

**Ideology and Movement Militancy against Partisan Allies:
Evidence from Strikes in Post-Authoritarian Chile**

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ABSTRACT

Why do social movements sometimes protest against their allies when in government? Conversely, why is it difficult for governments to fully co-opt and demobilize social movements, even when movement leaders are political allies? Studies of union militancy have suggested that the answer may lie in leaders' ideologies, but studies addressing this question have overlooked ideologies, assuming rational choice explanations. I argue that leaders with a militant and autonomist ideology strike against allies because they believe strikes are a necessary to achieve gains—contrasting with their less autonomist colleagues' views. Statistical and qualitative analysis of six Chilean public sector unions in the first eighteen years of post-authoritarian regime (N=86) support the theory. Reanalysis of secondary data suggests it may apply for other Latin American countries as well.

Why do social movements sometimes protest against their allies when in government?

Conversely, why is it difficult for governments to fully co-opt and demobilize social movements, even when movement leaders are political allies? This is an important for studies of both social movements, and the political economy of governance. In this article, I argue that leader's ideology is a crucial explanatory factor left aside by sociologists and political scientists addressing this question. Curiously, in spite of strong criticism against resource mobilization and political opportunity structure theories' rational choice assumptions, scholars have not extended these critiques to analyses of movements linked to parties and subject to cooptation. We know ideologies lead radicals to choose more militant tactics than less radical factions choose when confronting clearly defined adversaries (Kimeldorf 1988; Stepan-Norris and Zeitlin 2003; Voss and Sherman 2000); yet we assume decisions are when the adversary is in some ways an allies. This article seeks to fill this important omission, where ideology has not been granted the attention it deserves.

Until about 1980, sociologists concerned with corporatism and with movement cooptation inquired into the tensions between materially interested choices and those motivated by ideology and identity to understand conflict between working-class movements and partisan allies (e.g. Offe and Wiesenthal 1980; Pizzorno 1978, among the most influential works). However, since then, studies of corporatism and movement cooptation have placed most emphasis in material inducements for rational choice, leaving ideological and identity motivations aside. Since the late 1970s, neocorporatist and political exchange theories became influential, focusing only on the rational choice side of Pizzorno's theory or in other variants (Korpi and Shalev 1979; Regini 1984; Schmitter 1977). Studies of democratizations since the 1980s adopted the rational choice dimensions of political opportunity theory to explain why urban and labor movements were not

protesting in the new democracies led by partisan allies (Fishman 1990; Frank 1995, 2002; Hipsher 1996, 1998; Nelson 1991; Valenzuela 1989; Webster 1998). In the new century, sociologists have written less about this important problem, leaving it to political scientists to explain why governments are more or less successful at avoiding resistance against market reforms. And, as we may expect, political scientists have used rational choice explanations, paying little attention to ideology, culture, or identity (2001; Burgess 2004; Madrid 2003; Murillo 2001). Sociologists are still concerned with potential conflict between movements and partisan allies, but are conducting the type of systematic analyses on the topic they used to (e.g. Baiocchi and Checa 2008). A systematic analysis of the non-rational and ideological dimensions of militancy against partisan allies is long overdue, as Regini (1992) and Hicks (1999) noticed decades ago.¹

In this article, I bring back in the analysis of the role of ideology in defining movements' militant tactics even against allies in government, thus limiting governments' capacity for movement cooptation. I do so focusing particularly in labor movements, which are the movements most typically considered in analyzing conflict between movements and government allies; yet lessons from labor movements may extend to other movements tied to parties, such as urban, indigenous, and student movements. My theory is that strikes against allies in government depend significantly on whether or not the leaders' embrace an ideology of militancy and union autonomy from parties. Leaders with an ideology of union autonomy often strike because they see industrial conflict as a necessary means to achieve gains from the government, even if they are partisan allies. In contrast, leaders without an autonomist ideology avoid striking because of ideological preferences for less confrontational methods or because they are co-opted by the government. The contrast between choices of leaders with different ideologies may be especially

notable where movements are highly politicized and politically divided, with segments tied to traditions of militancy and autonomism. This is the case of various Latin America and Southern European labor and urban movements, as well as movements in other regions, such as in South Africa or India.

After reviewing the rational choice literature on the subject and explaining my alternative theory, I test all theories observing six Chilean unions—a typical case of “polarized” or “contestatory” labor movements—through eighteen of the post-authoritarian period. I first run statistical analysis and then discuss those results introducing qualitative evidence that helps make sense of them. Results provide wide support for my theory but no support for political exchange, political process, and economic costs theories of strikes against government allies, and very limited support for leadership survival theories. Leadership competition makes strikes more likely, as predicted by leadership survival theory, but the mechanism is not the rational choice of leaders seeking political survival. In fact, non-autonomist leaders prioritize moderation over securing their posts, and strikes are pushed by the autonomist or opposition leaders who raise competition. On the other hand, while unions tend not to strike when they are weak, as leadership survival theory predicts, it is unclear whether this represents a leadership strategy to avoid responsibility for failures or a rank-an-file strategy to avoid failure.

Following the analysis of the Chilean case, I discuss my theory’s prospective applicability to other countries with polarized and with corporatist labor movements. Re-analysis of evidence from other countries suggests it is likely that the theory explains some strikes elsewhere, even if other factors play a stronger role, especially in countries within the corporatist tradition. I finally summarize my findings and conclude calling for more research to test the theory in other countries.

RATIONAL CHOICE THEORIES OF STRIKES AGAINST ALLIES IN GOVERNMENT

Political Exchange Theories

“Political exchange” theory’s basic argument is that when unions have access to political power—through the ability to affect political stability or through control of governmental posts—the rational choice is to exchange present restraint for concessions or future benefits. The rank-and-file do not see that political exchange is the rational choice; thus, under-exploiting present-time bargaining power can delegitimize leaders (Pizzorno 1978; Regini 1984).² Consequently, union leaders will offer restraint only when political market and organizational conditions can avoid the crisis of representation that political exchange can produce.³ One of the key conditions for this is that leaders must be politically isolated from the rank-and-file, for instance, through indirect elections—i.e. where national leaders are elected by plant-level leaders, rather than by the rank-and-file.⁴ Thus, the theory would predict that *indirectly elected leaders will not strike*.

Leadership Competition and Political Survival Theories

In tune with political exchange theory, Murillo and Astudillo Ruiz also argue that labor leaders will avoid strikes only when their legitimacy is not at risk. However, unlike Pizzorno, they make no assumptions about the workers’ interests and focus on the leaders’ interest. Union leaders prefer being loyal to their allies; nonetheless, *leaders will strike when they face competition from other leaders who gain support by opposing unpopular policies* (Murillo 2001).⁵ Thus, strikes are a tactic for leadership survival.

While Murillo sees no relation between union strength and strikes, leadership survival theories in non-political contexts predict that *leaders avoid striking when the union is weak* because they will be blamed for their failures and lose support, even when facing competition

(Palacios-Valladares 2011).⁶ While this does not explain why or when unions strike against allies, it predicts when they will not strike.

Political Process and Democratic Transition Theory

The “political process” approach focuses on opportunities and constraints for mobilization that develop throughout the political process to explain contention (Tarrow 1998). It has been used to explain social movement restraint during post-authoritarian periods (Hipsher 1996, 1998). Less explicitly, it has been the theory underlying explanations of government-allied unions’ restraint during those periods (Fishman 1990; Frank 1995, 2002; Nelson 1991; Valenzuela 1989; Webster 1998). The argument is that *government-allied union leaders and workers in general refrain from striking during the period of stabilization of fragile new democracies*, either as concerned citizens or due to party influence. As time passes, leaders may push for more mobilization if workers’ expectations are not met and risks of returning to authoritarianism diminish.

Economic Costs Theory

In his analysis of Argentine and Mexican government-allied unions, Madrid argues that strikes against government reforms depend on the severity of the reforms’ impact on workers and the number of unions and members affected. In his cases, he claims, *strikes are the response to reforms that impose high costs on many workers, such as privatizations* (Madrid 2003). In Chile, privatizations are the most costly reforms affecting public sector workers, since they involve massive downsizing and the loss of job security provided by the state.

Madrid also uses the oldest and most general theory of strikes to explain why the unions he analyzed did not strike in some periods, even if other conditions pushed them to do so.

According to this theory, *unemployment discourages strikes* because it makes it harder to find jobs if workers are fired in retaliation (e.g. Ashenfelter and Johnson 1969).

AN IDEOLOGICAL THEORY OF STRIKES AGAINST PARTISAN ALLIES

In the past decades, some studies of industrial conflict have stressed the importance of leaders' ideologies and militant experiences in explaining strikes and other radical tactics against employers (Kimeldorf 1988; Ost 2000; Stepan-Norris and Zeitlin 2003; Voss and Sherman 2000). Generally speaking, the argument is that leaders with certain ideologies and struggle experiences see strikes and other militant tactics as necessary, while other leaders prioritize moderate strategies or are simply co-opted by the adversary. Unless these "radical" leaders see struggle as necessary only against private employers and betraying political allies is too severely punished, we should expect militant ideologies to also encourage strikes against partisan allies.

Thus, I propose that leaders embracing a relatively radical and autonomist ideology strike more often than others because they see strikes as necessary to achieve gains—in contrast with leaders who believe in moderation and the party's interest in governing, or see political favors as the preferred means of achieving gains. (By "autonomist" I do not refer to specifically Marxist or anarchist ideologies like syndicalism or *operaismo*; rather, I refer to the more general idea that workers' organizations should not be subordinated to parties and that struggle is more important than political exchange to advance workers' interests.) It will be harder for the government to avoid strikes advocated by these leaders, who are likely to believe that by striking they will get something better, if not now, in future negotiations. The government may even need to let autonomist leaders strike hoping to lower striking workers' expectations each day of strike.⁷ Conversely, those who see the party's objectives as more important than their constituency's or who are highly co-opted by their party's governing leaders will defend moderation when their party is governing. They will work to lower rank-and-file expectations before striking even when strikes could be effective. In short, *autonomist leaders will strike more often than other leaders.*

Ideology and Strikes in Polarized Labor Movements

Ideological differences among leaders matter more in some contexts than in others. The more divergent the views on militancy, class struggle, and organizational autonomy are amongst union leaders, the more these ideological differences should explain variation in propensity to strike. In countries where union leaders hold similar ideologies or are hardly committed to an ideology, ideological differences should have a weaker effect than in countries where labor is politicized and politically divided.

The latter is the case of “contestatory” or “polarized” movements, highly politicized and typically divided between Socialists, Communists, and often Christian Democrats (Streeck and Hassel 2003; Valenzuela 1992).⁸ They are typical of Latin America and Southern Europe, among other places—e.g. Brazil, Chile, Finland, France, El Salvador, Greece, Italy, Japan, Nicaragua, Peru, Portugal, South Africa, Spain, and Uruguay.⁹

There are many reasons why autonomist and militant leaders are common in countries with “polarized” labor movements. First, actual or potential competition across partisan lines has been historically high in these countries, promoting a tradition of leadership responsiveness to the rank-and-file. This is especially the case among Socialist and Christian Democratic union leaders, since their parties had weak union ties and disciplinary mechanisms, and did not grant electoral isolation to their union leaders while in government (Deppe et al. 1978; Streeck 1988; Valenzuela 1992).¹⁰ Second, union leaders in these countries have inherited a militant and autonomist culture. The old anarcho-syndicalist spirit upon which some of these movements were born has subsisted as an obstinate concern with union autonomy among leaders (Lavau 1978). Third, high repression during the formation of these movements and authoritarianism in the 20th century provoked militant responses, often from clandestinity, and a sense of need for

radical and confrontationist means (Valenzuela 1992).¹¹ Therefore, the ideologies of Communist and Socialist labor leaders in these countries have typically been more radical than elsewhere (e.g. Bartolini 2000; Marks et al. 2009).¹² (Christian Democrats are less prone to radicalization and militancy because they do not fundamentally represent class interests (Western 1997-81) and may represent workers more averse to conflict.¹³ As these leaders' parties have moved towards moderate and "catch-all" strategies that do not represent workers, party-union relations in these countries have often been severed (Baiocchi and Checa 2008; Burgess 2004; Daley and Vale 1992; Weitz 1975). Thus, autonomist leaders are likely to emerge within polarized labor movements, especially among Socialist leaders who experienced authoritarianism and whose parties have moderated their programs.

DATA

Case Selection

Because the proposed theory has individual leaders at its core, I focus on explaining variation between unions and over the course of time, rather than between countries, as is frequently done in studies on this topic. I keep the country constant to avoid additional variation introduced by each country's specificities, such as different coalition configurations.

I chose post-authoritarian Chile for four reasons. First, its labor movement is one of the best representatives of the polarized type (Valenzuela 1992), where ideological differences are more salient. Second, it allows for comparison between periods of democratic consolidation and stable democracy.¹⁴ Third, it allows for evaluation of the role of leadership competition on strikes because not all labor-based parties were in the government coalition (*Concertación*) of Christian Democrats, Socialists, and Social Democrats.¹⁵ Fourth, autonomist stances expressed beyond strikes—the dependent variable—are easier to identify in post-authoritarian Chile than in other

countries because ideological differences among Socialists led some leaders to compete against the official lists of the government coalition.

I treat each year of a union as a period of observation, since it is a reasonable unit of time that encompasses both formal and informal bargaining processes in which a union is at risk of striking. Some national unions are in the practice of bargaining *de facto* over wages almost every year; the others have many locals, with at least one of them involved in collective bargaining each year;¹⁶ and all unions negotiate additional issues between official collective bargaining periods, some of which end in strikes. Some readers may worry that this produces an unequal probability of strikes among the cases, for instance, if many locals happen to bargain during the same year; however, there is no reason to expect that formal negotiations are more likely to end in strike than informal negotiations—in fact, among the unions in which this could happen, I found that strikes did not occur more in years in which more locals negotiated.

To select unions, I only considered national unions with high public relevance, because a probabilistic sample could include small unions for which little or no archival data is available.¹⁷ In addition to providing better data, this choice makes unions more comparable. For comparability I also discarded unions of supervisory workers, subcontracted workers (who also bargain with private employers), municipal workers (who also bargain with municipalities), and the main national trade union center CUT—CUT is peculiar in that it bargains simultaneously with the state and main employers' associations, and in that it primarily negotiates regulations affecting private sector and minimum wage workers although its strength is derived from public sector workers with higher wages. From the twelve remaining unions, I excluded six because information available through the press, their websites, published studies, and other written sources, is extremely scarce.¹⁸ Thus, I selected six unions, representing the workers of the

following publicly owned enterprises and public services (union acronyms in parenthesis): copper mining (FTC), ports (FENATRAPORCHI), oil (FENATRAPECH), healthcare (CONFENATS); teachers (Colegio de Profesores), and ministries' public employees (ANEF). For each union I only selected years in which the union president was a member of the governing coalition (*Concertación*).

Data collection was conducted in 2008, thus covering 1990 through 2007—nine years of the democratic transition and nine of stabilized democracy. The sample contains 86 observations after excluding the observations in which two of the unions were led by Communists.

Sources

The following sources were used for data collection: a thorough list of public sector strikes for most of the period studied;¹⁹ newsletters tracking labor's and state enterprises' activities (Algranati et al. 2000–2007; Dirección del Trabajo 1996–2000; MundoMarítimo 2001–2008); national newspaper articles;²⁰ websites (especially news archives), annual reports, and publications of the unions and state enterprises; interviews with one major union leader per union;²¹ 13 published case studies of single public sector industries or unions; and official unemployment rates of the National Statistics Institute.²²

Coding

Table 1 summarizes the coding of the variables as justified below, the proportion of cases with a positive value for each variable (code 1), and the correlations with the dependent variable and the theoretically relevant independent variable.

[Table 1]

Significant Strike. A significant strike is one that lasted a full day or longer and involved the majority of at least one union local. Shorter or minority strikes typically did not represent an

intention of intense conflict—for instance, they were meant as a strategy to raise a problem without the costs of full day or indefinite strike, sometimes concluded by the constitution of a bargaining table. Coding them as significant strikes would have meant conflating qualitatively different forms of militancy which should have different explanations. Since the theory proposed is about whether unions will strike or not, rather than about how long, massive, or frequent strikes will be, binary coding (0 and 1) is more adequate, with 1 indicating presence of *Strike*.

Union President is an Autonomist Leader. Ideology is difficult to measure in this case because many of union leaders' claims to believe in labor's autonomy and its struggles are lip service that other leaders or analysts find hard to believe. Non-autonomist leaders will obviously never publicly admit that they follow partisan orders. However, sometimes leaders do express their beliefs in labor's moderation as a value or in the workers' need to defend the government. This was often the discourse of Christian Democratic union leaders, both in the interviews I conducted and in the press, and can be taken as a sign that the leader does not embrace an autonomist or radical stance. Nevertheless, few Socialist union leaders took such an explicit defense of moderation in general, especially after the first few years of the coalition's government. For instance, they may defend militancy as a general policy but always justify a decision not to strike on case-specific grounds. It is difficult to consider these leaders as having an autonomist ideology.

The clearest marker of an autonomist stance is stressing an autonomist platform. In Chile, this is demonstrated by competing against the government coalition's list in union elections with a "militant" or "autonomist" discourse that manifests a break with the alliance's norm—unlike in other countries, leaders are not subject to major disciplinary sanctions for this in Chile. In these cases, leaders more loyal to the government or governing parties are often forced to publicly

defend their position as pro-government and in opposition to the markedly autonomist leaders. Perhaps most importantly, breaking the alliance is hardly the easiest way to deal with leadership competition, so it cannot be explained as a response to competition for political survival.

In Chile, since the mid-1990s, Socialist union leaders have confronted each other in union elections. In these cases, a Socialist fraction, sometimes in alliance with Communists or with some fractions of the government coalition, will oppose another Socialist or Social Democratic fraction typically allied with Christian Democrats which represents the government *Concertación*—these splits can only count as autonomist when votes from separate lists are not reunited by local leaders indirectly electing a union president. In almost all cases, it is very easy to recognize which list is closer to the government and which one is autonomist: the autonomists split from most of the coalition's parties, have a more radical and autonomist discourse, and often ally with the Communists. I code unions presided by leaders winning under this conditions as *Autonomist*.²³ Qualitative evidence corroborates the contrast between beliefs about autonomy and militancy of leaders coded as autonomist and beliefs of other leaders.

Indirect Election of Union President. *Indirect* indicates that the union president was elected by plant-level leaders, not voted for by the rank-and-file as an individual or as part of a list.

Leadership Competition. It seems safe to assume that, given the stability of leaders and votes per list, leaders can predict intense competition before they lose an election. Thus, I code the last term before the defeat of the incumbent's list as one with competition. Exceptions were when leaders reported a surprise defeat by a last-minute move of a previously allied leader or because of the death of the existing leader—coded as no-competition. Conversely, I code as *Competition* the period before an election won by the incumbent if newspapers anticipated intense competition before the election.

Weak Union. Public sector unionization is high in Chile and almost all unions are able to produce a work stoppage of impact if we focus on the proportion of unionized workers and their control of core operations. The exception is the port workers' union, which is divided from the union of (privately hired) longshoremen and thus represents a small portion of the labor power. This union was always coded as *Weak*. Other unions were coded as weak when they had been defeated in a strike in the previous negotiation round, because this weakened the members' morale to confront a strike.

Period of Stabilization of Democracy (Transition). This period lasted until late 1998, when General Pinochet was arrested in London. Until then, the perception that *coup d'état* in case of turmoil was possible remained strong, with the military raising some major threats to the stability of the new democracy at critical moments (Silva 2002:376). Since 1998—also the same year he left the army to become Lifelong Senator—various signs of a perception of the stabilization of Chilean democracy became evident. In 1999, for the first time, the courts ordered the first arrests of military officers for human rights violations in Chile and, in 2000, the first criminal charges against Pinochet were raised. As a condition of Pinochet's return in 2000, he had to retire from parliament and soon after he retired from public life entirely (Barton 2002).²⁴ Unlike before 1998, the military respected these decisions and fears of reprisal largely vanished.

Privatization Attempt. Since the executive government can only privatize or transfer partial control of public enterprises to investors with support from congress, I code as *Privatize* the serious attempts with support from congress, excluding initiatives that only had executive support.

ANALYTICAL STRATEGY

Because the dependent variable is binary, I use logit or probit models regressions whenever

possible. I first run a logit regression with random effects allowing for union clusters. This addresses the potential problem of having an omitted variable that affects each union differently and that is not correlated with the independent variables in the model—e.g., if some unions strike more because their members are more radicalized and radicalization had no relationship with *Autonomist*. The model returns robust estimates adjusted for the possibility that errors in the model are clustered by union.

I then run a fixed effects model. This allows controlling for all the omitted variables which are constant across years for each union. Most notably, it does not require the random effects model's strong assumption that omitted variables are not correlated with the regressors. For instance, if rank-and-file radicalization were an omitted variable and radicalization depended on having an autonomist leader, a fixed effects model would be more adequate than a random effects model. The model estimates coefficients after such possible effect. The drawback is that it requires more statistical power. Thus, if a random effects model were more suitable, the fixed effects model could show as non-significant a coefficient that should be significant. Similarly, controlling for fixed effects in logistic regressions require a much larger sample to return reliable coefficients; thus, I use an OLS regression. Fortunately, using OLS would only be a problem if we were trying not trying to identify relevant variables but to create a predictive model. By specifying "robust" standard errors, the standard errors are robust to the heteroskedastic error problem that arises when OLS is used for binary dependent variable.

Finally, I run a probit regression with instrumental variable (IV) and union clusters to solve the potential problem of endogeneity of *Autonomist*. It is possible that the correlation between *Autonomist* and *Strike* is due to an omitted variable, such as rank-and-file radicalization or changes in solidarity, which causes both the election of autonomist leaders and strikes.²⁵ If this

were the case, the relationship observed would be spurious. The problem is solved by introducing an instrumental variable that is not theoretically related to such omitted variables but in theory affects *Autonomist* and through this variable affects *Strike*. The regression should show such correlation and, if there is endogeneity, it will return a significant *rho* (ρ). This model also allows a better understanding of the emergence of autonomist leaders by testing the effect of possible causal variables.

Instrumental Variables

Three instrumental variables should correlate with the emergence of autonomist leaders within the same party:

Honeymoon Period. Union-party ties are strained when union-allied parties do not meet workers' expectations, but this does not happen quickly, given the long-lasting relationships (Burgess 2004; Gillespie 1990). Thus, I hypothesize that *if expectations are not met after a "honeymoon period," more leaders will move towards autonomist positions and autonomist leaders will have more support.*²⁶

Indirect Elections. According to McCarthy and Zald, union leaders move towards bureaucratized conservatism if three organizational conditions are met: (1) A base of support independent of membership sentiment . . . (2) The commitment of leaders (and followers) to other goals . . . (3) The co-optation of leaders by other groups (McCarthy and Zald 1977:338–39). Thus, these conditions may prevent militant, autonomist stances from emerging.

In Chile, the first two conditions are expressed concretely by indirect elections. Presidents of national unions elected indirectly, that is, by plant-level leaders, can use personal favors and other resources available through their position to assure support from local leaders instead of for gaining grass-roots support. This (1) gives them a base support independent of membership

sentiment and (2) demands systematic commitment to other goals. Thus, I predict that *union presidents will have autonomist stances if they are elected directly.*

While *Indirect* is not a good instrumental variable, because it could also directly promote strikes according to political exchange theory, it is theoretically relevant to consider its relation to *Autonomist*.

Bonuses. McCarthy and Zald's last two conditions are expressed in Chile by bonuses received by some presidents of public enterprises' trade unions, sometimes more than doubling their income (e.g. CODELCO 2006:98). This highly lucrative compensation for participating in the enterprise's board of directors is proportional to the profits. Thus, bonuses (2) induce commitment to other goals and (3) work as a strong co-optation mechanism. Consequently, I expect that *union presidents will have autonomist stances if they do not receive monetary bonuses.*²⁷

Coding of Instrumental Variables

Honeymoon Period. The length of political honeymoons varies. In the Chilean case, the *Concertación's* honeymoon period may overlap with first years of transition. However, reports of the national trade union center CUT, coinciding with de la Puente's interview statements, mention that some leaders began to sever ties with the government between 1994, when the second administration began and put forward a second disappointing labor reform, and 1996—the unsatisfactory 1991 labor reform was disappointing but tolerated (Frías 1995). This was a time in which democracy was clearly not stabilized; General Pinochet still as Commander in Chief of the Army and some military threats were put forward in 1995 and 1998 (see above). Thus, I code as honeymoon years those of the first administration (1990-1993)—results are the same when including 1994, the year of the reform.

Union President Receives High Bonuses. This condition is present when union presidents receive money in addition to their salary as members of the board of directors of the public enterprise.

STATISTICAL RESULTS

Table 2 shows six regression models predicting Strike.²⁸ Model 1 includes all the independent variables, but the coefficients may be biased because of a high number of regressors, as indicated by the missing Wald χ^2 —probably because of the low sample size. The problem persists even after eliminating the non-significant variables (results not shown). The problem is solved by including the two variables significant at $p < .05$ one-tailed (Autonomist and Competition) and only one of the other three variables at a time. When doing this, Weak appears significant ($p < .1$ one-tailed, Model 2), but in the models including Transition or Unemployment (not shown), these variables are not significant. Thus, Model 2 shows that Autonomist, Competition, and Weak have the predicted effect even if there is an omitted variable not correlated with the regressors and which affects each union differently.

[Table 2]

Models 3 and 4 show that when we control for fixed effects by union Autonomist still has a positive effect over Strike.²⁹ Unemployment appears slightly significant in Model 3, but after eliminating the non-significant variables (Model 4), only Autonomist and Weak remain significant, with the predicted effect.³⁰ Unlike in the random effects Model 2, Competition does not appear as significant. This may be because some unions' unobserved characteristics are correlated with both Strike and Competition, but it is probably because the random effects model is more adequate.³¹

Models 5 and 6 show probit regressions with instrumental variables—including only

significant variables in Model 6. The positive effect of Autonomist is strong and significant and the instruments Honeymoon, Bonus, and Indirect have the predicted negative effect over Autonomist. This and the non-significant *rho* indicate that the effect of Autonomist over strike is not due to endogeneity.

The non-significant coefficients of Competition and Privatize in the first stage of Model 5 also indicate that the coding of Autonomist avoids the possible measure problem of simply indicating autonomist stances taken as a response to leadership competition or privatization attempts.

These models return some unexpected results as well. Indirect has the predicted negative effect in the first step, yet, curiously, in the second step it has a significant positive effect over Strike, contrary to political exchange theory's prediction. The source of this positive effect is unclear. Unemployment has a significant effect over Autonomist in the first stage in Model 5. However, since there is no theory to explain this and its effect is not significant in a model with only significant variables (results not shown), the result may be due to sampling error.

Overall, we see that the only variables that remain significant in all three analyses—random effects, fixed effects, and IV—are Autonomist and Weak. Competition is also likely to have a relevant effect, given its significance in the random Model 2—probably more adequate than model 4—and in Model 6.

QUALITATIVE ANALYSIS

Let us now turn to qualitative data to illustrate more concretely how the significant independent variables— Autonomist, Weak, and Competition—contribute to the occurrence of strikes.³²

Autonomist Leadership (and Weakness)

Raúl de la Puente's (Socialist) leadership of ministries' civil servants union, ANEF, is a good

example for understanding why autonomist leaders strike more than non-autonomist leaders, and why they tend to strike particularly when their union is not weak. His disappointment with the experience of the first years of transition to democracy pushed him towards an autonomist stance of militancy and a disposition to strike against government allies. He acknowledges that, in 1990, they “left in the hands of the parties the representation of workers that unions held during the fight against Pinochet [in the 1980s].” Yet, he adds, by the mid 1990s he began to see this as “mistaken” (interview with author), and moved towards an autonomist stance. In 1996, he abandoned the alliance with the Christian Democrats in the union and since then ran most elections in the same list with Communists, while his party often endorsed another list, one with all the *Concertación* coalition’s parties and more loyal to the government. His move was motivated by a change in his view of the government’s representation of workers and cannot be explained as a survival strategy, since he did not face strong competition from the Communists and, in fact, has maintained the presidency of the union ever since.

De la Puente’s split from the *Concertación*’s electoral lists—frequently allying with the Communist opposition—also reflects an attitude towards the government that notably differs from that of his non-autonomist predecessors in ANEF, both in discourse and militant action. De la Puente sees strikes as the only way to gain better concessions (interview with author) and archival sources show ANEF has achieved additional wage increases after striking almost every year. Whenever de la Puente speaks in the press about the bargaining process, he is confronting and criticizing the government. In contrast, the preceding president, José Fuentes (Christian Democrat), honored and praised his governmental counterpart, the Treasury Minister (*El Mercurio* 1995b, 2000). Fuentes’s friendliness with the government translated into a policy of non-militancy, whereby the single strike under his presidency lasted for only an hour. Similarly,

another former non-autonomist president of ANEF, Milenko Mihovilovic (Christian Democrat), criticized the government for rewarding militant unions rather than moderate ones like his (*El Mercurio* 1993a). Interviews with Ricardo Barrenechea and Osvaldo Verdugo (Christian Democrats) confirm non-autonomist leaders' disposition against militancy. They argued that dialogue was usually more effective than striking—yet, in fact, teachers' received large salary increase offers after long strikes opposed by Verdugo (Espinoza 2001). They added that the government had an interest in workers and the country, so union members should be responsible citizens when considering striking against the government (interviews with authors). In sum, autonomist leaders' dispositions towards conflict significantly differ from those of their more moderate colleagues.

Why does the government not avoid strikes led by autonomist leaders such as de la Puente? The government expects to increase wages only about as much as the inflation rate, while de la Puente, unlike non-autonomist leaders, demands additional raises for increased productivity, economic growth, and compensation for previous losses. The distance between their expectations is huge. If the government granted concessions before a strike for which there was organizational capacity, they would hardly be considered sufficient and union would probably still strike to press for further concessions. De la Puente could not easily call for moderation in these cases, not only because Communist leaders would press for more and criticize him, severing his alliance, but because he gained his political capital through a discourse in favor of a militant strategy—as opposed to his predecessors, who won elections with a discourse of moderation. Having one or two relatively short illegal strikes seems to allow ministries' workers to test their strength and adjust their expectations about what they can gain³³—and the government generally responds with some sort of increase. Thus, by publicly defending an autonomist and militant

discourse, de la Puente creates the conditions that make it very difficult for the government to avoid strikes.

Yet autonomist leaders do not always encouraged strikes. Notably, when ANEF struck but neither immediately gained concessions nor had the strength to continue striking, the workers' morale became low. In this case, de la Puente would not encourage strikes the following year.³⁴ To put it in simple numbers: when autonomist leaders were not weak, they struck 75 per cent of the times, but they struck only 11.1 per cent of the times when they were weak—in contrast, non-autonomist leaders' strike rates were 15.6 per cent and 10 per cent, respectively, suggesting weakness discourages autonomist leaders from striking, but not non-autonomist leaders. Restraint may occur because autonomist leaders are avoiding failures that can cost them their posts, because workers do not feel like striking after a defeat, or both.

In sum leaders with an autonomist and militant discourse defer from their non-autonomists colleagues in their dispositions towards strikes. Autonomist leaders' defense of strike as the best means to gain concessions creates conditions that make it hard for the government to prevent strikes—at least when the union is not weak.

Leadership Competition

The Teachers' Association struck three out of the five years in which its non-autonomist Christian Democratic leader Osvaldo Verdugo faced strong competition from Communist leader Jorge Pavez. This makes it a good case to understand how competition leads to strikes.

Contrary to leadership survival theory's prediction, Verdugo did not usually support strikes when facing competition. Instead, he strived to avoid them or at least shorten them (Interview with author, see also *El Mercurio* 1995a). When strikes occurred (1991, 1993, and 1994), they did so against his will, because Pavez managed to gain support from some unaffiliated and

government-allied leaders in the Socialist Party and Radical Social Democratic Party (also in the governing coalition) (*El Mercurio* 1994a, b). Furthermore, in 1993, local leaders in many regions struck without the approval of the national union (*El Mercurio* 1993b). In these cases, leadership competition triggered strikes, yet this occurred due to the mobilizing capacity of the Left and not because Verdugo used it as a “strategy for political survival” as Murillo would have predicted.³⁵ In fact, Verdugo lost control of the union because of his insistence on moderation. While this eventually cost him the role of union president, he was able to hold on to it for four years, and has continued to win other important union posts because he represents teachers that are not fond of militancy. It is unlikely that this strategy was simply due to bad decision-making and thus an outlier. While there are few cases of competition in my dataset to generalize from them, a similar decision also cost Christian Democrat Manuel Bustos the presidency of the Chilean national trade union center (CUT).

To conclude: when facing strong competition, non-autonomist leaders prefer to assume the political costs of preventing strikes to fulfill programmatic or partisan interests. By doing this, they still maintain support from their more moderate constituency.

Explaining Autonomist Leadership

Why do autonomist leaders emerge when the union has direct elections? Political exchange theory’s explanation—that would-be-loyal leaders are pressed by the rank-and-file to betray their allies in government against their will—does not seem plausible. This would be inconsistent with autonomist leaders’ split from the governing coalition’s list in union elections—thus losing part of their base—and their alliances with Communists—which are not explained by competition because autonomist presidents carry more votes than Communists.

Direct elections seem to promote autonomist leadership because they autonomist leaders to

displace leaders who appear to favor the government over workers' interests. However, leaders elected indirectly face no costs for prioritizing moderation or loyalty to the government. For instance, Raimundo Espinoza has managed to win indirect national elections in the copper workers' union FTC since 1993, even when he comes in fourth or fifth in his local's elections. What indirectly elected leaders need to worry about is securing support from other plant-level leaders that elect them. This is sometimes aided by the government's co-optation of some local leaders to support moderation. It is plausible that resources obtained from leadership, including bonuses make aid this process as well. All this makes it more difficult for autonomist leaders to become presidents in unions with indirect elections.

How does the "honeymoon" period affect autonomist leadership? Autonomist leaders did not emerge immediately in all unions with direct elections. In the case of ministries and port workers, some leaders came to change their views on union-party relations after a few years of Socialist-Christian Democratic administration. Some leaders believed that the new government would realize the workers' demands, especially given their important role in the struggle against the dictatorship (interview with De la Puente). Others believed that workers' moderation was needed during the transition to democracy (interview with Carlos Garrido).³⁶ In 1991, this idea was widely shared by 79 per cent of the less critical or radical plant-level union leaders in the coalition, notably those who believed that the economic system was rather just; yet, it was shared only by 46 per cent of those who thought that the system was rather unjust (Frank 1995:407). Some Socialist teachers, who ran in the same list with Verdugo (Christian Democrat), supported the 1991 teachers' strike, against Verdugo's will. Thus, leaders with autonomist stances existed in the early post-authoritarian period, although they were fewer than in the late 1990s and they did not head national unions.

As expectations were disappointed, those who had believed in moderation came to believe that they had to confront the government to achieve their demands (interviews with de la Puente and Garrido). They broke their alliances with other union leaders in their parties, making their autonomist stances more evident. This occurred well before anybody considered democracy stabilized, with Pinochet still as Commander in Chief of the army until 1998 and some major crises when the military's interests were threatened (see Appendix B). While the transition may have contributed to preventing the emergence of autonomist leaders, its effect was much shorter than predicted by political opportunity theories. Most importantly, what made many leaders change their views around 1994-1995 was not the stabilization of democracy, but the government's disappointment of their expectations, including unsatisfactory labor reforms in 1991 and 1994 (see Appendix B)—in other words, the end of the honeymoon.

Political exchange theorists may argue against my interpretation. They could claim that directly elected leaders defend an autonomist discourse and strike because they have to respond to the militant rank-and-file, even if they know moderation is more rational. The direction of causality would be the same, but the rationale would be different. Yet, if this were the case, directly elected leaders who maintain the coalition or stay on its moderate faction, like Verdugo, should push for strikes—but they did not. Most importantly, there is no reason why leaders who do not differ ideologically would compete against the moderate faction of their partisan coalition, where they could have more votes on their list. They should rather try to maintain the coalition's unity to prevent Communist leaders from gaining enough following to strike. Correspondingly, in the statistical analysis, Indirect should have a statistically significant effect even if we include Autonomist, but it does not. In sum, the data does not support political exchange theory and suggests that indirect elections only affect strikes through making the emergence of autonomist

leaders more likely.

LEADERS' IDEOLOGY AND STRIKES IN OTHER COUNTRIES

How are we to make sense of this evidence in the light of previous works that support a variety of rational choice explanations of strikes against government allies?

First, the theory is more likely to be suited for cases of polarized labor movements. These cases hardly been discussed in systematic comparisons, but some analysts' interpretations stress the strength of these leaders' autonomist dispositions and their distancing from the party's line when it has not coincided with their more "workerist" positions (Burgess 2004; Daley and Vale 1992; Deppe et al. 1978; Frías 1995; Lavau 1978; Ross 1975; Weitz 1975).

Second, evidence for rational choice theories from other countries has major weaknesses, particularly when it comes to evaluate it in respect to the ideological theory of strikes. Political exchange and political process theories have not been analyzed using systematic comparisons of unions negotiating with partisan allies in government (Fishman 1990; Frank 1995, 2002; Nelson 1991; Pizzorno 1978; Regini 1984; Valenzuela 1989; Webster 1998). Most importantly, qualitative or quantitative systematic comparisons in other countries, either with polarized labor movements or not, simply omit the relevant variable from the analysis (Madrid 2003; Murillo 2001).³⁷ Furthermore, this omission can make non-significant variables appear as significant—had I omitted the variable Autonomist from the analysis, Unemployment and Transition would have misleadingly appeared as significant ($p < .05$, and $.1$, respectively, in random effects regression, and $p < .1$ and $.05$, respectively, in fixed effects regression, one-tailed tests).

More striking is the fact that Murillo's evidence seems to suggest that autonomist leaders emerged in Argentina and Venezuela and they pushed some of the strikes she curiously explains as a response to competition. For instance, strikes of Argentine telephone workers were not led

by previously loyal leaders facing competition, but by a populist faction that competed against the loyal leadership in the capital's local (pp.159-60).

This also seems to support my interpretation of the effect of leadership competition over strikes as a push by opposition and autonomist leaders rather than a survival strategy of would-be-loyal leaders—at least for some cases. Beyond the case of autonomist locals pushing for strikes in Argentina, Murillo also mentions that militancy of Mexican autoworkers and Venezuelan teachers were largely led by leaders linked to the opposition (pp.83, 116). Murillo mentions this pull from opposition as something that motivates government-allied leaders to strike as well, but it was not the case in Mexico and the number of strikes led by government-allied unions or locals in Venezuela is unclear. The reason she downplays this may be that opposition strikes were not the dominant pattern in her data. Yet, these cases suggest that we should carefully distinguish the three very distinct ways in which competition can induce strikes beyond the Chilean case: as a rational choice for leadership survival, as an ideological choice of autonomist leaders, or as a push from stronger opposition leaders.

Murillo's cases also show that some leaders also opposed militancy even when their posts were at risk of losing their posts. For instance, the president of the electricity workers' union signed an agreement in 1993 and lost the election to an independent militant leader the same year. It is hard to imagine that this government-allied leader did not know he was risking his post with that decision but that he maintained loyalty anyways. The same applies to Buenos Aires telecommunication workers. Most likely leaders could have foreseen competition before losing elections this, but they preferred to withdraw from striking. Furthermore, even after losing the capital's local, the moderate leadership of the Argentine telecommunications workers did not oppose privatization. Cases like these may have been common, but they are not accounted for by

Murillo's coding. This is consistent with my interpretation that leaders like Verdugo prioritize moderation over their post when facing competition because of their non-autonomist dispositions.

Finally, Murillo's evidence does not really show that one variable, competition, explains variation in 89 per cent of the cases, as she suggests. These results are inflated by methodological decisions. Murillo's coding does not capture absolute militancy but variations between the two periods she observes—for instance, workers who struck rarely or not at all, such as Mexican electricity workers, are coded as militant, while unions like that of Venezuelan oil workers, who struck two out of three years, are coded as non-militant. Thus, her findings suggest that changes in competition increase or decrease militancy within a given union, but not that they explain almost all variations in militancy across unions as she infers. Variations across unions should be explained by additional variables. This more moderate conclusion is also consistent with my findings and my theory.

In sum, while my findings are more likely to apply to countries with polarized labor movements, data about other Latin American countries is not inconsistent with my theory. Moreover, such data suggest that strikes against partisan allies in other countries may also be explained by the emergence of autonomist leaders. This possibility should be more systematically evaluated by further research in countries with various types of labor movements.

CONCLUSIONS

This article proposes an ideological theory of militancy against partisan allies in government. I have argued that the leader's ideology vis-à-vis the movement's autonomy and militant tactics explain many of such strikes, especially in countries with a "polarized" labor movement—i.e., politicized and divided, common in Latin America and Southern Europe. I maintain that, on the

one hand, leaders who embrace an autonomist and militant ideology tend to strike because they see strikes as the main means to achieve concessions when the union is sufficiently strong; on the other hand, leaders who believe in moderation and the party's representation of workers tend to avoid strikes against partisan allies, even when this can cost them their leadership. Statistical and qualitative analysis of six Chilean unions through eighteen years support the theory. A brief re-analysis of secondary data suggests that the theory may apply to other countries as well, including those with a corporatist tradition, such as Argentina and Venezuela, although more research is needed to assess this possibility.

The findings also contradict existing theories of strikes against partisan allies, which are based on rational choice assumptions. First, there was no support for political exchange theory's prediction that leaders who are isolated from their bases do not strike because moderation returns more long-term benefits than the non-rational rank-and-file can see. Rather, these leaders did not strike because they could be co-opted. Second, against leadership survival theory's prediction, non-autonomist leaders facing strong competition opposed strikes even when this would clearly cost them their posts. Competition induced strikes, but it was because Communists were able to get support from autonomist leaders, against the will of the Christian Democratic union president. Third, contra political process theories, the period of stabilization of democracy had no significant effect over strikes. Although some leaders exercised moderation in the early post-authoritarian period, autonomist leaders broke with the coalition and led strikes when democracy was still unstable. Finally, the hypotheses of economic cost theories were not confirmed: neither privatization nor unemployment had a significant effect over strikes. In fact, privatization attempts were rarely resisted. The only rational choice prediction supported by the data was that unions strike less when they are weak. It is unclear if this was leadership survival strategy to

avoid responsibility for a failure or a response of workers' limited expectations, morale, or organizational capacity—the latter would be consonant with resource mobilization theory.

This is not to say that militancy and restraint are purely ideological, nor does it imply that institutions and incentives do not matter. Rather, I have argued that their effect is mediated by leaders' ideology. Institutions—particularly electoral systems—matter insofar as they affect the possibility of autonomist fractions to lead or influence unions. Similarly, organizational constraints on strikes may be evaluated rationally by leaders, but their decision about which course of action to pursue depends on their ideology vis-à-vis labor's autonomy and militancy: for autonomist leaders, strikes are the best tactic when the union is strong; for non-autonomist leaders, strikes should generally be avoided, regardless of their possible effectiveness and the union's strength. Finally, the political costs of striking during the transition to democracy convince only some leaders to refrain from striking and only while their expectations about the coalition's government are not largely disappointed; other leaders do not believe that labor should sacrifice its interests during the transition period or that striking actually threatens the stability of democracy. Put shortly, in countries like Chile, the incentives that determine strikes according to rational choice theories only have an indirect effect—if any—mediated by the leaders' ideology.

The focus of this study on one country prevents us from knowing whether the theory holds true in other countries and, if so, under what conditions. Nonetheless, there are good reasons to believe that it holds for other countries in the region, both with “polarized” and “corporatist” labor movements. Yet, this remains to be addressed by future research. Similarly, the findings about labor militancy may not be extensible to other movements linked to parties, such as urban movements, for which rational choice approaches have been used to explain restraint (Hipsher

1996). Future research should consider this possibility.

My findings have important implications for the study of social movements and governance and political economy. Social movements studies need not only pay more attention to the relationship between ideology and movement strategies, as Walder (2009) argued in a recent review; they must specifically consider the importance of ideology in the choices of those frequently treated as rational decision-makers: party members leading movements. Additionally, the effect of direct elections in promoting the election of autonomist and militant leaders should be taken seriously by students of unions and other movements risking cooptation. For studies of governance and political economy, the findings indicate that whether a government can expect its allies in social movements to restraint from militant tactics depends not only on the incentives for or against militancy; restraint depends largely on the leaders' ideologies and whether they are convinced that moderation is necessary—for instance, after authoritarianism. Leaders' evaluations may change in time without regards for actual political opportunities. This occurred when *some* Socialist leaders came to see moderation as inadequate, not because an authoritarian backlash was no longer a threat, but because they and their constituencies were disappointed with the meager results of moderation. This may help should also help us understand the breakups or splintering of unions and parties, as has occurred in Spain Brazil.

TABLE 1. Summary of Variables' Coding, Distributions, and Selected Correlations

Variable	Description	Coding for 1 (presence of condition)	Mean	Strike's ρ^c	Autonomist's ρ^c
Strike	Significant strike	The majority of at least one local union struck for one day or more. ^a	.22		0.35***
Indirect	Indirect election of union president	President did not run as an individual or on a list voted for by the rank-and-file.	.63	-0.29**	-0.63***
Competition	Leadership competition	Last term before the defeat of the incumbent's list, except in the case of surprise defeat reported by interviewee; or newspaper reports on intense competition. ^b	.09	0.22*	-0.09
Weak	Weak union	Union represents small portion of labor power; union struck during the last negotiation and was defeated.	.34	-0.20*	0.11
Transition	Period of stabilization of democracy	Years in which General Pinochet was Commander in Chief of the Army or in Senate (1990-1998).	.23	-0.04	-0.26**
Privatize	Privatization attempt	Attempt to change ownership or control of public enterprise by the executive with support in congress.	.10	0.00	-0.02
Unemployment	Unemployment rate	Year average of monthly unemployment rate (continuous variable)	8.09	-.06	.06
Autonomist	Union president is an autonomist leader	Union president was elected on a list that ran against a list of the government coalition's parties.	.24	0.35***	
Bonus	Union president receives high bonuses	Union president receives high bonuses as member of the board of directors of the corresponding public enterprise.	.35	-0.15	-0.42***
Honeymoon	First years of union-allied government	First administration of Socialist-Social Democratic-Christian Democratic coalition (1990-1993).	.23	-0.09	-0.31**

Notes: $N=86$. Mean is proportion of cases with presence of condition.

^a For the union of ministries' civil servants (ANEF), outcomes of independent bargaining processes of its hundreds of locals are not considered to reduce excessive complexity—as a reference, the other unions only have between four and fifteen locals.

^b Incumbency is assigned to the president for the majority of the year. In all cases it coincides with the leader at the moment of year's major bargaining process, except for ANEF 1996.

^c Spearman's ρ bivariate correlation. † $p < .1$; * $p < .05$; ** $p < .01$; *** $p < .001$. One-tailed significance test indicated for variables with hypothesized correlation (independent variables in relation to Strike and instrumental variables in relation to Autonomist); two-tailed significance test indicated for variables without hypothesized correlation.

TABLE 2. Coefficients for Regressions Predicting Strike (Robust Standard Errors in Parenthesis)

	Random Effects Logit				Fixed Effects OLS ^a				IV Probit ^b			
	Model 1		Model 2		Model 3		Model 4		Model 5		Model 6	
Autonomist	2.633**	(.965)	2.384**	(.876)	.581***	(.175)	.617***	(.160)	3.056***	(.713)	2.925***	(.815)
Indirect	.315	(1.053)			.009	(.294)			1.391†	(.804)	1.371*	(.668)
Competition	2.346**	(.809)	1.784*	(.849)	.213	(.241)			1.606**	(.615)	1.649**	(.629)
Weak	-2.417†	(1.706)	-1.738†	(1.330)	-.394*	(.196)	-.417*	(.191)	-1.286†	(.823)	-1.097*	(.639)
Transition	-.885†	(.650)			-.102	(.115)			.108	(.388)		
Privatize	1.749	(2.573)			.018	(.166)			.496	(1.143)		
Unemployment	-.375†	(.267)			-.058†	(.042)	-.031	(.029)	-.090	(.125)		
Intercept	1.239	(1.901)	-1.863	(.742)	.847†	(.495)	.367**	(.121)	-1.565	(1.246)	-2.224***	(.603)
R^2 or Pseudo R^2	.268		.226		.364		.341					
<i>First Stage</i>												
Honeymoon									-.221***	(.060)	-.325*	(.155)
Bonus									-.115	(.121)	-.138†	(.092)
Indirect									-.567***	(.151)	-.549***	(.133)
Competition									-.196	(.211)	-.244	(.208)
Weak									.119	(.104)	.123	(.081)
Transition									-.254	(.198)		
Privatize									.086	(.069)		
Unemployment									-.054*	(.024)		
Intercept									1.232***	(.286)	.694***	(.068)
Wald χ^2 or F	—		7.65†		4.24***		5.19***		3.29†		31.82***	
Rho (ρ)									-.521	(.232)	-.458	(.275)

Notes: $N=86$. † $p < .1$; * $p < .05$; ** $p < .01$; *** $p < .001$. One-tailed tests are used when the hypothesis posited has with clear directional claims and the coefficient's sign coincides with the hypothesis. Two-tailed test is used for all other cases. Std. errors adjusted for 6 clusters in union in logit and probit models.

^a Unions' coefficients not reported. Teachers' union omitted because of collinearity. Unions with significant negative effects in relation to reference union (copper workers) are oil ($p < .01$, two-tailed, Models 3 and 4), ministries' ($p < .05$, two-tailed, Model 4), and health ($p < .1$, two-tailed, Model 4) workers' unions.

^b Instrumented variable: Autonomist. Instruments: Indirect, Honeymoon, Bonus.

¹ To my knowledge, only three empirical studies touch on union militancy against government allies considering non-rational elements such as ideologies, identities, and culture (Deppe et al. 1978; Fishman 1990; Frank 1995). Unfortunately, these studies, largely ignored by the scholarship on the subject, do not systematically test the effects that ideology has on strikes.

² Another very influential version of the theory contends that labor's power within the polity must first be secure and organizationally united in order to have political exchange (Korpi and Shalev 1979). Since the first condition, security, was conceived of in the context of stable democracies and the second condition, organizational unity, is meant to explain cross-national variation, this version does not apply to explain variation within the Chilean case, which is my empirical concern.

³ Additionally, Pizzorno's theory had a non-rational choice dimension, stating that changes in collective identity and solidarities can induce either a wave of strike activity or a return to period of political exchange. However, this part of the theory, which was not tested empirically, has generally been overlooked by the scholarship on political exchange.

⁴ Neocorporatist theory suggests almost the same (Schmitter 1977)—its differences with political exchange theory are only relevant when focusing on national trade union centers, which are not the object here.

⁵ Astudillo Ruiz (2001) also proposes a similar theory. Burgess (2004) also suggests that union leaders will betray their partisan allies when they risk being sanctioned by workers.

⁶ Palacios-Valladares analyzes private sector unions, yet her claim is applicable to any case of leadership competition. Resource mobilization theory suggests a similar prediction with a different explanation—that they strike more when they can win and less when they are likely to

lose (Shorter and Tilly 1974). Yet, this theory does not fully apply to strikes against government allies because the theory assumes that union leaders are adversaries of management.

⁷ On the role of strikes lowering rank-and-file expectations, see Ashenfelter and Johnson (1969).

⁸ These authors stress different variables, but their classifications of various countries under democratic regimes—this article’s concern—are very similar and also consistent with other typologies (Bartolini 2000; Crouch 1993; Golden 1986; Western 1997).

⁹ In some of these countries, the classification applies only for certain historical periods. Other countries present some elements of the “polarized” type—e.g. Bolivia, Colombia, India, Paraguay.

¹⁰ The contrast here is with Communist Parties and with labor-linked parties other countries. However, some scholars have stressed that Communist union leaders have sometimes moved towards more autonomist positions (Deppe et al. 1978; Ross 1975; Weitz 1975).

¹¹ Voss and Sherman (2000:328) stress that militant experiences in other movements created a “knowledge, vision, and sense of urgency required to use confrontational strategies’ among some unions leaders in the United States.

¹² Although most parties have moderated their programs in the past decades, radicalism may still subsist.

¹³ There are some cases of autonomist militancy among Christian Democrat-dominated unions, but they seem to be caused by pushes from non-Christian Democratic leaders in the unions (Baccaro 2000:591; Deppe et al. 1978; Lavau 1978).

¹⁴ By consolidation I refer to the stabilization of democracy, not to the improvement of the general quality of democracy. In Chile this is called the period of “transition,” but should not be

confused with the last years of authoritarian rule.

¹⁵ Social democratic parties are the Party for Democracy and Radical Social Democratic Party.

¹⁶ In Chile, the equivalent to a union local is a *gremio*, *asociación*, or *sindicato*, although these names literally mean union or craft union. National Unions are called *federación*, *confederación*, or *asociación*. For simplicity, I use the English terminology, reserving the term “union” for national unions.

¹⁷ This excluded unions from the following local and often small public enterprises: water supply public utilities, Santiago’s subway, the National Aeronautic Enterprise of Chile, the House of the Coin (currency production), and the National Coal Enterprise.

¹⁸ These are the unions from the following enterprises: ChilePost (postal service), StateBank, State Railroad Enterprise, National Mining Enterprise (refines and sells minerals from small-scale producers), National Television, and *La Nación* (newspaper). The little information available may be due to lower relevance. For instance, news often report votes about elections and collective bargaining of the studied unions, regardless of whether they strike or not, but almost never in the case of the excluded unions.

¹⁹ Personal communication with Carolina Espinoza based on disaggregated data from Armstrong and Águila (2006).

²⁰ I conducted searches by the dates of strikes in the database and by keywords in *El Mercurio*, the Chilean “newspaper of record,” through LexisNexis and two of *El Mercurio’s* (2008a; 2008b) search engines. Few articles from *La Tercera* were used.

²¹ Interviewees were Roberto Alarcón (health, Socialist), Ricardo Barrenechea (oil, Christian Democrat), Raúl de la Puente (ministries, Socialist), Carlos Garrido (ports, Socialist), Eitel

Moraga (copper, Communist), and Osvaldo Verdugo (teachers, Christian Democrat). All presidents of their union or local for most of the years observed. All presidents of the union for 6-12 years at the time (average ?) except for Moraga, who was president of CUT for two years. For each union, at least one more leader was contacted but did not make himself available. Others were impossible to reach because of lack of contact information. All interviews were conducted by phone from the United States in May and June of 2008, lasting between forty and ninety minutes. Three interviewees were interviewed twice.

²² The detailed list of archival documents is available upon request.

²³ Christian Democrat leaders have also splintered from the coalition, sometimes building alliances with Communists against Socialists, but have not won the presidency of national unions like this (interview with Moraga; personal communication with Darío Quiroga, Communist advisor to the union of subcontracted copper workers, CTC).

²⁴ Barton places the end of the transition in 2001, when the constitution was reformed, but this has no relevance as a threat for union behavior. In any case, including 1999 or 2000 in the analysis returns almost the same results, except that *Transition* appears significant in the random effects model.

²⁵ See note 3 above for the issues with Pizzorno's hypothesis on the effect of solidarity changes over strike waves.

²⁶ These reactions are more or less explicitly suggested in case studies in Chile, France, Spain, and South Africa (Burgess 2004; Daley and Vale 1992; Frank 2002; Frías 1995; Wood 2002). Deppe et al. (1978) also suggest major waves of protest in France and Italy in the 1960s as a causal factor, but this does not apply to Chile for the period studied.

²⁷ Since bonuses are provided only in unions with indirect elections, *Bonus* indicates all three of McCarthy and Zald's conditions are simultaneously met.

²⁸ I report significance at the level of $p < .1$ because expecting significance at the standard level of $p < .05$ could be too demanding for such a small sample.

²⁹ The large differences between effect sizes in logit and in OLS models are less notable when using the same function (OLS or GLS) for fixed and random effects models (results not shown).

³⁰ I do not report a similar model without *Unemployment* because in this case *F* is reported as missing.

³¹ Unfortunately, the Hausman specification test cannot adjudicate between random and fixed effects models here. Hausman appears non-significant—calculated using GLS fixed and random effects regressions with the same significant coefficients because it cannot be calculated for regressions estimating robust standard errors. However, this may not be because the random effects model is more suitable but simply because the sample is too small. Nevertheless, given the small number of cases, random effects is probably more adequate (Clark and Linzer 2013).

³² Other factors appear to have induced or prevented strikes in some cases, but their effects were more idiosyncratic than systematic. Thus, I do not discuss them here.

³³ It should be noted that although making strikes illegal for some unions induces short, less costly strikes, autonomist leaders can lead longer illegal strikes, as in the healthcare workers' 24-day strike in 2006—the longest by a non-Communist public sector union since 1990.

³⁴ Interviews with author. Healthcare workers' leader Raúl Alarcón indicated the same (interview with author). This is further supported by a close look at the healthcare workers' union. Without facing competition, Alarcón led a 24-day strike in 2006 when the union was strong; but when he

did face competition, in 2000, he did not strike. Had the union been sufficiently recovered from the 1996 defeat, the Communists would have most likely pressed for a strike or lead one in 2001 when they controlled the union—as they usually did—but they did not.

³⁵ It could be argued that some of the governing coalition's leaders that supported the strikes did this for political survival. However, it seems more accurate to describe some of them as moving towards autonomist stances, particularly those who supported Pavez against Verdugo in following elections.

³⁶ In interviews, Barrenechea and Verdugo (not autonomist) also justified limiting militancy to protect democracy, but they also defended moderation in general when discussing more recent negotiations. Thus, the fears about the transitions' stability cannot be considered the reason for their moderation.

³⁷ Furthermore, studies including those of polarized labor movements do not systematically analyze variables other than their proposed relevant variables (Astudillo Ruiz 2001; Burgess 2004).

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