia promoting one of two views of society. One brings all of society and its actions within the scope of a market capitalist economy so that any and all activities, including those of the family and household, are transformed into market transactions (e.g., Gary Becker) based on particular assumptions about rational human behavior as maximizing utility or profit. While common among rational choice theorists and many academic economists, this kind of economic monism is not found in critical social theory.

The other, more typical form of economic monism takes a dualistic view of society. On this view, the economy is narrowly conceptualized as existing solely or predominately as a self-regulating market-capitalist sphere of non-normative, anonymous and autonomous mechanisms and strategic actions that are seen as distinct if not separate from all normative, social, and cultural spheres of life. This dualistic view of society is a predictable formulation of economic monism in much social and political theory, and one I think pervades critical social theory. My specific claim is that Habermasian critical social theory is shaped by what I am calling the *dualistic formula of economic monism*. My argument is that the dualistic formula of economic monism in critical social theory inadequately represents diverse economic realities and restricts

our thinking about and enabling of social and economic change and justice.

As I see it, there are three interrelated issues at stake in analyzing the presence of economic monism in critical social theory and they pertain to the three dissonances mentioned above. This dissertation covers the first two most important ones: (1) conflict between monistic economic representations in Habermasian critical social theory and alternative representations from other critical approaches across the disciplines and (2) discordance between Habermasian monistic economic representations and actual everyday economic knowledges and practices. Here, I want to address the third dissonance pertaining to economic monism in critical theory and the vitality of critical theory itself.

If, as Dahms asserts, the "distinction between traditional and critical theory" is "especially pertinent to economic theory" (Dahms 2011, 17), then the kind of economic theories subsumed in critical social theory are most problematic. I take Dahms to mean that perhaps more than any other theory the vitality of critical theory heavily depends on the kind of economic knowledge and discourse assumed and articulated in its representations of economy. Since the days of Horkheimer's "interdisciplinary materialism" with his articulation of 'philosophical moments' in Marxian critiques of political economy, along with Georg Lukacs' Weberian *Marxism*, critical theory now appears to have momentarily settled on Habermasian *Weberian*-Marxian representations. The latter can be described as a project of analyzing "the logic of capitalist production and development," such as "bureaucratic capitalism, managerial capitalism, financial capitalism," in a "totally administered world" (2011, 18). The question then is whether or not this economic representation strengthens or weakens on which critical theory depends it.

In my view, critical theory's vitality depends on its degree of economic monism. Despite divergences between critical theory proper and Habermas's version of critical *social* theory, both

pre-Habermasian and Habermasian generations share representations of a monistic economy. One reason is both Marxian and Weberian critiques of a modern capitalist economy variously present a totality of capitalist logic strengthened by the 'iron cage' of state administration and monopolistic and autonomous markets. This totalized market-capitalist economy has been invariably depicted as a singular object domain, or as an instrumentalizing or purposive sphere, or as an encapsulated system whose effects of alienation, reification, or purposive rationalization must be overcome or be relatively accepted (Dahms 2011). While early critical theorists have perhaps better captured the social, cultural, and historical constructions of economy (Benhabib 1986), their critiques of commodity fetishism, capitalism's contradictions, and the mediations of mass society have all treated the economy as monolithic and deterministic.

Economic determinism is present both in Marxian and Weberian economic representations involving a dualistic view of society in which the market capitalist economy is seen as encroaching on our moral and social lives in disabling ways. As Dahms points out, one of the key distinguishing features of first-generation critical theorists is their concern with the way "successive transmutations" of economic processes in the age of corporate capitalism have shaped cultural and political forms of social life "beyond the reach" of all affected (2011, xiii). Habermas's second-generation version of economic determinism manifests as colonization of the lifeworld as he also deals with dual tensions between these "reifying effects of advanced capitalism on social, political, and cultural life" and the potential for the increased "communicative formation of norms and values" (2011, 50).

As I argue later, this monistic economic depiction inherent in this dualistic view of society also resembles some of the defining features of mainstream neoclassical and even classical economics. If one of the main distinguishing factors of critical theory has been its

opposition to "traditional theories of capitalism" from Smith to twentieth-century neoclassical economics (Dahms 2011,18), then Habermas has indeed taken the traditional economic theoretical path. That Habermasian critical social theory continues on this traditional path attests to the powerful influence of or "colonization" from mainstream economics. The extent is such that even the most progressive feminist critical theorists, like Nancy Fraser, are susceptible to reproducing it.

This reproduction of mainstream academic economics is especially problematic for critical social theory. Since, as Dahms points out, critical theory's starting assumption is that our understanding of society is itself shaped by society, there is a "special need for critical theory" not to "reproduce the patterns of the social formation it is designed to elucidate" (Dahms 2011, 16). Habermasian critical social theory is dependent on traditional economic paths that are assumed and articulated in its economic representations thus weakening some of its vitality or status as *critical* theory.

In my view, the Habermasian dualistic formula of economic monism must be replaced with alternative representations of diverse economic practices. This requires dismantling, reconfiguring, and multiplying the dualistic conceptual, analytical, and social relationships that form economic monism. Doing so entails inviting alternative economic knowledge and discourse across the disciplines which in this dissertation include Robert Heilbroner and William Milberg; postmodern and poststructural economists, such as Jack Amariglio, David Ruccio, and J.K. Gibson-Graham; feminist economists, such as Julie Nelson and Nancy Folbre; economic sociologists, such as Marilyn Power and Eric Olin Wright; and international development economists and justice theorists, such as Amartya Sen and George DeMartino.

These interdisciplinary economic representations address the dissonance of experiencing

traditional economic discourse in otherwise transgressive and progressive critical social theories. In fact, the need for incorporating interdisciplinary economic research in critical social theory to strengthen its vitality is a conclusion Dahms (2011) also reaches. More importantly, these alternative interdisciplinary economic approaches offer more complex or diverse economic representations that address the dissonance between monistic economic representations and our actual everyday diverse economic practices. As I show throughout this project, expanding the scope and complexity of economy ultimately expands the possibility of social and economic transformations.

Like much social and political theory, critical social theory is shaped by its monistic economic representations. Simply put, economic monism lacks an account of the diverse constitution of economy.[1] Representations of economic monism tell us the economy exists solely or predominately as a market-capitalist system operating according to self-regulating mechanisms or strategic actions that are distinct if not separate from all normative, social and cultural spheres of life. In other words, economic monism typically comprises a dualistic formulation of society, or what I call the *dualistic formula of economic monism*.

In this first chapter, I critique Jürgen Habermas's representation of economy in *The Theory of Communicative Action* (TCA) and *Between Facts and Norms* (BFN). I argue Habermas's communicative action theory typifies the dualistic formula of economic monism by compiling ideal typologies of spheres, perspectives, and actions that depict a non-normative, self-steering market-capitalist system as separate from a normative communicative sociocultural lifeworld. I further argue that economic monism is the basis of Habermas's rationale for a

[1] See dissertation introduction and chapter four for explanations on economic monism.

[2] Habermas attributes this lack of distinction to Weber's twofold meaning of "purposive rationalization:" the growth of purposive rationality and an overall societal process of differentiation. For Weber, all societal rationalization processes are the growth of purposive rationality. Nonetheless, Habermas clarifies distinctions Weber did make which early critical theorists overlooked. Under the

dualistic theory of communicative action.

This chapter contains four main sections. In the first three, I establish Habermas's stated rationale for a dualistic approach to communicative action set in dualistic idealized types that together comprise an overall dualistic view of society. I then interpret his representation of economy as the "paradigmatic system" (TCA, BFN) as paradigmatic economic monism. At this point, it should be apparent that Habermas's theory of communicative action typifies the dualistic formula of economic monism.

In section four, I advance my claim that economic monism is the basis of Habermas's rationale for a dualistic theory of communicative action. I argue that both the functionalist and normative sets of rationale Habermas offers for maintaining dual distinctions between the system and the lifeworld accept and promote the idea of an unalterable self-regulating market-capitalist economy operating autonomously beyond the moral and social grasp of individuals. I also propose Habermas's representation of a mechanistically functioning economic system is seen primarily from a macrolevel system perspective requiring an *objectivist stance* traced to the same stances and depictions in classical or early modern economics ultimately replicating neoclassical macroeconomic depictions. I conclude with assessing some normative, methodological, and descriptive levels of confusion and with some consequences of Habermas's monistic economic representations.

◉◉◉

Writing Sample No. 2: Chapter 1, Section 1. Habermas's Rationale for a Dualistic Theory of Communicative Action

Jürgen Habermas's theory of communicative action is a model of action using language as a means of communication aimed at reaching mutual understanding for the social integration and stability of society (TCA1, 101; BFN 17). To understand the aim of communicative action,

we first need to understand Habermas's rationale for developing this action model. Habermas develops the specific concept of *communicative rationality* into a theory of communicative action from his critique of early Marxian Critical Theorists. Understanding Max Weber as having had the most influence on Georg Lukacs, Max Horkheimer, and Theodor Adorno's critique of instrumental reason, Habermas explores Weber's thesis of rationalization and his "diagnosis of the times" (TCA1, 243, 339-365). Despite differences among these theorists, all shared the view that some kind of instrumental rationality underlies modern capitalist society setting in motion a rationalization process that encroaches on our moral and social lives.

According to Habermas, Weber understood "rationalization" as the ascendancy and institutionalization of "formal rationality," a term Weber used synonymously with "purposive" and "instrumental" rationality or *Zweckrationalitat* — "the mastery of the world in the service of human interests" (TCA1, 345). Weber considered the impersonal bureaucratic and economic forces of modern capitalism as the most prominent manifestation of the progression of instrumental rationality associated with "disenchantment:" a world stripped of all moral or ethical meaning in an environment increasingly taken over by the pursuit of self-interest (TCA1, 218, 243, 345-349). Here, reason is not objectively but subjectively realized by a structure of action that disregards moral objective standards.

While Weber considered the growth of modern capitalism to be one of several prominent factors contributing to the growth of instrumental rationality, Lukacs considered the capitalist economy to be *the* causal basis for the latter. For Lukacs, the growth of instrumental rationality is a process of reification or abstraction of anonymous capital-labor exchange relations deforming the lives of workers. As these exchange relations become further abstracted into the whole of society, knowing-acting subjects become one with their objects by taking on an "objectivating

attitude" both to themselves and to each other, thereby turning all social relations into purely instrumental ones (TCA1, 355-361).

While Horkheimer and Adorno agreed that an instrumental or objectivating attitude creeps into the moral and social crevices of our lives, like Weber they did not see the economy as the sole causal basis for instrumental or purposive rationalization. Instead, they located this progression of instrumental rationality or reification in the cognition of goal-oriented acting subjects who everywhere take on this kind of objectivating attitude. Nonetheless, all agreed that it is in the economy where instrumental reason has "'gone wild'" (TCA1, 346-355, 377-379).

For Habermas, these scenarios of modern life do not accurately or wholly capture the concept, meaning and function of rationality. In their narrative of modern life, Habermas argues, the rationality of knowing-acting subjects is always instrumentally exercised and systemically abstracted into a "higher order" of purposive rationality. Through this purposive-rationalization process, the consciousness of individuals is always overridden to the extent that individuals dissolve into an overall purposive-rational totality (TCA1, 377-379). In Habermas's view, this scenario confounds two different forms of rationality, instrumental and purposive, and the failure to distinguish between the two is at once a failure to understand that each functions at a different level. Whereas instrumental rationality functions at the level of action, purposive rationality functions at a higher system level (TCA1, 386-392).[2]

More importantly, Habermas argues that conflating these two different forms and levels

[2] Habermas attributes this lack of distinction to Weber's twofold meaning of "purposive rationalization:" the growth of purposive rationality and an overall societal process of differentiation. For Weber, all societal rationalization processes are the growth of purposive rationality. Nonetheless, Habermas clarifies distinctions Weber did make which early critical theorists overlooked. Under the concept of formal rationality, Weber categorized two main aspects that make possible the "calculability of actions." Under "the instrumental aspect," belongs "efficacy of available means," and under "the strategic aspect" belongs "correctness of the choice of means." It is the strategic aspect of rationality in particular that Weber considered purposive rationality (TCA1, 162-172, 345, 353).

of rationality omits another moral-practical form of rationality that he conceives as "communicative rationality" or "communicative action" (TCA1, 390-392). At a political-philosophical level, the concept of communicative action essentially recasts the normative principle of practical reason in a "linguistic telos of mutual understanding" (BFN, 4).[3] As such, communicative action is regarded as crucial for ensuring our normative and critical capacity in resisting the growth and encroachment of purposive rationality (TCA1, 390-392, 398; BFN, 4-9). At a social level, communicative action is seen as critical both for the social coordination and normative integration of society. In an early oft-quoted passage Habermas says,

> If we assume that the human species maintains itself through the socially coordinated activities of its members and that this coordination is established through communication — and in certain spheres of life, through communication aimed at reaching agreement — then the reproduction of the species [and society] also requires satisfying the conditions of a rationality inherent in communicative action. (TCA1, 397)

With this critique of instrumental rationality, Habermas offers an alternative narrative of modern social reality describing anew the social problem. The problem is not that instrumental rationality is abstracted or made absolute as purposive rationality or that the cognitive exercise of instrumental reason has "gone wild." It is in thinking that one form of instrumental or purposive rationality is the only legitimate one and basis of social reality thereby disregarding a normative communicative form of rationality (TCA1, 398). Thus, the social problem redefined is an "*imbalanced rationalization*" process wherein purposive rationalization grows at the expense of communicative rationalization (TCA1, 183, original emphasis).

---

[3] The concept of communicative action also emerges out of what Habermas saw as a need in critical theory for a paradigmatic shift from a philosophy of consciousness to one of language. For him, the task of critical theory was "*interrupted* with the critique of instrumental reason;" the paradigm of communicative action allows us to return to this task (TCA1, 386, original emphasis).

As moral and communicative aspects are "colonized" or driven out by "delinguistified media" in a purposive rationalization process, the normative integration of everyday life is consequently "loosened up" (TCA1, 398). At the same time, the more communicative rationality increases with the societal complexity of modernity, the less it is practiced and the more difficult it is to normatively integrate and stabilize society (TCA2, 180). For Habermas, then, a stable society must be reproduced, coordinated and integrated not just through instrumental action or purposive rationalization but also through the rationalization of communicative action occurring at two levels (BFN, 17, 25-27).

At the political-philosophical level, the moral rational principle of communicative action serves as a singular binding universal norm to which all values and aspects must appeal to achieve mutual understanding and consensus. Under this aspect of mutual understanding, communicative action serves as a medium transmitting and renewing cultural knowledge and values for action coordination. At the social level, communicative action is a mechanism of action coordination and a medium of social integration. Under this aspect of coordinating action, communicative action serves as a coordinating mechanism for social integration (TCA2, 125-126, 137-138; BFN, 4, 8, 17-18, 35, 139-141). In fact, Habermas notes the "basic concept of communicative action explains how social integration can come about" (BFN, 524, fn 18).

Social integration, therefore, successfully comes about to the extent that communicative action succeeds as a mechanism for coordinating action through the process of mutual understanding and consensus. The success of all of this depends on the two distinctly different and separate forms of societal integration described above as a dual rationalization or differentiation process of two different and separate forms of purposive and communicative rationalities (TCA2; BFN). I return to the rationale for this dual process when I later argue that

economic monism is really the basis for it. Habermas's main conclusion is that communicative action is the normative linguistic medium of social integration and as such it is considered to be critical to the "constitution of social reality" and in "the final analysis" to the stability of society (BFN, 26).

Writing Sample No. 3: Chapter 5, Section 5. An Everyday Life of Economic Difference

Having mapped out the axes of economic difference, the once submerged diverse economy is now above sea line. Next I want to show how these axes might converge in the diverse provisioning lives of people. Different axes can intersect in infinitely different ways, and how they do depends on countless variables that ultimately form real life composites of economic difference. The following is a possible real-life composite of economic difference in the fictional provisioning life of Maria.

Maria is single parent and working professional employed by one the largest American multinational IT-sector corporations responsible for much global employment. In fact, the ILO's 2008 *World of Work Magazine*, estimates 65,000 multinationals employ more than 90 million people — or one in 20 of the global workforce — making the top 100 multinational companies alone directly responsible for the employment of about 15 million people (ILO, 5). While multinational corporations are nominally capitalist enterprises, their complex surplus appropriations and distributions warrant more involved characterization.

Even the most capitalist of multinationals include noncapitalist, nonmarket, and varied labor compensations and practices. For instance, many multinational corporations appropriate and distribute surplus or profit both to workers and to a range of outside social, community and environmental projects. In a global trend of CSR, increasing numbers of multinational

corporations have strengthened their relationships with the ILO by incorporating, for example, clear and forceful policies on worker conditions, environmental protection, and community support. Many also work with governments around the world to procure greener technologies (ILO World of Work 2008).[4]

Maria's company — as she tends to think of it — is very much an alternative-capitalist enterprise. It is consistently rated among top tier multinationals in all CSR areas, especially in global corporate citizenship. In the language of economic difference, this means it is continuously rated highly for its external surplus distribution to the following areas: serving and empowering urban communities around the world, researching and developing socially and environmentally responsible technologies, and influencing governments everywhere to follow course. In her position as a contractor management specialist, Maria plays a strong working role in maintaining this top tier status.

Before understanding Maria's position, it is important to grasp the global scope of this company. As a global IT company with a relative monopoly on semiconductors, it intersects with both alternative-market and nonmarket transactions since much of its trade occurs not in the market but within the company itself through intra-firm transactions and transfers. These nonmarket transactions reflect international estimates showing that even though the top 500 multinational corporations account for 70% of the world trade, approximately half of it takes place within the same multinational or between the same set of multinationals (Share the World's Resources: Multinational Corporations; UNCTAD). The global scope of Maria's company is such that it frequently transfers products to same-company locations and it frequently engages in

[4] Multinational enterprises and the ILO have been working together for decades to identify and develop CSR-related strategies. In 2007, a number of renowned world companies, such as Nestlé, Panasonic, Telefónica and Manpower signaled their commitment to principles laid out in Geneva and to further promote socially responsible labor and environmental practices (ILO's *World of Work Report* 2001, 2-6).

corporate barter with other cooperating multinationals when it agrees to exchange semiconductors for other products like parts or minerals.

Of course, this company also participates in international market transactions. Even here, though, its commitment to working only within supply chains that encourage lawful and ethical social and environmental regulations translates into strongly regulated alternative-market transactions. For instance, the company refuses to purchase resources like minerals from regions whose conflicts are the direct or indirect result of adverse mining impacts and it demands its suppliers and their suppliers' suppliers do the same. In fact, the company is working very closely with industry peers through the Electronic Industry Citizenship Coalition's (EICC) establishing a code of conduct that requires minerals to be sourced responsibly, minimizing adverse effects on communities and the environment, and to improve supply chain verification processes. In doing so, the company is increasingly guided by global 'greening procurement' trends that ultimately control markets thus changing the meaning and field of market competition.[5]

These alternative-market transactions intersect with alternative-capitalist and non-capitalist practices. Alternative-capitalist practices are in play when the company externally distributes millions of dollars annually to ensure the social and environmental integrity of thousands of global suppliers and markets. At the same time, noncapitalist and nonmarket practices are involved when the company's partnership with global governments and public sectors for the responsible use of technologies results in the company being a frequent recipient of government allocations and grants. Furthermore, these funds are often designated for technical projects that are turned around to serve public sector use in energy and infrastructure, in medical

[5] The emphasis on sourcing and purchasing goods and services that are less environmentally damaging than comparable alternatives is part of what is identified as "green procurement." This essentially means giving attention to the lifecycle of a product from manufacturing and transport to processing, disposal and recycling. The greening trend itself is driven from numerous directions, including consumer and public sector awareness of and demands for sustainable energy and more.

and environmental cleanup technologies, and in security technologies for militaries, Interpol, and intelligence agencies. These facts alone throw into question this company's status as a private capitalist enterprise achieving free-market success.

The regulation of legal and ethical supply chains and markets requires organization and management. This is where Maria enters the picture. Over time, her company has become a kind of entrusted clearinghouse for public and nonprofit grants to be redistributed through its alternative-capitalist practices to independent contractors for project execution. All axes of economic difference converge on Maria's provisioning life in her role alone as a U.S. contract specialist serving as a company liaison between the public sector and private contractors. Maria is tasked with evaluating, directing, and externally distributing government allocations and grants to her company in exchange for providing the kind of abovementioned expertise and technologies for public sector use.

Maria's job title however does not really convey the fact that her role is critical to her company's consistently high CSR ratings. She is also charged with the responsibility of ensuring that the independent contractors to whom public-private monies are externally distributed do business with others whose legal and ethical supply chains are verified. What is more, many of the projects themselves aim at responding to societal and environmental problems. For example, some of the projects Maria manages pertain to the use of responsible technologies for pressing concerns in urban communities, such as economic and infrastructure development, disaster relief and cleanup, medical and healthcare equipment and child education. In some sense, Maria in her position as a contract specialist is single-handedly orchestrating the axes of economic difference when she externally redistributes surplus (alternative-capitalist) from the public sector (nonmarket transaction) to her company for projects worked by independent contractors.

For this challenging work, Maria is nicely compensated monetarily and in kind. In other words, her company's internal surplus distribution is generous. In addition to a good salary and benefits package, Maria benefits from 100% comprehensive healthcare coverage for in-network routine and preventive healthcare services. Her company is able to do this with long-term efficiency because early on it had the foresight to externally distribute some of its surplus to some of the best consultants and advocates in health plans, patient-quality, and labor union rights. Her company also saves on long-term premium costs by encouraging good health practices for employees, including a healthy work environment, and their families. For instance, Maria and her coworkers regularly takes advantage of a wide range of free and low-cost goods and services in her workplace, such as daily healthy delicious food selections, options for physical activity, and educational seminars on everything from mental and physical health, to nutrition, cuisine, and lifetime habits.

In addition to paid work, Maria participates in two kinds of unpaid work. One is as a volunteer in one of her company's child and teen educational mentorship programs. In fact, this program and others like it are made possible by the nonmarket transactions of gifts and grants to her company from nonprofit and philanthropic institutions and some state, local, and community donations. The second kind of unpaid work Maria performs is as the sole caregiver of two small children. Maria's household and childcare work segues into another world of axes converging on Maria's provisioning life.

While the vast majority of childcare still takes place in the household, Maria's demanding paid work and occasional travel puts her in a position of needing reliable childcare. Even though her company provides an outstanding workplace environment and a range of health and wellbeing benefits, including flexible hours, it does not provide childcare services. Also, her

family and friends do not live close enough and they too are in a similar position. In fact, one of the main reasons her sister is largely unavailable is that she is the main caregiver for their mother, making her sister one of the 62 million unpaid American caregivers whose time and finances are already stretched (Folbre 2008a). As with many working parents, then, Maria must purchase childcare services from any number of alternative-capitalist and noncapitalist institutional and independent providers and nannies.

In fact, childcare has increasingly become a diverse sector all its own. Childcare services are offered in capitalist, alternative-capitalist and noncapitalist sites involving paid, alternative-paid, and unpaid work. According to the National Association of Child Care Resource and Referrals Agency (NACCRRA Fact Sheet 2012), there are approximately 2.3 million childcare workers with 94.5% of them women outside of parental-household childcare. Capitalist childcare enterprises include "body-hire" agencies, services or centers, including hired housekeepers. These corporate childcare centers pay a wage or salary managed by a supervisory team. Less corporate (or capitalist) are independent childcare centers. Center staff childcare makes up about 24% of paid childcare work, while childcare home providers make up another 28% of this paid work. In addition, it is estimated that half of the paid childcare workforce, namely independent nannies, are uncounted (BLS Household Data Annual Average, 2009; NACCRRA Fact Sheet 2011).

Since Maria values the efforts and outcomes of alternative-capitalist and noncapitalist enterprises, she has been inclined to choose from state-sponsored, nonprofit, and cooperative childcare centers that have reputable certifications and equitable or collective wage and salary setting. She especially likes the idea of joining a childcare cooperative since she has had a very good experience as a member of a local consumer organic food co-op which provides better

quality produce and grocery items and member benefits.

At the same time, Maria travels occasionally to Europe, India and the Middle East, sometimes for extended time periods and also has long-term daycare needs. For this, she participates in local alternative-market and nonmarket transactions, like parental childcare time-sharing, bartering childcare for other goods and services, as well as purchasing the services of noncapitalist independent childcare workers, like nannies. All of this works out well because when Maria is not traveling she has the job flexibility to reciprocate parental time-sharing and other agreements. Maria's diverse economy represents just some of the infinitely possible combinations of ways multiple axes of economic difference converge on everyday provisioning lives.