A geography of debauchery: State-building and the mobilization of labor versus leisure on a European Union border

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Abstract: By comparing the spatial organization of Swedish labor and leisure practices today with the movements and stereotypes tied to previous generations of Sweden's sizeable population of so-called "vagrants," this article studies the impact of state policy on the spatial imagination of both citizens and other sojourners within its bounds. Because the ethnographic research for the article took place in a new transnational city that is being created by the European Union and various local proponents, the article then considers the same issue at the EU level, to pursue the question of the EU's "state-ness" and the status of migrant laborers within that emerging polity.

Keywords: European Union, migrant labor, money, transnationalism, vagrancy

You can't read away development. It has its pace. And we vagrants will disappear, and all people will work in the service of society for the sake of all, and life will receive its inspiration through the hands of labor.—Harry Martinson[1]

[E]very prodigal appears to be a public enemy, and every frugal man a public benefactor.—Adam Smith

In the year 2000, two royal families met at the halfway point of a shiny new bridge in order to inaugurate the new connection between their two countries. It spanned a body of water that had separated two land masses since the last Ice Age and had separated the countries of Sweden and Denmark since 1658. True to the millennial year of its completion, the bridge promised to usher in a new Golden Age for Swedes and Danes. According to its proponents, the bridge would lead to greater prosperity because it stood as the capstone of a general European Union (EU) project to promote "mobility" over an age-old national border by creating a new transnational city (the so-called "Øresund Region"), a city that would meld Copenhagen, Denmark with Malmö, Sweden.[2] The transnational and EU-sponsored Region would evolve, they claimed, into a truly

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"rational" economic space of production; it would end senseless and dated barriers to mobility that had been erected by nation-states and "culture" long ago (Berg, Linde-Laursen, and Löfgren, 2000, 2002).[3]

The bridge, seen in this light, is but one more instance of a governmental commitment to mobility and boundary-transgression that is sweeping the European continent more generally. Indeed, the EU is promoting many such "transnational regions," both with monetary and other forms of institutional support (see Darian-Smith 1999). Strong forces within the Brussels-based EU apparatus aim to turn these transnational zones into models for the entire EU: in the near and glorious future, proponents believe that people will traverse age-old and tension-laden borders without even noticing the existence of a national boundary.[4] Further, in virtually all of the rhetoric, legislation, and adjudication produced by the EU government and its proponents, obstacles to movement must be removed in order for the EU project to continue, whether they be obstacles to the movement of goods, people, services, or capital (i.e., the classic "factors of production"); in fact, liberating the factors of production was the EU's original raison d'etre (Peebles 1997). But following Clifford (1997), Hannerz (1996), Löfgren (1999), and others, it is necessary to distinguish among different *types* of mobility in order to show that only some types are endorsed, whereas others are discouraged or even fully halted. For this reason, the embrace of mobility within the EU must be analyzed more carefully.

To that end, this article details how the "spatializing state" (including emergent states such as the EU) attempts to reconfigure geography by channeling certain flows while trying to dam up others. In the case presented here, the EU is working to "reterritorialize" (Gupta and Ferguson 1992: 20, 2002) Copenhagen *for Swedes* from a zone of extraterritorial debauchery and leisure into one of hum-drum production and labor, from an unregulated exterior space into a regulated interior space. I undertake this study by comparing the social history and later eradication of the so-called "vagrants" from within the bounds of late-nineteenth-century Sweden with the behavior of Swedish tourists in Copenhagen prior to the opening of the bridge.

Relying on the history and practice of vagrancy to tell this story is a good strategy, for throughout history, vagrants have often been labeled as people of leisure. In reality, however, they have often been people pursuing and providing much needed labor. They therefore offer a particularly good window into studying state practices directed toward the flows of labor and leisure. By studying these flows and how they shift through history, we can see how specific ideologies of money, time, production, and consumption are propagated by governmental entities in both obvious and hidden ways.

I will then show how these ideologies, in turn, affect the boundaries of "home" and "abroad," for state penal practices vividly clarify precisely where vagrants do *not* belong, and which "homes" they should be sent to in order to eliminate their unwanted presence. In this manner, an investigation that carefully distinguishes between the mobility of labor and leisure offers one method for studying state practices ethnographically, for their effects on the ground become manifest, no matter how distant from any capital city (cf. Holmes 2000).

In an accident of history, the new transnational Øresund Region and its bridge are trying to subsume the *locus classicus* of Swedish extraterritorial leisure: Copenhagen, Denmark. Just as Swedish vagrants of yore were considered nonlaboring, spendthrift, and decadent "foreign" intruders into the bounds of a properly state-regulated zone, I will use ethnographic evidence to show how Swedes today, when abroad in Copenhagen, often assume a similar role as leisure-oriented and uncontrolled foreigners; just like the vagrants of the previous era, they too are banished to their "home" (in the historical annals of vagrancy, this was often a disputed locale) on the soonest possible embarking vessel.

But now EU policy and its proponents are pushing to eradicate this practice, and the new bridge is an intimate part of this effort. The goal is no less than to create an entirely new, transnational sense of social belonging. Regional ad-

vocates and the EU, if successful in this endeavor, will eliminate "banishment" as a punishment for the sins of vagrancy by enlarging the bounds of the "home," just as the Swedish state did before it. In order to ensure that Swedes are treated as these new "Øresundians" (instead of as foreigners) when in Copenhagen, regulated labor will be promoted. Conversely, leisure that relies on economic and regulatory asymmetry should, ideally, be exported to a new extraterritorial region. The evidence will show, therefore, that builders of both the Swedish modern welfare state and the EU have aimed for full citizens to be granted the right to "move *without* money," whereas this used to be the precise "crime" that marked an individual's status as both a vagrant and, more often than not, a foreigner.

But eradicating vagrancy, as Swedish history shows, is a lengthy and hard-fought socio-legal process, one that gradually expands the boundaries of social inclusion by expanding the boundaries of "home." In light of this, I close the article with a coda, which brings these comparisons to bear on the stereotypes and punishments leveled on immigrants today in the Øresund Region, in order to consider the implications of new senses of home and abroad for people still unfortunate enough to be sullied with the mark of vagrancy.

Approaching the diverse forms of vagrancy, analytically

In order to proceed with this argument, it is essential to first turn to the illuminating work of Day, Papataxiarchis, and Stewart (1999). Turning to their work allows us to isolate at least one reason why many states seem to discriminate between the flows of labor and leisure in the manner that I am concerned with here. Day, Papataxiarchis, and Stewart and their co-authors show us that often states are predisposed to criminalize and banish people with a "present-orientation," whereas they valorize and support people with a "future-orientation." In their book, *Lilies of the field: Marginal people who live for the moment,* they bring together a compelling and diverse set of ethnographic examples of "marginal peoples," and suggest that they all share a common ethos: the ethos of living for the present, of living an "anti-economic" life in which the world is structured around abundance rather than scarcity. The authors argue that sharing, autonomy, intense mobility, freedom, and a disdain for hierarchy often form vital components of this present-oriented ethos (Day, Papataxiarchis, and Stewart 1999: 3–4, 7).[5]

In living a present-oriented life, these people delve into a ritualized space in "non-durational time" that creates an alternative to the burdens forced on them by dominant society. Politically speaking, living for the present is not a passive, but an active stance, for "timelessness constitutes a powerful tool of resistance and opposition to surrounding neighbors and institutions" (Day, Papataxiarchis, and Stewart 1999: 3).[6] In this ritual space, people value today over tomorrow, finding the present full of joy and satisfaction. Many dominant societies, on the other hand, await better days from the ever-distant future and hold that the present is filled with "suffering and deprivation" (Day, Papataxiarchis, and Stewart 1999:2). This is a key, and I believe, important insight; I rely on it in order to argue that Copenhagen and its boats served as this ritual space-time for many Swedes.

As Day, Papataxiarchis, and Stewart's book details, people with present-oriented lifestyles are often targeted by states for "reform" and are singled out as suspicious and potentially nefarious by dominant groups. As Stewart explains, they are often accused of being decadent and of "harvesting without sowing" (Stewart 1999: 29). States have often tried to "settle" them and train them to integrate more fully into the state's harmonized and regulated economic space.[7] What is additionally striking about this is the fact that the phenomenon is so widespread, found in such diverse places as Amazonia and industrial Japan, as shown in their book.

The vagrants of nineteenth- and early-twentieth-century Sweden could be added to this list. By doing so, I would like to build on Day, Papataxiarchis, and Stewart's point that "The ritual construction of a present is not just an escape

from the real world but also changes the world. However, in the existing literature, the implications of this sort of [present-oriented] action have not been adequately delineated because political anthropology has focused on instrumental action oriented to the long term" (Day, Papataxiarchis, and Stewart 1999: 18). In other words, we can learn a great deal about states and emergent states by witnessing the interplay between dominant societies and people who live with no thought for the morrow. By looking at groups of people whom dominant society *perceives* as present-oriented (whether it is true or not), we can see how mutual pressures between these social actors bring forth a new world.

The vagrant's present-oriented attitude toward money—his or her alleged spendthriftness—raised the hackles of state bureaucrats and other reformers (see Gill 1999; Papataxiarchis 1999; and Stallybrass and White 1986: 125–148 for similar examples). According to the nineteenth-century Swedish state's logic, spending money "carelessly" announced a commitment to the present and to gratifying consumption, whereas saving money clarified one's dedication to the future and to laborious production. Not carrying enough money for tomorrow, therefore, was considered evidence of a lack of interest in laboring, or at least, not laboring *enough.*[8] As such, it also served as evidence that one might well be planning (or be forced by exigency) to sponge off of the community's hard work. In light of this, proof of regulated laboring (i.e., gainful and reliable employment) served as a vital method for being accepted into the customary Swedish welfare system that preceded the state welfare system.[9]

But as the history and practice of vagrancy will show, in the marketplace one could enter into a different sort of covenant: one was granted rights according to the amount of money one had in his or her pocket. Thus, the vagrant was welcomed despite his or her ceaseless mobility into market space[10] so long as he or she had money. Once the money was gone, they were sent packing, back to an alleged "home" that would care for them regardless of how well they had planned for tomorrow.[11] Often they were laborers, in fact, essential and hard-working laborers (e.g., people who tamed the northern forests or undertook unwanted work on the farmstead). Swedish police archives document in endless detail the manner in which hard workers were classed as vagrants and cast out of the town simply because of their lack of money for tomorrow.

This mobile mass was seen as dangerous, threatening society with its alleged prodigality and threats to dominant social mores. In other words, prostitutes and peddlers, orphans and widows, drunks and journeymen, insane people and migrant laborers, could all be classed—bizarrely to our thinking—under the same umbrella legal category. They were not *necessarily* "prodigal," nor did they necessarily move around too much, but rather they had the audacity (or mere misfortune) to move into market space without enough money for tomorrow.[12] In short, for one reason or another, these people were all marked as non-savers, and thus received special treatment by the state—banishment, jail, the workhouse, rehabilitation, etc.[13]

It is this different teleological orientation of time, money, and the people who use it that proponents of the Øresund Region are trying to change today. The EU qua state *in formation* is attempting to colonize an old space of vagrancy—a space that is oriented, for Swedes, around spending and leisure—and convert it into a space of Swedish investment (i.e., saving) and labor. Crucially, all this is happening contemporaneously with wide-ranging attempts at the EU level to newly regulate the flow of immigrants, another group of people frequently classed as "dangerous" and "threatening" to dominant social mores. Beier informs us of a similar situation from the era of the consolidation of the English state.[14] He uses the history of vagrancy reforms in order to contest the claim that the English state was weak at the time. Just like the EU today, it had no standing army or national police force, and its jurisdiction thus relied on officials at the local level who were frequently uncooperative. In a further similarity, the interests of these local officials often stood opposed to those of the national state, and thus it was hard to ensure any sort of village-level

enforcement of national legislation (in the case of the EU, this jumps to the opposing interests of national and federal levels). Beier asserts that vagrancy legislation was the first to dovetail the interests of the local with those of the national, and thus the English state "developed a number of institutions to control vagrants that were novel and greatly extended state authority" (Beier 1985: 12; see also 146).[15]

Taking this as a suggestive parallel to the situation in the EU today, I am arguing that the EU government's and proponents' attempts to eradicate forms of vagrancy (both by encouraging a new flow of laboring Swedes to Copenhagen and by instituting a vast "unified refugee policy") may be creating a classic instantiation of an "unintended consequence." In this case, the extension of EU powers and the commensurate growth of its state may result, since immigration policy stands as one of the vital spheres in which national and EU interests dovetail. As is well-documented, most, if not all, of the nation-states that comprise the EU have expressed a profound interest in seeking EU-wide measures to deal with the seemingly more localized immigration "problem."

By noting such parallels, I am by no means implying that there are no *actual* differences between, say, migrant laborers and tourists. I am saying, instead, that certain states in certain historical epochs may have chosen to neglect these differences, and instead lump these varied social actors together by marking them as present-oriented non-savers all. Non-savers had to be banished or reformed because of the bad example they set and because of their *apparent* lack of contribution to the *future* social reproduction of the state.

We should therefore follow this state logic as an ethnographic object (howsoever offensive it may appear to us) and see where it takes us, rather than merely denigrating it as unenlightened. Perhaps, though now denigrated within the nation-state itself, the state logic that dictates who can and cannot move without money still reigns without question in emergent legal spaces. If we seek it out, we might then see something new about the treatment of people who move without money, of people who—for whatever reason and for whatever duration—share an orientation toward the present instead of the future, and thereby gain Smith's label of "public enemy" for their alleged prodigality (see epigraph, above). Noting the ways in which the EU and Sweden both try to stop the mobility of non-savers allows us to witness the spatializing state in action, delineating zones of future-oriented production and present-oriented consumption, thereby reconfiguring the geographies of debauchery. In the process, we can discern the shifting borders of belonging and exclusion.

Historical vagrancy, ever so briefly

We could almost complete our task of studying the Swedish government's lengthy endeavor to eliminate vagrancy by merely noting the shifts in naming practices of the vagrant. An array of governmental reports, laws, parliamentary discussion, and police reports attest to the long engagement with vagrancy, and the titles alone grant a sense of the slow change in attitudes. Beginning their historical career as "wanderers" (*kringstrykande*), by the nineteenth century we start seeing the term "defenseless" (*försvarslösa*), referring to the lack of money on his person. At the end of that century, the term "unattached drifter" (*lösdrivare*) enters the lexicon. Finally, the most telling assemblage from the twentieth century: "societally harmful asociality" (*samhällsfarlig asocialitet*) and the more straightforward "junkie, drug abuser" (*missbrukare*). This arc traces a slow shift from a resigned attitude toward the wanderers (who often provided essential services on the farmstead) to the laissez-faire indictment of being defenseless in a daily economic war of man against man, to the scientized danger facing the social collectivity.

Briefly, the Swedish state showed a widespread hatred of mobile populations during the building of the People's Home (the colloquial term used for the social welfare state). In particular, vagrants (*luffare*) were a storied and fairly common group of people who wandered the country roads of Sweden; myriad government reports,

newspaper articles, propaganda pieces, and fictional literature attest to their presence and centrality in the Swedish imagination (one of the most famous Swedish novels of the twentieth century relates the story of "Bolle," the vagrant). Here is a succinct illustration of prevalent attitudes, taken from a government commission report:

"Aside from the fact that vagrants can be called parasites upon society, who are far from living in a socially useful manner, [and also] are a burden for society and cause it much expense, this [social] element constitutes a large portion of those who have made themselves guilty of criminal activity or could be feared to surrender themselves to crime, even if they have not always been won over to this. … Vagrancy therefore constitutes a danger for law and order's preservation, and if it is allowed to freely flourish without setting measures from the general public, this danger will without question increase at a high rate."[16]

Here we see, *inter alia,* the claim that without social action, the vagrants could readily overrun the country. Furthermore, other reports[17] attest to governmental concerns that children need to be protected from the ways of the vagrants, lest they succumb to the tempting lifestyle. Simply put, there was a fear that the life of the road might exert a pull on citizens and draw them into unproductive lives or "unregulated lifestyles."[18]

Be that as it may, in a series of reforms beginning in 1885 and continuing until 1981, vagrants were decidedly eradicated, a shame on the public conscience that needed to be washed away by the establishment of the orderly social democratic state.[19] Other groups were also famously settled during the same era: the "travelers" or "tinkers" as they are sometimes called in the British Isles, the Roma, and the Saami, the transhumant reindeer herders of the Arctic region (see the excellent contributions by Lindholm 1995 and Svensson 1993). The People's Home—comprised as it was out of countless smaller middle-class homes—quite clearly could not tolerate anyone refusing to hold down a fixed address (cf. Scott 1998).

But instead of delving deeply into this cultural history, all that needs to be established here is the vagrant's relationship to governing morals concerning work, money, and travel. These, in turn, contributed to ideas about "foreign-ness." Vagrants found themselves breaking the law simply because it was illegal to be found "abroad" with no cash (and, significantly, "abroad" meant anywhere outside the home village, even if they were Swedish vagrants in a Swedish city); they found themselves abhorred because people often believed that they did not want to work, and instead wanted to live off of other people's hard-earned material wealth. Such people, often referred to as "parasites," had allegedly adopted a life in which movement was the end instead of the means, a life of constant wandering with no purpose. In short, vagrants were accused of being wandering, lazy, and drunken spendthrifts. Consider, for example, the following quote, culled from a government document:

"Unpracticed with the ownership of a large amount of money, he is subjected to, and in most cases, falls victim to the temptation of squandering the money on strong drinks or an excess of clothes or some such, and old buddies or new friends from the bar aid him in quickly finishing off the resource. While in possession of the money he has decided that he has no need of work, and when it is finished he is already back again on the vagrancy trail."[20]

These sorts of accusations were leveled despite the fact that the labor of the vagrants contributed greatly to building the nation in numerous ways, not least by undertaking all the *unregulated* labor that no one else wanted to do.

As alleged spendthrifts, they of course rarely had any money on them, and were obviously not managing to save any money either. Such wandering, unlike the sanctioned movement of the businessman, was illegal not in and of itself, but because it was movement without the legitimizing mark of regulated work and the money that results from it. Carrying money stood as a guarantee against "non-parasitical" behavior *in the future.* It testified to a legitimate plan for

tomorrow, and this was important for the burgeoning and increasingly anonymous towns of the industrializing era.[21] And herein lies one of the keys to the vagrant: as someone who is removed by choice or circumstance from the system of future-oriented savings, vagrants claim that they live "on their own time" (Day, Papataxiarchis, and Stewart 1999; Gmelch 1977: 35). Instead of relying on money, they are constantly proposing barter transactions (mostly food and lodging in exchange for work or a song). Alternatively, they are spending it with panache and vigor as soon as it comes into their hands (as we saw above), not worrying about tomorrow at the expense of enjoying an abundant today.

For centuries, these brazen people who moved without money were dealt with under the "law of the home village" (Widen 1906). The law dictated that vagrants be returned to some alleged "home," thereby demarcating home and abroad, membership and exclusion, depending upon access to money. Thus, just as Harrington (1999) has pointed out, the welfare policies of small villages created new zones of inclusion and exclusion, often defining membership by birth or work (see Wimmer 2002 for a similar story at the national level; see also Mongia 1999).

However, there was another sort of belonging outside the confines of the village—belonging in the marketplace. Evidencing a proper level of social personhood in this community depended upon having money. Otherwise, one was deemed a foreigner, unable to take part in this other community's daily rituals. Such a foreigner was always sent home. The strongest testimony to this foreign status within a market community—not, for example, a typically "imagined" one of blood or soil (Anderson [1983] 1996)—is surely the fact that prior to the vagrancy reforms of the twentieth century, non-Swedish and Swedish vagrants were treated exactly alike: all were sent to their various and scattered homes, regardless of which state such a home might be located in.[22]

As one traces the governmental reports through the years, one finds a slow erosion of the category "unattached drifter." Through modern science, the category was continually fine-tuned, precisely because modernist reformers insisted on the obvious differences, for example, between drunks and migrant laborers. It was simply not fair—or governmentally efficient—to have a catchall law for all these diverse types, merely because they all separately faced a potentially money-less tomorrow. First, the age barrier was raised to 21 through a series of reforms of the laws protecting children. Soon after, a new "alcoholics law" was passed that called for new treatments of this group. In 1918 a special law was passed that addressed the problem of prostitution. By 1929, a law dealt specifically with the mentally ill. A new "care of the poor" law took care of beggars. New homes were built for the care of the elderly. A 1980 parliamentary report finalized the process, insisting that from then on, every county would take care of any Swedish citizen found inside its borders, mobile or immobile. The vagrancy laws of the nineteenth century were finally taken off the books in 1981, and it was no longer illegal to move without money (as long as you were classed as Swedish).

Home was now everywhere, and there was no home county to be shipped back to: the foreignness attached to poverty had been eradicated, allegedly. The People's Home and its vast welfare state had colonized market space, previously marked as "foreign" and outside the community. The entire country became communal, tamed, regulated toward future-oriented productivity and the vagrant could not be left behind in this development, as the epigraph from Martinson presaged. The village and its communal control over labor practices and welfare within its confines had moved to a national level. This is at least one reason why Sweden was widely celebrated as an achieved utopia during the second half of the twentieth century. Aptly, almost 500 years prior to this, Sir Thomas More had envisioned the guaranteed care of mobile populations as one of the touchstones of utopia. He wrote, "Wherever they go, though they take nothing with them, they never lack for anything because they are at home everywhere" (More [1516] 1993: 60).

But has there truly been a structural shift? Did the People's Home truly make the utopian

move of eliminating vagrancy? Perhaps it merely goes by a different name today. In order to answer this question, we must turn now to a study of sanctioned and unsanctioned movement in Øresund today.

The hidden supports of sanctioned mobility

Lately, unsanctioned movement has received so much focus in scholarship—including in this article—that it seems necessary to make a brief corrective. Following Gellner (1983), we need to also emphasize the manner in which many states actively support specific types of mobility. The Swedish state, as many of my informants involved with business in Sweden conceded, must promote the mobility of capital and labor, grease the wheels of the national machine, so to speak. There is an immense infrastructure that supports and advances the growth of capital, created at a cost that independent capitalists could never support themselves. The returns to capital are, in other words, highly dependent upon governmental intervention. As one Swedish businessman told me, "you can't grow all by yourself."

It is worth imagining this as a sort of nationalized fixation with mobility, industry, connection, and the future. As Frykman and Löfgren ([1979] 1996), and others have shown, countless state projects (that were specifically *not* profitable) built a system that synchronized the people of the nation-state. Toll-free highways and ferries were built. The railway network and the telephone system were nationalized. For many years, the state provided people with major tax breaks for *work* cars, but not, significantly, for leisure cars. As a result, an astounding number of Swedes had individual businesses registered under their names, with no employees; the car was then purchased "for the company" though it was often used as often for the family. Even the growth of the welfare state itself had a great deal to do with rationalizing the movement of labor throughout the country, so that it would not be hampered by a fear of losing benefits when seeking out labor in the most efficient locales (Lundberg 1996; Widen 1906).

In the process of helping with all this connectivity and mobility, the state also channeled movement in certain directions and away from others. Hence, for example, in Sweden there is a special branch of state policy entitled "sparsely populated area policy" (*glesbygdspolitik*) that aims to maintain and support the population of the far north. If it were not for *glesbygdspolitik,* this area would be substantially less inhabited. Swedes are discovering this right now, as many are leaving the far north as benefits and support programs dwindle (as reported by Axelsson in 1999 in *Sunt Förnuft*). But such policies extend well beyond the far north, and have contributed to the particular imaginations of mobility that keep many Swedes' domiciles within the confines of the nation-state.

For example, one informant who had found a job in another Swedish town, far away from Malmö, took advantage of a well-known welfare benefit provided by the state. As part of Sweden's policy of encouraging labor-fluidity, the government pays to transport workers from zones with high unemployment to zones in need of laborers. He thereby received the full cost of his relocation to this distant town. Significantly, if he had moved to a city *outside* of Sweden, he would have been on his own. Many people in Sweden see the state's job as providing for this sort of money-losing connectivity: it must support the mobility of labor and capital that would otherwise be too costly.

Proponents of the EU are trying to alter this state-channeled flow right now in places like the Øresund Region, by convincing people and by making it cheaper (in time and money) to move *outside* the nation-state in search of labor instead of, as is far more common, leisure. In other words, the entire concept of "building the Region" involves governmental expenditures that seek to facilitate the flows of labor into new territories. The policy is organized around an implicit belief that labor builds cohesive communities in ways that leisure never could, just as the old village law (described earlier) insisted as well.

Thus, Sweden and the EU valorize and coddle labor with both hidden and overt subsidies, while at best leaving leisure to its own devices, and at worst trying to ship it out of its regulatory space altogether with sumptuary laws and the like.[23] But they coddle it and channel it in different directions. By attending to these differences, we can see the subtle activities of a new state, as it battles for the hearts and minds of the citizens of old ones.

The following section will clarify this discussion, by discussing the nature of typical past Swedish leisure practices in the market space of Copenhagen, just outside the nation-state and the sumptuary laws that dramatically reduce leisure practices within its space. Swedes here would mimic the vagrants of yesteryear. Practicing vagrancy is similar in effect to refusing to contribute to national welfare via regulated labor; as a vagrant, one refuses (or does not have the means to accept, in the case of migrant laborers classed as vagrants) the power of these rules. One escapes, howsoever briefly, into an orientation toward the present. Consequently, even the cash that you might have as a vagrant or a migrant laborer does not have the same teleological orientation as that of the businessman—it is not destined to become your future-oriented capital, only your present-oriented means of consumption. And this is unacceptable if the Øresund Region is to be built, as planned, as a zone of fluid and charged capitalism.

Ship of fools, hourly

During the entirety of 1999 and the summer of 2000, I was researching the Regionalist movement, as well as a set of groups opposed to it. As a result, I spent much time on the hourly ferries that used to cross the water between Copenhagen and Malmö. Taking the ferry itself was an age-old tradition among Swedes (described further below), and I became interested in investigating the association this tradition had with the drinking of alcohol, that is, the association this tradition had with leisure.

Once I witnessed a particularly dramatic instantiation of the alcoholic underpinnings of this tradition. I learned from many other experiences on the boats, however, that for all its drama, it was not particularly unique. While walking toward the Copenhagen harbor, I spotted a man who appeared to be dead, lying face-down in the middle of a reliably trafficked street. I did not quite know what to do, but noticed that everyone else did. The Swedes who were all hurrying to catch the next boat just kept walking right by him. Was this a display of their famously "solidaristic" behavior toward their fellow humans? I hesitated. Thankfully, so did one Swedish woman. We consulted each other and then jointly stooped down to investigate whether the man was breathing or not, for he was completely motionless. Indeed he was alive, and appeared to be merely some of the effluvia that is spat out of the local bar scene nearby. He was, in short, merely in need of a long, alcohol-induced sleep. He had just chosen a particularly perilous spot to collapse.

As we hovered near him and contemplated what to do with this human flotsam, a Dane yelled at us in Danish to "Take him back to Sweden!" The interesting thing, of course, was that there was nothing about this particular human that made him look particularly Swedish or Danish; rather, his location and behavior (or lack of behavior), gave him away to this Dane as an obvious Swede. Presumably, all the Swedes who neglected his dire circumstances also hazarded a guess as to his background and reason for being there, and this was why they chose to bypass him and his sordid predicament. Both the excessive drunkenness and the lack of sympathy directed toward it were notably out of keeping with standard moral codes within Sweden itself, a place filled with people who constantly pride themselves on their alleged rationality and kindheartedness toward anonymous others.

With this classic example of latter-day vagrancy in mind, it is useful to compare the two different modes of transport over the Sound in order to think about the current transformations underway in Øresund. When I first arrived in

Malmö, one could only cross the Sound by boat. There were three ferries in or near Malmö. Two competing companies (Pilen and Scandlines) departed from the city center and landed in a tourist district in Copenhagen, and the other one (also owned by Scandlines) connected Limhamn, Sweden with Dragør, Denmark (this latter one was not only a passenger ferry, but also transported trucks, buses, and cars). Since the bridge has been built, all of these routes have been shut down.

What is intriguing about the use of the ferries is their association with leisure travel. The Pilen boat connecting the two cities was openly considered a "party boat." It was much cheaper to ride than its Scandlines competitor, and people thought of it as more "trashy." The level of service was also different: on the Scandlines boat there were waitresses, whereas the Pilen boat only had a kiosk where one had to wait in line. Though the Scandlines was assuredly the choice for business travelers over the Sound, it was also used by a great many tourists.[24] The ferry connecting Dragør and Limhamn was also considered a boat that survived off of its connection with festivities. The operating company openly proclaimed this during the debate over its closing. The company explained it had to close many months prior to the bridge opening because the boat subsidized its movement of freight during the slow winter months with its movement of revelers during the summer months. Since the bridge was opening the following summer, they would lose a great deal of money. The commuters who were affected by this early shutdown were few, and despite their protests to the media, the state decided against subsidizing the Dragør ferry, and instead let it die. In other words, if the boat had been a more vital means of transporting laborers instead of, if the neologism be permitted, "leisurers," it would perhaps have carried on its service at least until the bridge was functional. By way of comparison, the Swedish state does, tellingly, subsidize every train ticket over the bridge into Copenhagen.

Be that as it may, boats such as these enabled the creation of a national tradition, called "to tour" (*att tura*), wherein people hop on ferries that leave Sweden for *other lands* in order to get wild, or at least to initiate a consumption-oriented splurge on decadent goods. I was endlessly informed (and witnessed) that this is not only a rite of passage for Swedish youth, but is continued by other generations, albeit in mostly more civilized doses.

This common ritual is not least related to the cheaper costs of drinking on these boats. Because they are in international waters, they provide tax-free imbibing. The boats are thus organized around festive consumption—the Dragør ferry even had draught taps and tax-free stores that one could browse in (tax-free stores, it should briefly be noted, sell mostly "luxury" viz., decadent items, ranging from perfume to cigarettes, liquor, and candy). Much beer and Gammel Dansk (a Danish hard liquor) is tossed back, at all hours of the day, including the early morning. Significantly, all of these boats land in locales that are not associated with Swedish work; they land in tourist centers. When they existed in Copenhagen, they landed in a strip of bars and restaurants that in the evenings was always filled with Swedish revelers. Dragør is a quaint sort of village with "typically Danish" architecture, and many of its stores survived by selling products (especially decadent ones) to visiting Swedes, who found them cheaper there than at home. The citizens of Dragør were even more worried about the shutdown of the ferry than those of Limhamn, knowing how much their town depended upon Swedish extraterritorial consumption practices.

Now, consider the new bridge and its trains, which caused the shutdown of all of these ferries. Despite heading into some sort of "international space," there are no tax-free products for sale, and certainly no beer or Gammel Dansk; instead only coffee, that singular beverage associated more with labor than leisure, is for sale. The trains deliver one to completely different parts of Copenhagen: its airport, its central train station, and then on to other local commuter stops. In fact, it runs along the same commuter rails that local Danes depend upon, stopping in parts of town that are not considered touristy in the least. Also, bridge traffic is not policed by

the Swedish border patrol nearly as well as the ferries were. When disembarking from the ferries, you had to walk through a customs zone and were often at least subject to a brief scan from the police (people of color invariably had to show identification, of which, more below). Occasionally one spotted a drug dog, sniffing passersby for decadent contraband. These police were looking for illegal immigrants, as well as for any attempts to carry home too many festive objects from the trip to Denmark (there are specific per capita allotments of alcohol allowed into the country). These trappings are largely absent today, replaced by such weak epigones of nation-state power as a voluntary customs-declaration box at the first train stop in Sweden. The shift in all of these practices reveals, I believe, a hope that Copenhagen used to be a zone of potentially dangerous and present-oriented consumption and is now becoming a more mundane and orderly space of future-oriented production.

The bridge, in short, has been designed to harmonize Copenhagen and Malmö's labor practices, not its leisure ones. I heard a witty, and perhaps unintended, encapsulation of this fact when I attended a business conference about the exciting possibilities promised by the new bridge. A Danish speaker at the conference jokingly quipped, "the nice thing about the bridge is that it will get the Swedes home at night." Clearly Swedes have a bad reputation for their disorderly behavior in Copenhagen. Indeed, their reputation is so bad that one might hazard the hypothesis that Swedes on festive journeys to Copenhagen share some of the same behavior, and suffer some of the same stereotypes, as the vagrants of a previous era.

As corollary evidence that many Swedes do, in fact, embrace the alleged attitude of the vagrant when they travel *outside the nation-state,* the general culture of leisure travel should be briefly explored as well. A newspaper article in 1999 by Olsson informs us that in the early 1990s, Swedes traveled abroad more than any other population in the world. The "organized group tours" (*charterresa*) carry ubiquitous ads in the local papers, and have many offices around the country. Even a popular film by one of Sweden's most famous comics, entitled *Charterresa,* has satirized Swedish travel abroad. On more than one occasion I was told the seeming urban legend that there is a specific ski town in Austria that has banned Swedes. They always cause too much of a ruckus, fighting and vomiting throughout the town.

Even more suggestive, another rite of passage for *virtually all* Swedish youth is "to go train hobo-ing" (*att tågluffa*). This occurs when a group of Swedish youth set out on the rails (*tåg*) to explore foreign European lands on a shoestring. Dare I draw too many conclusions from the use of the term "*luffa,*" the verb form of "vagrant"? Upon leaving the country, they resolutely mimic the practice of true vagrancy that was abhorred and repressed when it occurred within the country during the building of the People's Home.[25] They even sleep and hang out on the streets outside train stations (the classic abode, I might add, of the vagrants of old in Sweden), and they are always short on cash. As such it is celebrated as a moment of freedom and happy-go-lucky childishness—and certainly an extended period of no labor and present-oriented action.

Noting the manner in which such national rites are played out abroad, one is reminded of Foucault's ([1961] 1988) discussion of the old "Ships of Fools" that plied the rivers of Europe prior to the incarceration of madmen. Cities would place their insane on merchant and pilgrimage boats that would come through town, thereby cleansing their space of urban chaos. When these ships did land in cities, the streets were filled with scores of roving madmen, but only temporarily.

With only slight exaggeration (for certainly not all Swedes on the boats are drunk), one can posit that this is a nearly exact parallel to the old plight of pre-bridge Copenhagen, inundated hourly by mind-altered Swedes who had temporarily abandoned their reason, conveniently leaving it at home, so to speak. This reference to Foucault does not preclude critiques of his work that have instead emphasized the relationship among the eradication of vagrancy, the growth of the welfare state, and evolving notions of

nationals versus aliens (e.g., Harrington 1999; see also Wimmer 2002). On the contrary, I agree with Harrington's argument that vagrancy as a bureaucratic "problem" gave rise to new boundaries of exclusion and inclusion; governments believed that they had to carefully separate out workers and (alleged) non-workers in order to thereby discern who was contributing to the general welfare and who was not. I am only relying on Foucault here in order to point out that present-orientation gets labeled as a sort of unreason that needs to be reformed or banished.

In Copenhagen and other locales abroad, Swedes are natives of market space, encouraged to stay as long as they have money, exiled as "foreigners" to their "home village" to sober up as soon as they run out. As consumption-oriented missions, these Swedish trips abroad allow for a brief foray into the pleasures of living in the present.[26] They can blissfully forget about tomorrow and spend their money today, without any bad conscience that they are not saving for the good of themselves and their community. I even know a mother who returned home penniless from a leisure trip abroad (a journey she made without her child), and she knew that now that the spending frenzy was over, she had to start "being responsible again with [my] money." In classic vagrant fashion, when her flight was canceled and she had to wait until the next day to get home, she had to sleep at the airport, because she had no more earmarked money left to spend, literally.[27]

It is as if the ritualized space of present-orientation discussed by Day, Papataxiarchis, and Stewart (1999) can only be recreated outside the Swedish nation-state. Outside the country, Swedes are often in danger of committing all the asocial practices that they themselves attributed to the vagrant: spendthrift ways, mobility, drunkenness, embracing leisure and shunning work, and the vagrants' general freedom from dominant social mores. Recall, for example, that when I spotted the passed-out reveler on the streets of Copenhagen, most of the Swedes just kept walking right by him; this is the sort of thoughtlessness toward one's fellow man that is considered crude (often colored as a peculiarity blighting only America) and unacceptable *within* the nation-state. This belief arguably stands as the moral grounding for the entire welfare state apparatus. The belief that the vagrant did not care about anyone but himself—the pathological individualist—was a frequent critique from the era of their desired eradication; in Copenhagen, most of the Swedes, on this day at least, just wanted to make sure they caught the next boat. Thus, we are no longer talking exclusively about the stereotype of the drunken Swede abroad, but a more general phenomenon of solipsistic consumption that tends to present itself in foreign spaces instead of the cooperative production that organizes itself within the (People's) home.[28]

As described previously, the advent of the bridge is altering the conditions of possibility for this sort of extraterritorial debauchery in Copenhagen. Meanwhile, the boats that travel to Finland remain famous for their festive nature.[29] This stands as evidence that states can manipulate the flows of labor and leisure, and in so doing, affect the conceptualizations of space. A heavy tax on decadent goods can indeed be seen as a different incarnation of the "ship of fools" policy of early modern Europe, for it successfully exports Swedish (temporary) madness (i.e., drunken spendthrifts) and non-productivity abroad. Tax-free partying financially rewards the reveler for "taking it outside," and thus creates the utterly economically rational desire to devote oneself to tantalizing consumption (in all its non-alcohol and alcohol-related forms) in front of foreigners instead of fellow countrymen.

Thus, with the bridge and the EU-sponsored regionalization project, we have a new state "greasing the wheels" of future-oriented labor, just as was documented earlier for the Swedish state. Meanwhile, it appears that leisure must largely support itself (testified to by the closing of the boats, discussed above), or even be shipped abroad by latter day sumptuary laws.[30] In seeking an answer for why this recurs in many capitalist states and the EU, I am suggesting that the state conceives—rightly or wrongly—of leisure as present-oriented action and labor as future-oriented action. Following Day, Papataxiarchis,

and Stewart (1999) again, we must ask why states so frequently favor future-oriented action, while they simultaneously insist on the elimination of present-oriented actors, such as alleged "vagrants."

Beier points us toward an answer from early modern England. There, vagrants were seen as a sort of anti-society, and thus, fundamentally dangerous to the structures of dominant society. He even claims that the English translation of a 1509 book, entitled *The Ship of Fools,* marks the beginning of a general fear of a vast group of lawless wanderers threatening the values and pillars of "good" society (Beier 1985: 7). In the case of twentieth-century Sweden, the perils and contaminations of present-oriented vagrancy could not be altogether eliminated. Thankfully, though, they could be exported on latter-day incarnations of the ship of fools.

Vagrancy eliminated?

Given all of this, we should take a look at the potential consequences of the arrival of a new regime, which is attempting to turn Øresund into a grand zone of labor. And so we arrive at today's Sweden, in today's new Europe. I have argued here that the Region's proponents are concerned with regulating labor across the Sound. What is fascinating about this shift is the fact that there was *never* a drive to harmonize leisure practices across the Sound. In fact, the geography of debauchery outlined earlier specifically depended upon the *disharmony* of the leisure regimes governing Denmark versus Sweden. Copenhagen, a space of unregulated leisure for Swedes during the twentieth century, is being sold and pushed as a new space of promising and life-enhancing regulated labor in the twenty-first century.

These efforts are being supported by an emerging state that wants to spend money on labor connectivity in a new area; out with the present-orientation and in with the future-orientation. The EU is making extensive contributions to the realization of the Region, and the government hopes that this transnational region will become a model space of a borderless Europe, with the national border losing its everyday meaning. People will cross without a thought to the fact that they are leaving the nation-state, and instead they will be embracing a new regional identity. The people leading the charge share an implicit belief in the value of future-oriented labor for promoting a shared sense of belonging to a community. According to their logic, present-oriented leisure apparently just does not work as communal glue, nor has it throughout the twentieth century.

So the Region is attempting to incorporate a subset of people previously treated as vagrants (Swedish citizens) and convert them to its new ethic of socially binding and fluid labor, to convince them that the Region, as a newly delineated unit, is a regulated home, not an unregulated abroad. If Copenhagen as a space of vagrancy *for Swedes* is successfully conquered, they will no longer be considered foreign there. Instead of being shipped back on a boat when they run out of money, they could be cared for in Copenhagen itself or they might even live there permanently anyway.[31] The EU qua state will have produced a new, more expansive home.

But for all this talk of the Region as a zone of inclusive, future-oriented labor, there are still groups that are labeled present-oriented vagrants, and not targeted for any of these EU-led "reform" policies directed toward Swedes. For them, the Region remains market space. Prior to the completion of the bridge, there was a noticeable aspect of any given trip across the Sound on a boat. Upon arriving in Sweden, one always had to pass through a customs control room. The basic criterion for getting through this zone without having to show papers was skin color. Undoubtedly, people of color had to stop and show passports or ID, even if they were born in Sweden (cf. Löfgren 1999; O'Dell 2003). As a result, one often spotted a family being denied entry. They are today's migrant labor force. In a repetition of history, they too are constantly "sent home." It is only that now the meaning of "home" has altered. Instead of being sent back to their villages in Sweden, these people are sent home to some other country: Pakistan, Iraq,

Turkey, Romania (see Hacking 1998: 79 for a similar assessment of the border in Catalonia). Perhaps the catchall law of money and belonging that determined foreignness by assessing the amount of cash you carried is now returning, merely attaching itself to new—and equally diverse—populations.

Interestingly enough, the critiques that are cast upon today's immigrants are virtually identical to those voiced against the "asocial" and unattached roamers of an earlier era, the people caught "abroad" with no money. I was told numerous urban legends about immigrants' abuse of the so-called "Everyman's right," the rule in Sweden that guarantees traditional gathering and usufruct rights on other people's private property. Further, I have been told many variants of the claim that that "it's hard to integrate someone who doesn't want to be integrated." Likewise, there is a constant refrain about the relationship among immigrants, criminality, and work: Sweden must learn to integrate these people in order to put a stop to their criminal behavior, and "honest" work is the solution. A related complaint circulates that these immigrants are "lazy" and only come to Sweden to live off of others. Countless people voice the concern that these foreigners will "overrun" the country if the situation is not "controlled." As I documented previously, all of these claims served as central impetuses behind the drive to address the vagrancy problem in early-twentieth-century Sweden.

Such people, scandalously, attempt to move into foreign space without enough money for tomorrow. If they garner a regulated living, however, they become less suspect. For regulated laborers are incorporated laborers, well on their way to becoming "native," at least within a socialist ethos, where joining the system of regulated production stands as the premier mark of social inclusion and proof that one has joined the system of future-oriented social welfare. One immigrant was quoted in a magazine, proclaiming "if you succeed in Sweden, you become Swedish; if you don't succeed, you remain an immigrant" (in *ETC* 1999 [2]: 46).

One is reminded of a point made long ago by Raymond Williams (1973) in his book *The Country and the City.* In the penultimate chapter of that remarkable work, Williams points out that the migration from country to city has not ceased, it has only moved to a grander scale. The "corrupting influence of foreigners" in the metropole now hails from the West Indies or India rather than from the rural zones of the British Isles. Though they constantly provide labor that redounds to the glory of the state, somehow credit for this glory, except in a few scattered folk songs, always bypasses the workers who helped to build it.

Furthermore, if Beier is correct, forms of vagrancy—at least in the cases presented here—also provide a reactive impetus in the building of the state, forcing it to increase its policing powers in a continuing effort to control them; it must spend money and effort to channel flows of labor and colonize the flows of leisure. The ritualized spaces directed toward the present must be eradicated (or exiled) in favor of homogenized space dedicated to the future. Some of the political implications for present-oriented action that Day, Papataxiarchis, and Stewart asked us to search for thereby become manifest, for boundaries are made anew in this process. As the European Union strives to create a vast, unified refugee policy to be applied within its harmonized market, we should therefore recall the hatred often leveled upon mobile populations, frequently labeled "foreigners" and just as surely always greatly aiding in the construction of a new state, of a new definition of "home."

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Notes

1. All translations are my own, unless otherwise noted.
2. The region gains its name from this sound, which is called the Øre Sound.
3. The region and its bridge as novel phenomena affecting local culture have been admirably and expertly covered by many others (see e.g., Berg, Linde-Laursen, and Löfgren 2000, 2002; Idvall 1997, 2000; Linde-Laursen 1995; Löfgren 1999; Nilsson 1999, 2000a, 2000b). This transnational bridge project was the subject of copious debate prior to its completion. For a concise history of the evolution of the arguments regarding the bridge, see Idvall (1997). For a highly detailed history of the production of the border between Sweden and Denmark, see Linde-Laursen (1995).
4. The Øresund Region should be seen as related to all the other transnational border regions that are cropping up, not only in the EU, but around the world. For example, Lindquist's (2002) insightful work on the border region between Indonesia, Singapore, and Malaysia offers a very illuminating comparison. As I do, Lindquist also finds that people often traverse the border in order to escape the reigning moralities of the home, and to seek out certain anonymous monetary relations that are more taboo there. Berdahl (1999) also provides an excellent example of the manner in which one can study the flow of objects and subjects in order to provide an ethnographic account of boundary construction. Her treatment of border crossing as a sort of ritualized liminal space has been instrumental in the development of the argument made in this article. Other examples of important work on border zones include Armstrong (2003), Asher (2005), Rabinowitz (2003), Sahlins (1989), the copious and illuminating work focusing on the US/Mexico border (for an overview, see De Genova 2002), and of course the path-breaking collection edited by Donnan and Wilson (1994). Boye (2000) even offers an explicit and detailed comparison among Hong Kong/Guangdong, Singapore-Johor-Riau, and Øresund.
5. The authors cite, among others, Woodburn's work as an inspiration, and his work is particularly interesting for those interested in the question of orientation toward the future or the present (see Woodburn 1982).
6. Incidentally, it seems to me that Day, Papataxiarchis, and Stewart's book should be considered as a central text for anthropologists who are interested in analyzing the effectiveness of various practices of resistance or who are openly calling for a more activist discipline. Though the book does not endorse any particular political stance, it provides food for thought and covers different ground than many other studies within the literature on resistance.
7. Peebles (2008) (forthcoming) investigates how the state produces this space and this orientation toward a common future via national currency.
8. In this regard, it is worth noting that vagrancy legislation was often a thinly disguised method of criminalizing poverty (cf. Beier 1985).
9. Levander ([1934] 1974) covers this period nicely in his *Fattig Folk och Tiggare* (Poor people and beggars).
10. In Bakhtin's (1968) sense of market space as "the world upside down." His sense of market space is very specific. A market in the more everyday sense often has more in common with his ideas about courtly culture: zones in which hierarchy and states successfully manage to regulate and channel flows. The highly regulated

space of the Swedish nation-state is not a market in Bakhtin's sense.

11. Market and home spaces can of course be coextensive. The same city, Copenhagen, may be a home space for Danes and a market space for Swedes. I only mean to imply that there is a layering of space, a layering that states often try to eliminate or at least redefine for new groups of outsiders (cf. Lefebvre 1991).
12. According to Marx, the reason why "foreigners" were allowed in market space was because everyone was a foreigner in the anonymous market space whose governing value is money. In this sense, the story told here is chronicling, then, the slow effort to overpower the "law of money" with the law of the state.
13. It is a well-known fact among scholars of vagrancy that vagrancy laws served as a catchall law, used to police all sorts of "criminal" elements, and only became rigorously applied to today's definition of a vagrant in the modern era (see e.g., Beier 1985; Hill 1972). Good comparative material exists for the US, Germany, Holland, France, and England, e.g., Allsop (1967), Beaune (1983), Beier (1985), Foucault ([1961] 1988), Hacking (1998), Harrington (1999); Hill (1972); J. Lucassen and L. Lucassen (1997), Marx (1990: 877–895), and Sassen (1999).
14. Many excellent studies of the relationship between mobile groups and states exist. See, for example, Caplan and Torpey (2001), Comaroff and Comaroff (1992), Day, Papataxiarchis, and Stewart (1999), Fontaine (1996), J. Lucassen & L. Lucassen (1997), L. Lucassen (1993), Sassen (1999), and Torpey (1998).
15. Primary document research suggests that the same may have been true in Sweden. In one report (page 60 of *Underdånigt Förslag till Förordning Angående Lösdrifveri, m.m* or "Humble suggestions for regulations concerning vagrancy, etc.," published in 1882, in Göteborg (Sweden) by Göteborgs Handelstidnings Aktiebolags Tryckeri), a police chief in Malmö complains that his department cannot successfully control the vagrancy problem on the outskirts of town because he does not have enough officers.
16. See "Betänkande med Förslag till Lagstiftning om Åtgärder mot Lösdriveri samt Åtgärder mot Sedeslöst Leverne av Samhällsskadlig Art" (Consideration with recommendations for legislation concerning measures against vagrancy as well as measures against untraditional practices of the socially dangerous type). 1929. Tillkallade Sakkunniga. *Statens Offentliga Utredningar 1929: 9* (Socialdepartementet). Stockholm: Kungliga Boktryckeriet, P.A. Norstedt & Söner.
17. See pages 75, 78 of Ragnar von Koch. 1926. "Betänkande med Förslag till Lag om Behandling Av Vissa Arbetsovilliga och Samhällsvådliga, m. fl. Författningar (Consideration with suggestions for laws on the treatment of various types of people unwilling to work and violent toward society, with additional statutes). *Statens Offentliga Utredningar 1926: 9* (Socialdepartementet). Stockholm: Kungliga Boktryckeriet, P.A. Norstedt & Söner.
18. Hacking (1998) recounts the sudden emergence of a new psychological diagnosis at the time, concerning people who could not resist the pull of the road.
19. Unfortunately there is not the space here to give proper due to this fascinating history. The ubiquity and subsequent demise of the vagrant in Swedish society has been largely neglected, but not for lack of primary sources. However, Wallentin (1989) makes an excellent preliminary foray into the material. See also Peebles (2002: 209–223) for much more primary document research than can be related here.
20. Page 55 of the report of 1882, mentioned in note 15.
21. As evidence, a contrario, see Malmöhusläns Landskansliet DIVa: 2918; 11 March 1879 in the Malmö archives. Here we find a successful application from a foreign merchant to reside in town precisely because of proven monetary resources.
22. In Malmö's police archives, one can find Germans, Russians, and other sundry Europeans all being served with the identical punishment as the Swedes in the archives: Banishment to the "home" (Malmö Stadsarkiv DIIa: 5, Kriminal polisen i Malmö).
23. There are, of course, special zones of state-sponsored leisure. It is interesting to note, however, that these zones are virtually always in places where an economy based on production has utterly failed, and so a commitment to leisure manifests itself as a method of creating new forms of labor.
24. Löfgren (1999) is quick to point out that the ferries were used by many different people for many

different reasons. Nonetheless, the overwhelming thrust of his description also focuses on the liminal and festive aspect of the ferry ride, delivering people away from the everyday.

25. But strangely, vagrancy was simultaneously romanticized during this era, a story that, unfortunately, cannot detain us here. For example, it surely means something that Martinson's (1949) book *Vägen till Klockrike* (The road to the kingdom of clocks) is one of the most famous books of twentieth-century Swedish literature.
26. Others have pointed out this distinction between home and market space (see Hart 2000). Day (1999) and Malkki (1995) also show us fascinating instances of people who behave differently in a sort of "market space" than they do in "home space."
27. This sort of predicament is becoming less and less likely, as more and more Swedes start to carry credit cards. But that is another story altogether.
28. See Daun [1989] 1996: 44 and Wagner 1977 for similar arguments about moral inversions outside the Swedish nation-state.
29. This story is also interesting vis-à-vis new EU laws (see Peebles 2002: 161–200). But even in Øresund, these practices will not change overnight: Swedes still use the new bridge in order to go wild in Copenhagen. But for those who are interested in seeing the Region converted into a space of labor, the structures are now in place for the project to proceed.
30. The EU does provide infrastructural support for the leisure industry, but the lion's share of its concern revolves around how to get labor to become mobilized across borders. And some of its regulations actively seek to cut back on subsidies for leisure travel (the elimination of tax-free shopping).
31. And indeed, this precise issue has proven to be a sizeable problem for early EU jurisprudence. How could a mobile transnational labor force be assured that it would receive the famously healthy welfare benefits of Western European states whenever it crossed a border? Without this assurance, labor mobility is severely hampered, and the European Court of Justice has worked hard to ensure that benefits are accorded to newly arrived "foreigners" from other EU lands (see Peebles 1997).

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